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Abstract
This thesis investigates the finance-growth relationship in view of the recent financial
crisis for the EU countries from 1990 to 2016. The empirical approach examines two
sub-periods before and after the crisis and employs static and dynamic panel models.
The results from the static panel approach suggest that financial development promoted
economic growth at regular times, with market sector prevailing in this positive effect.
In contrast, at stress times, financial development hindered economic activity, with the
bank sector dominating in this adverse effect. The findings of the dynamic models in the
long-run suggest a positive and significant effect of the market sector before the crisis,
while after the crisis, there is an inverse finance-growth relationship. However, the overall
results reveal that the post-crisis economic growth recovery rather weak and the financial
system has not enhanced the economic activity.
With respect to the previous literature, the present research provides new evidence on
the finance-growth nexus in view of the recent crisis, suggesting that the weakness of
the financial system to enhance economic growth exhibits high persistence eight years
after the occurrence of financial crisis and the banking system evolves significantly in a
worse way compared to the pre-crisis period. Moreover, when the financial development
is examined in conjunction with the role of fiscal policy, the findings reveal that banks
and other institutions held more government bonds to enhance the governments’ cred-
ibility not to default, and the ability of intermediaries to invest on assets was limited.
Furthermore, a significant finding in this study is that of the deposit guarantee schemes,
and the capital adequacy of banks during 2008-2009 protected depositors and promoted
the stability of the financial system which restrained the economy to permissible growth
levels thus not leading to a collapse. A further remarkable finding is that the stock market
participants during crisis periods, because of the doubt about the direction of the stock
market, are reluctant to act as investors, and thus future trading on specified securities
tends to increase as well as share prices fell.
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Chapter One
Introduction
1.1 Overview of the Research Project
This doctoral thesis forms empirical research investigating the impact of financial devel-
opment on economic growth on the face of the recent financial crisis. The research aims
to examine the role of the financial system in the economy before and after the financial
crisis. This role, in turn, illustrates how the financial system should be structured and
regulated for the recovery of the real economy after a shock and effectively deal with a
future crisis.
The study investigates the countries of the European Union (EU) during the period
1990-2016. Also, it examines three regional panels of countries to capture the different
characteristics among the EU countries. More precisely, the full sample of EU countries
is divided into three regional groups according to the background of their economy, and
geography:1 North West; Central-Eastern and Baltic; and South group.2 The advantage
of regional panels of countries is that the finance-growth relationship can be investigated
for a more homogeneous group of countries, thus capturing the panel heterogeneity, and
compare the results from the different regions.
The sampling period is selected to start in 1990, as it includes data for Central and
Eastern Europe and the Baltic States (also known as transition economies). Also, it ex-
amines two different phases of crisis periods. The first phase is from 2008 to 2016, where
the assumption is that the crisis period has not finished yet; and because the sample
finishes in 2016 the dummy variable that captures the crisis specification is defined as
continuing from 2008-2016. The second phase of the crisis period is the sub-prime crisis
1Geography affects the quality of institutions through the demand and supply side of financial develop-
ment. For instance, the production of particular agricultural products or primary goods and exploitation
of some natural resources could reduce the demand for external finance, relative to other countries at a
similar level of GDP.
2See details in Chapter 3 (List of countries Table 3.1).
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period (2008-2009), which refers to the crisis that occurred in the mortgage industry due
to borrowers being approved for loans they could not repay. For a better understanding
of the different examined periods, a graph is provided below (section 1.1, Figure 1.1).
1.2 Background of the study
Financial development is defined as the improvement in the quality of five critical financial
functions by:
• providing information about possible investments and allocating capital based on
these assessments;
• monitoring individuals and firms and exerting corporate governance after allocating
capital;
• facilitating the trading, diversification, and management of risk;
• mobilizing and pooling savings;
• easing the exchange of goods, services, and financial instruments.
The Global Financial Development Database3 is an extensive dataset of financial system
characteristics, measuring all the above functions and includes data for determinants of
financial development. Specifically, it includes measures for the size of financial insti-
tutions and markets (financial depth); the degree to which individuals can use financial
institutions and markets (access); the efficiency of financial institutions and markets in
providing financial services (efficiency); and the stability of financial institutions and mar-
kets (stability) (Levine et al., 2012). These four characteristics are measured for financial
institutions and financial markets.
The importance of the financial sector can be dated back to Schumpeter (1911), who
proposed that the increase of the financial intermediaries lowers the information and the
transaction costs. The intermediation role of the financial system links lenders to borrow-
ers, resulting in the transfer of resources to the most productive uses. However, a leading
view of economics was that financial development is beneficial for economic growth (Hicks,
1969; Goldsmith, 1969; Gurley and Shaw, 2006).
After the financial liberalization, the endogenous growth theory has increased interest
in the growth-enhancing effects of finance. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) and Greenwood
and Smith (1997) have all documented that the impact of financial development on eco-
nomic growth is positive, through savings, investment, the productivity of capital, and the
3Published by the World Bank Data
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efficient use of information. Along with improvements in theoretical research, a growing
body of literature has evolved to analyze the relationship between finance and growth us-
ing empirical methods, e.g. cross country, time series, panel data, and firm-level studies,
suggesting that higher levels of financial development are robustly related with faster rates
of economic growth (King and Levine, 1993b; Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995; Levine and
Zervos, 1996; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Levine, 1997; Rajan and Zingales, 1998;
Levine, 1999; Arestis et al., 2001) among many others. All the above studies employed
cross-sectional or time-series data, providing substantial evidence in favor of the positive
growth effects of financial development.
However, more recent studies that used panel data models arrived at a less uniform conclu-
sion. Loayza and Rancière (2006), Seetanah (2009) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg
(2008) showed that there is a positive association between financial development and
growth, whereas Wu et al. (2010) Arcand et al. (2015), Samargandi et al. (2015) have
demonstrated that the financial sector has a negative effect on growth. Also, researchers
have recently suggested that financial development is beneficial up to a specific point,
after which hinders economic activity (Checherita-Westphalb and Rother, 2012; Law and
Singh, 2014; Arcand et al., 2015). This indicates a non-linear relationship between finan-
cial development and economic growth, implying that the more rapid the development of
the financial system, the slower the growth of the economy.
1.3 Motivation for the research
By and large, researchers have demonstrated a positive relationship between financial de-
velopment and economic growth. In general, they suggest that a well-developed financial
system is growth-enhancing. Also, before 2008, the focus in many studies was on the de-
terminants or sources of financial development, rather than the financegrowth link itself.
Furthermore, the period from 1994 to 2008 was characterized as a period of euphoria (see
Figure 1.1) where the financial liberalization, the higher economic integration, and the
low-interest rates led to a credit boom and a rise of private demand. The latter included
a rise in imports and created trade deficits. Alesina et al. (2005) noted that increasing
integration leads to more cross-country spillover effects,4 and hence there is a need for
international cooperation.
4Spillover effect refers to the impact that events the economy of one nation can have on the economies
of other nations. The term is usually applied to the negative impact that a national event has on other
parts of the world.
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Figure 1.1: The mean of GDP growth rate over the period 1990-2016.
Even though the global financial crisis did not originate from Europe, it spread rapidly
and remained there, affected the economic stability, exposing the fragilities and gaps in
the EU’s financial system. More precisely, in 2008 and 2009 there is a sharp drop in the
growth rate to 6% for the EU countries, and by the end of 2016, the economic growth
is moving slightly less than 2%. This is an indication that the total economic activity
in Europe had not yet fully recovered by the end of 2016. Also, after 2008, many Eu-
ropean Union (EU) countries presented unsustainable public debts, and unpopular fiscal
measures were undertaken by policymakers to reduce the budget deficit and stabilise the
debt. The effectiveness of liberalisation in the financial sector was questioned across fi-
nancially developed and stable economies such as those in the EU. While it is clear that
the finance relationship between financial development and growth is positive, there are
still questions regarding the role, and the contribution of the financial system to economic
activity in the pre- and after-crisis periods. Therefore, the initial motivation was relied on
the weaknesses of the financial system to stimulate the economy of the EU countries. In
addition to that, the severe decline in the activity of the real sector indicates the need for
both policymakers and economists to investigate the finance-growth relationship before
and after the crisis.
Furthermore, in many EU countries, the infrastructure to cope with a financial crisis
was inadequate or non-existent. Despite the financial integration achieved through coor-
dination and harmonization of the national legislation of the member states, significant
heterogeneities were exhibited after the recent crisis. This highlights the significance of
the research into what is essential to the development of the financial sector and what is
the key for policymakers to develop a sound financial system and follow prudent economic
policy. Also, it motivates the researcher to investigate different groups of countries, being
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more homogeneous, according to their economic background and geography as well.
A drawback related to the existing literature is that many studies used cross-sectional
data and could not analyze the changes of variables over time as well as the differences in
variables between countries, thus not helping to estimate the causal effects. After 2000,
there is a considerable number of studies investigating the finance-growth relationship
using panel data and employing standard and dynamic panel models. However, the sam-
ple period considered in the majority of these studies does not exceed the crisis period
(2008-2009); and no consideration has been given so far, of which conventional measures
of financial development led to economic growth across the EU countries, before and after
the recent financial crisis. This motivates the current thesis to apply the techniques that
enable doing empirical investigations in standard and dynamic panel framework.
Apart from the finance-growth relationship before and after the crisis; a further issue
relates the fact that in the existing studies, the structure of the financial sector, whether
it constitutes a bank-or-market based financial system has not received considerable at-
tention among researchers. However, the investigation for the impact of financial bank
and stock market sectors development on economic growth provides ambiguous results.
In an earlier study, Levine (2002); Beck and Levine (2004) documented that bank-based
financial systems promote faster economic growth than market-based financial systems in
the short-term that are at an early stage of development. Also, Allen et al. (2012) argued
that the banking system plays a crucial role in the growth process, while Narayan and
Narayan (2013) suggested that the role of the stock market is more significant than the
banking sector. Therefore, the role of financial structure for the finance-growth associa-
tion requires further investigation and is essential to identify which countries are either
bank or market based or both.
However, for the majority of the existing studies, the prime objective was to investi-
gate the relationship between financial development and economic growth, and therefore,
either monetary aggregates (such as liquid liabilities to capture the overall size of the
financial sector) or credit to private sector (that enables the utilization of funds and their
allocation to productive activities) were used. Stock market capitalization was also widely
used as an alternative proxy of financial development rather than an indicator of the stock
market. This motivates the thesis to undertake a new investigation in order to establish
whether the behavior of two sectors of the economy, namely the banking sector and the
market sector, have a positive or negative effect economic growth before and after the
crisis.5
5Allen et al. (2012) as well as Law and Singh (2014) suggested for further research to examine the
link between the financial structure and the recovery of the real economy after a financial crisis as well
5
1.4 Objectives of the research
The research aims to investigate the effect of financial development on economic growth
before and after the recent crisis through a systematic analysis of the literature followed by
the contact of an in-depth case study of the EU countries. Specifically, the study focuses
on uncovering how financial development affects economic growth during the pre-and
after-crisis period, and the aim was achieved through the following specific objectives:
1. To analyze how the financial development affected the economic growth based on a
review of the literature.
2. To critically review and evaluate the literature on the various econometric methods
employed for the finance-growth relationship.
3. To develop the appropriate econometric models (static and dynamic) based on the
type of dataset and examine the finance-growth relationship before and after the
crisis.
4. To investigate the role of the financial structure for the economy on the face of the
crisis periods and evaluate the diverse country characteristics of the regions in the
EU.
5. To refine the finance-growth relationship, because of the insights derived from em-
pirical research as a part of original contribution to knowledge.
1.5 Contribution to the research
This research will help to generate policy insights for policymakers, regulators, and in-
vestors. The work is a timely contribution to policy because the EU governments are
currently developing new regulatory reforms to build a safer financial system. The thesis
focuses on the behavior of two sectors during the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods, as well
as for the short and long-term, which has not been addressed in the existing literature.
The contribution to the knowledge provides important policy implications for reforms
need to put forward in order to enforce the financial system’s stability.
Also, the investigation of the three different regional groups provides new insights into the
panel heterogeneity in a group of countries that implement the same regulations. If there
is clear evidence that more financial banking or stock market development promotes or
hinders economic activity, then policymakers should propose new regulations accordingly.
Furthermore, the findings have important implications for investors, as the higher degree
as the critical role of equity markets.
6
of financial integration in one group of countries means that this place might be more
attractive for investments.
The thesis also contributes to the empirical literature through the sub-studies to the
following points:
1. The first study extends the literature regarding the relationship between financial
development and economic growth through a comparative approach on the face of
the recent financial crisis in a group of countries that implement the same regulations
for the financial sector.
2. The second study extends the literature providing an investigation of the finance-
growth relationship using two new aggregate indices, one for the banking sector and
one for the stock market. It contributes to the knowledge by considering which
sector prevails in any positive or negative impact on economic growth before and
after the crisis. It also extends the literature taking into account the response of both
financial sectors to the quality of fiscal policy, both crisis periods being considered.
3. Both studies extend the literature by investigating the effect of financial development
on economic growth in two phases of crisis periods; the sub-prime crisis period, which
represents the finance-growth association two years (2008-2009) after the crisis; and
the ongoing crisis period, which represents the finance-growth association eight years
after the crisis (2008-2016).
4. The third study extends the literature exploring the dynamic relationship between
financial development on the face of the crisis employing the panel ARDL models
with two indices for the financial system. It contributes to the knowledge by con-
sidering of which sector dominates in any positive or negative effect on economic
growth in the short-run (one year-according to the lags of the estimated models)
and the long-run, before and after the crisis.
5. All studies extend the literature investigating three different regional groups, thus
capturing country heterogeneities in the EU and providing new insights into their
financial structure.
1.6 Structure of the research
The structure of thesis is relied on six chapters, including an introduction and a conclu-
sion. The introduction and the conclusion help to present the work as a coherent body of
research. The introductory chapter provides an overview of the research, the background
of the study, the motivation, the aim and objectives as well as the contribution. The
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intermediate chapters have been written to facilitate each of the five key objectives of the
thesis. The concluding chapter summarises how the overarching aim of the thesis was
achieved.
Chapter one presents an overview of the thesis, as well as the overarching aim and
objectives of this research.
Chapter two looks at empirical studies that explored the relationship between financial
development and economic growth. The analysis focuses on the type of data and the
econometric methods used in the studies as well as on the hypothesis of supporting the
view that financial development had a positive or negative effect on economic growth.
The chapter concludes by critically reviewing and evaluating the methodology and the
results of the finance-growth relationship.
Chapter three describes the dataset in detail, including its source, format, and char-
acteristics. Also, figures and combined graphs of all countries are presented with further
explanations of their characteristics and describing any trends over time.
Chapter Four discusses the methodological framework of this thesis. It describes all the
econometric techniques used to estimate the parameters.
Chapter Five presents the empirical results revolving around three empirical sub-studies
concerning the finance-growth relationship in view of the financial crisis. The first section
provides the results from a preliminary analysis of data including descriptive statistics,
correlation analysis, stationarity tests as well as Hausman and cross-sectional dependent
tests. The model specifications, the empirical results and the discussion of results are
provided in each of these sub-studies.
Study one. The first study of chapter five aims to explore the relationship between
financial development and economic growth on the face of the recent financial crisis, using
a panel dataset of 26 European Union countries over the period 1990-2016. The empirical
approach employed panel country-fixed effects models and used multiplicative dummies
to compare two sub-periods, namely the regular or normal periods and the crisis periods.
Finally, the study provides an investigation for three regional groups of countries (as
defined in the first section) to capture the country heterogeneity in the EU.
Study two. The second study of chapter five aims to examine the finance-growth
relationship across EU countries using the same dataset of the previous study. The prin-
cipal component analysis is employed to produce two new aggregate indices, one for the
banking sector and one for the stock market sector and capture the overall size of both
sectors. Similarly to the previous study panel, data regressions are employed using multi-
plicative dummies to compare the normal and crisis periods. Next, the response of banks
and markets to the quality of fiscal policy is investigated, which plays an essential role in
the current and future directions in economic growth. Similarly to the previous study the
finance-growth relationship for the three regional groups of countries is investigated.
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Study three. The third study of chapter five aims to examine the dynamic effect
of financial development on economic growth before and after the financial crisis using
the indices of the bank and stock market sectors. The empirical approach employed panel
cointegration tests to examine the existence of a long-run equilibrium between financial
bank sector and stock market development. Next, the error-correction based models were
employed for analyzing dynamic heterogeneous panel to examine the short and long-run
effects of financial development on economic growth for the pre-crisis and the ongoing
crisis periods. Similarly to the previous study three regional groups of countries were
investigated.
Chapter six summarises and discusses the main findings of the thesis. It lays forth
the empirical contributions of the work and presents the policy implications. Finally, it
presents areas for future research.
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Chapter Two
Literature review
2.1 Introduction
This chapter provides both a theoretical and empirical review of the relationship between
financial development and economic growth. First, it describes the theoretical background
of economic growth and presents the neoclassical and endogenous growth models. Second,
it presents the theoretical framework of economic development published by McKinnon
(1973) containing models in which financial liberalisation and development accelerate the
rate of economic growth. Third, the chapter provides an in-depth review of the research
of the finance-growth association.
The research on the role of financial development in growth can be traced at least to
Bagehot (1873) who argued that well-organized capital markets in England enhanced re-
source allocation towards more productive investments. Studies before 1973 emphasize
the critical role of the banking system for economic growth in mobilizing savings and en-
couraging investments (Schumpeter, 1911; Hicks, 1969; Goldsmith, 1969). Indeed, there
are studies of the theoretical framework before 1973 that found negative or, at best neu-
tral effects of financial development on growth (Keynes, 2018). After 1973, McKinnon
(1973) and Gurley and Shaw (1955) produced the theoretical framework which has been
formalized and extended over the last decades.
Since the publication of the theoretical framework by McKinnon (1973), the impact of
financial development on economic growth has received a considerable investigation in
the empirical literature. The survey of the empirical research primarily focuses on per-
spectives of econometric methodologies and mainly starts from the period of 1990 when
the transition economies liberalized their financial sector. In particular, this thesis iden-
tifies the methods that the authors employed according to the information given by the
collected data. There are three major types of data. First, the cross-sectional, which is
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a type of data collected for many entities (e.g., countries, firms, regions.) at the same
point in time. Second, the time-series, which is a type of data collected for one entity over
time of period using the information contained in their past value. Third, the panel data,
which include observations obtained over time of period for the same entity. Most of the
cross-sectional studies concluded that financial development positively affects economic
growth (King and Levine, 1993c; Levine and Zervos, 1996; Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995;
Levine, 1997; Azman-Saini et al., 2010), while more recent empirical studies that used
time-series or panel data models arrived at a less uniform conclusion (Arestis et al., 2001;
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Levine, 1999; Caporale et al., 2015; Samargandi et al.,
2015; Bumann et al., 2013).
In addition to the information that gives the type of data, the literature identifies the
conventional measures of financial development that are widely selected by the authors
from various sources. The variables that have received much attention in the empirical
literature are measures of the financial development and capture the size of the banking
and market sector relative to the economy. Also, the literature identifies the country
classification, which is based either on the level of development or on their level of devel-
opment as measured by per capita gross annual income. Accordingly, countries have been
grouped as developed economies, economies in transition and developing economies or
as high-income, upper-middle-income, lower-middle-income, and lower-income. Finally,
macroeconomic policy variables are examined in the literature to capture the macroeco-
nomic mismanagement and fluctuations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section two describes the theo-
retical background of economic growth and financial development, while section three
conducts an extensive survey of the literature on finance and growth.
2.2 Theoretical background
2.2.1 Economic growth
Economic growth is the annual percentage change in the National Income of a country
(Begg et al., 1994). Acemoglu (2012), argues that economic growth is one of the most
critical areas of social science and theoretical models below are the frameworks to study
and understand the potential sources of this.
2.2.1.1 Harrod-Domar Model
Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) argued in their model that economic growth depends on
the level of savings and the productivity of capital investment. According to their model,
11
the strategy is the mobilisation of savings and generation of investment to accelerate
economic growth. However, in this model, economic growth (g) is viewed as the direct
function of savings ratio (s) and an inverse function of the capital-output ratio (1/k). It
is evident in the function below that higher-income corresponds to higher saving, thus
higher investment:
g = s/k
2.2.1.2 Neoclassical Growth Model
Acemoglou (2009) reviewed the Solow growth model and argued that takes into account
the principles of the Harrod-Domar model and the fact that there will be diminishing
returns to the capital as increasing it. Also, he showed that the central element of their
theory is the notion of an aggregate production function, where technology appears sep-
arately, and the technology itself may not be constant over time. It can be written in
general form as:
Y (t) = F (K(t), L(t), A(t)),
where Y is the output of the total economy, K is capital, L is employment, t is the time
index, and A is technology.
2.2.1.3 Endogenous growth theory
Based on the Solow-Swan growth model, Romer (2012) points out that: “the only deter-
minant of income in the models other than capital is the effectiveness of labour A” (p.
72). The model involves four variables: labour L, capital K, technology A, and output
Y in a continuous set of time. There are two sectors, a goods-producing sector, which
produces real output and a research and development area, which adds to the stock of
knowledge. The output produced at time t is:
Y (t) = [(1− aK)K(t)]a[A(t)(1− aL)L(t)]1−a where 0 < a < 1
Fraction aL, of the labour force, is used in the RD sector and 1−aL in the goods-producing
sector. Similarly, the term aK, of the capital stock is used in RD and the rest 1 − aK,
in goods production. Both aL and aK are exogenous factors and constant. Aside from
1− aK and 1− aL terms and the restriction to the Cobb-Douglas form, this function is
identical to those of our earlier models.
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2.2.2 Financial development
2.2.2.1 Financial repression
After World War II, many allied countries faced large debts (also known as postwar debts),
and financial repression was a common practice to reduce their debt (Reinhart and Sbran-
cia, 2011). The idea of financial repression began with some historical precedents of Bank
of England and the U.S Federal Bank, where the governments used banks to raise funds.
Specifically, the financial repression required banks and other financial institutions to hold
more government bonds than they would, when the government had an urgent need to
issue debt. This was the case of funding the war expenditures for those two banks. In
other words, financial repression involved this period of regulatory measures requiring
banks and other financial institutions to hold government debt and impose restrictions on
international capital flows. Hence, the ability of intermediaries and consumers to invest
in assets other than for their government debt was limited.
The policy of financial repression prevailed in developing countries over the period 1970-
1980 and used this practice to generate revenues for financing public expenditures. The
urgent need to issue debt resulted from the refusal of foreigners to lend money to their do-
mestic governments. In the 1990s, substantial financial liberalization occurred, although
the degree and timing varied across countries. More precisely, in Latin America, financial
liberalization occurred in the 1970s but financial repression returned in the 1980s, with
debt crises, high inflation, and massive deficits (Dornbusch and Edwards, 1991). In East
Asia, the major countries liberalized in the 1980s, while In South Asia, financial liberal-
ization started in the early 1990s. African countries, as well as the transition economies,
turned to liberalisation in the 1990s.
Recent studies illustrate that the repression policy is most successful in liquidating debts
(Reinhart et al., 2011). Other scholars have observed that banks in the periphery countries
of the European Union (EU) have raised the holdings of their own governments’ debts
as a consequence of the recent crisis. They documented that, by the end of 2013, the
share of government debt held by the domestic banking sectors of EU countries was more
than twice that held in 2007 (Becker and Ivashina, 2017; Broner et al., 2014; Acharya and
Steffen, 2015). Chari et al. (2016), suggest that policies that allow financial institutions
to hold a small amount of their own country’s government securities may not be desirable.
Under such a policy, the EU governments undergoing austerity measures, and structural
reforms created fiscal stress and found that the best strategy is to pressure banks to hold
more government debt to enhance their credibility not to default.
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2.2.2.2 Financial liberalisation: McKinnon-Shaw 1973
From repression to liberalisation
McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) argued that the notion of financial repression refers
to policies that are a set of market regulations, and other non-market restrictions to
prevent the bank sector of an economy from functioning at their full capabilities. Also,
they argued that the outcome of repression would be low savings, high consumption, low
investments, and depressed economic growth. Their framework focused on liberalisation
of interest rate, especially in developing countries, which leads to increase the real interest
rate, as well as savings, spur investments, and eventually, drive to economic growth (see
figure 2.1 below).
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Figure 2.1: Saving and Investment under Interest rate ceilings
The diagram above illustrates the link between interest rates savings and investment.
The vertical axis Y measures the real deposit interest rate, and the horizontal axis X
measures the investment and saving. The curve II represents the investment function
with a negative slope because saving is a negative function of the regular real interest
rate, and the curves SS represent the saving function with positive slope because saving
is a positive function of the formal real interest rate. In the neoclassical model, the equi-
librium interest rate or clearing market level is r∗, which is determined by the point of
intersection of the curves II and S2. Under financial repression, the interest rate ceiling
below the market-clearing level (r∗), such as r1, ensures that there is an excess demand
for loans given by (I2 − I1). Under these circumstances, the quantity of investment will
be determined by the supply of saving S1. Any increase in the volume of saving that is a
movement to the right along the saving curve, gives a higher real formal interest rate, (as
illustrated in the diagram, from r0 rises to r1 and r
∗), which leads to increased investment.
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Thus, as long as the interest rate is below its market-clearing level since for the interest
rates below r∗, the investment would be tracing out along the curve SS. The simple
saving-investment diagram is the most widely accepted mechanism linking higher interest
rates to increased investment in repressed economies. Indeed, the II and SS curves would
both depend on some other variables other than that of real interest rates and the equi-
librium point can be affected. The policy prescription that follows the McKinnon-Shaw
analysis is straightforward: interest rates should be free from administrative restrictions,
and restrictions on bank lending that take the form of high reserve requirements should be
eased. Such policies would increase total saving, improve the overall investment because
of the increased availability of credit.
Generally, the financial liberalisation is a conversion from financial repression and is a
strong theoretical presumption for the financial sector to promote economic growth. Ad-
ditionally, one of the most critical factors that provided an impetus for moving to financial
liberalization was the pressure from globalization. For example, the increasing pressure
from the growth of trade, travel, and migration, as well as the improvement of commu-
nications, were some of them. The increased demand for access to international financial
markets broke the controls on capital outflows, which in turn resulted in more interna-
tional and flexible mobility of goods, services, and people. Thus, financial liberalization
and financial development are two distinct concepts. While financial liberalisation refers
to the removal of barriers in the international movement of capital flows, financial devel-
opment refers to the upgraded quality of financial transactions.
2.2.2.3 Critics for liberalisation policies
In contrast to the work of McKinnon and Shaw (1973), there are arguments against fi-
nancial liberalisation policies. Keynes (2018), Singh (1997) and Krugman et al. (1998),
state that financial development is an obstacle to economic growth because of the inherent
instability of the financial system. This school of thoughts argued that there is a role for
government intervention in the working of financial markets and argue that a low-interest
rate bolsters investments and income, resulting in higher savings. There are more critics
of financial liberalisation policies for the potential role in triggering financial and economic
crises.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981), Stiglitz (1994) and Stiglitz (2000) argued that financial lib-
eralisation may deteriorate information problems and that asymmetric information pre-
vails in financial markets. Also, more competition in financial markets may even imply
a reduction of marginal profits and a rise of the fragility of financial intermediaries such
as banks. Furthermore, in favour of the arguments above, authors claim that financial
liberalisation has in many cases, led to disappointing results and in some cases, even to
15
economical and financial crises. Finally, they argued that repression has several positive
effects. Firstly, an improvement of the average quality of the pool of loan applicants by
lowering interest rates. Secondly, an increase of the equity by reducing the price of capital,
and finally, the acceleration of growth rate if credit is targeted towards profitable sectors
such as exporters or industries with high technological effects.
2.2.2.4 Empirical research for financial liberalisation
Liberalisation-real interest rates and saving rates
The empirical literature suggests that the link between saving rates and real interest rates
is ambiguous as the researchers have not concluded unanimously to identify an effect of
changes in interest rates on domestic savings, especially in developing countries.
Giovannini (1985) examined the issue for 18 developing countries and concluded that
for the majority of cases, the impact of changes in interest rates on consumption growth
and savings were negligible and therefore should be ignored. Ostry and Reinhart (1992)
confirmed these results and argued that only when the disaggregated commodity structure
for traded and non-traded goods is assumed, interest rates lead to higher consumption
growth and lower savings.
In a different study, Ogaki et al. (1996) examined the relationship between real interest
rates, saving, and growth in developing economies, using a model in which the intertem-
poral elasticity of substitution varies with the level of wealth. The hypothesis that the
saving rate, and its sensitivity to the interest rate, are a rising function of income finds
strong empirical support. The rationale here is that only after the households achieve a
subsistence consumption level consider saving the portion of their budget left after sub-
sistence has been satisfied.
Bayoumi (1993) studied the relationship between financial deregulation and household
savings for 11 regions in the UK over the period 1971-1988. The findings suggest that the
effects of deregulation shown that savings become significantly more sensitive to changes
in wealth, current income, real interest rates, and demographic factors. Finally, saving
is also estimated to have become more sensitive to predicted changes in real disposable
income, which is consistent with a fall in the importance of liquidity constraints on con-
sumption. In particular, the author concluded that an autonomous fall in the personal
saving rate might be attributed to deregulation alone.
Jappelli and Pagano (1994) investigated the role of capital market imperfections on ag-
gregate saving and growth for 30 OECD and non-OECD countries over the period 1960-
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1987. The results showed that liquidity constraints on households raise the saving rate,
strengthen the effect of growth on savings, and increase the growth rate if productivity
growth is endogenous, which in turn may increase welfare. The overall results suggest
that financial deregulation in the 1980s contributed to the decline in national savings and
growth rates in the OECD countries.
Bandiera et al. (2000) examined if financial reforms raise or reduce savings for devel-
oping countries over the period 1970-1994. The authors constructed an index of financial
liberalization based on eight different components: interest rates; reserve requirements;
directed credit; bank ownership; prudential regulation; securities markets deregulation;
and capital account liberalization. The findings suggest a negative relationship between
the real interest rate and savings, while the effect of the financial liberalization index on
savings is found positive and significant.
Reinhart and Tokatlidis (2005) used data of 50 countries consisting of 14 developed and
36 developing ones over the period 1970-1998 and found that in the majority of cases,
higher real interest rates were associated with reduced savings. Similarly, Schmidt-H. and
Servén (2002) argued that the sign of the interest rate elasticity of savings was ambiguous,
both theoretically and empirically. Higher interest rates increased savings through the
substitution effect, but could ultimately reduce the savings rate if the associated income
and wealth effects were sufficiently strong.
Liberalisation and financial reforms
Stulz et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2001), and Mishkin (2011) confirmed through their
findings that the financial liberalisation process increases the efficiency of the financial
system by weeding out inefficient financial institutions promoting transparency and ac-
countability and creating higher pressure for a reform of the financial sector. The same
authors argued that the development of the international capital markets helped policy-
makers to discipline, who might be led to a temptation to exploit an otherwise captive
domestic capital market. Also, liberalisation is beneficial in the short and long run for
developed markets, while in emerging markets revealed more massive booms and crashes
in the short run (Kaminsky et al., 1998).
However, the empirical literature on financial liberalisation does not strongly support
the hypothesis that interest rates lead to higher savings. On the other hand, it is recog-
nised that a well-behaved financial system is a success of financial reforms throughout the
liberalisation process. Nevertheless, financial repression is an expensive way for a gov-
ernment to purchase this credibility due to collateral constraints. Banks can raise only a
limited amount of funds from depositors. Forcing banks to allocate a higher percentage
17
of these funds to government securities instead of productive investments lowers the total
amount of funding new investments, which is a driving force in a national economy. In
this sense, financial repression is crowding-out costs and reduces aggregate output by driv-
ing down private investing. Thus, policymakers need to balance moral hazard concerns
against debt-financing concerns.
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2.3 Empirical literature
After reviewing the theoretical framework, it is essential to examine and critically evaluate
the empirical research conducted in the field to determine if the theory reflects reality.
As mentioned in the introduction of the chapter, the analysis focuses on three different
types of data sets to assess the role of the financial sector in stimulating economic growth.
Notably, the review begins with the cross-sectional studies, continuous with the time series
and ends with the panel data studies.
2.3.1 Cross-Sectional studies
In early studies, especially for those conducted before 2000, the most common econometric
method used was the cross-sectional regression and focused on developed and developing
countries. However, the studies are old regarding the period covered, since the most part
is from 1960 to 1990. Cross-sectional studies were also conducted after 2000, included a
more recent period (1970-2009), and they have mainly investigated the structural char-
acteristics of the financial system for developing countries. Apart from cross-sectional
regression model, the studies used other models, namely pooled cross-sectional1 regres-
sion and Generalized Methods of Moment (GMM)2. The majority of the studies have used
one indicator of economic growth, which represents the dependent variable, and various
measures of financial development, which represent the independent variables. Regarding
the proxy of economic growth, the most widely used was real per capita gross domestic
product (GDP) growth or growth of GDP. As for the indicators of financial development,
the most commonly used are liquid liabilities to GDP, credit to private sector to GDP,
the ratio of total banks assets, stock market capitalisation to GDP, stocks traded or total
value traded to GDP, and the liquidity of the stock market or turnover ratio.
Table 2.2 provides a summary of these empirical studies that investigated the impact
of financial development on economic growth, and the channel by which the former af-
fects the latter. The data used in these studies are obtained from various sources, namely
the Global Financial Development Database published by the World Bank Data and the
IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) Database (October 2017). However, in some cases,
data were obtained from the central banks, and commercial banks of countries studied.
They also used large samples of countries which are higher than 41 (n ≥ 41) and in some
studies the sample is greater than 90, focusing on either developing or developed coun-
tries, but nor both of them.
1Pooled data occurs when a time series of cross-sections, but the observations in each cross-section do
not refer to the same unit.
2GMM is the best suited econometric model to deal with potential endogeneity issues, which cause
inconsistent and biased estimators
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In brief, the results from cross-sectional empirical studies that investigated the impor-
tance of financial intermediaries and financial markets in the process of economic activity
confirmed the positive relationship between financial development and economic growth.
Also, it became widely acknowledged by these studies that economic growth without
well-developed financial sector would be detrimental to the long run sector prospects in
developing countries and reform programs led to the higher financial development, which
in turn contributed to economic growth. Finally, the studies provide substantial evidence
that the primary channel through which financial development is positively related to
economic growth is the efficiency of investments.
2.3.1.1 Empirical findings that support the hypothesis of positive relation-
ship between financial development and economic growth
Employing OLS and GMM methodologies, studies below provide consistent results. They
found strong and significant evidence that all indicators of financial development are
positively related to economic growth. Other studies reveal that there is a significant
relationship between financial reforms and financial development, and support that the
main mechanism of finance to cause growth is an investment.
Using the cross-sectional regression models in three different studies over a sample period
from 1960 to 1989, King and Levine (1993b) found that all the indicators of financial
development were significant and positively related to economic growth. All findings are
consistent with the Schumpeterian view that the financial system can promote economic
growth. In particular, they investigated whether higher levels of financial development
were significantly and robustly correlated with faster rates of economic growth for 100
developed and developing countries. They used as proxies of financial development in-
dicators that are designed to measure the depth of financial intermediaries. These were
bank deposits relative to central banks and credit issued to private firms, which is more
directly linked to investment.
Also, in a new study which was a refinement of the previous one, the same authors
examined 92 developing and developed countries and found that the financial sector re-
forms lead to a higher level of financial development (King and Levine, 1993c). Finally,
the same results are obtained when 64-88 wealthy, rich, poor and impoverished countries
are investigated, confirming that the financial sector reforms are significant for the finan-
cial development (King and Levine, 1993c).
The findings from King and Levine (1993), were also supported by Gregorio and Guidotti
(1995), who examined the finance-growth for 100 countries over the period 1960-1985.
Financial development was proxied by the ratio of bank credit to the private sector. How-
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ever, the positive relationship between financial development and economic growth in the
whole cross country sample changes across subsamples and is negative in panel data for
Latin America. Specifically, the same authors applied the six-year average panel data
method for 12 Latin American countries from 1950 to 1985, with findings suggesting that
financial development improves growth performance. This effect, however, varies across
countries and over time. Authors pointed out that there may be instances such as the
Latin American experience, where deregulation of financial system and bailouts can lead
to a negative relationship between the degree of financial intermediation and growth and
they insist that the removal of financial repression requires a regulatory framework to
avoid a costly financial crisis. Their findings also strongly indicate that the main channel
of transmission from financial development to growth is the impact on the efficiency of
investment rather than its level.
The conceptual basis that was provided by some theories of the belief that larger, more
efficient stock markets boost economic growth, was investigated by Levine and Zervos
(1996). The authors examined whether there is substantial empirical evidence that the
stock market development is essential for the economic growth for 47 countries and a
sample period from 1976 to 1993. Using as proxies of stock market development indica-
tors that are designed to measure the size and liquidity of the stock market such as the
average of market capitalisation, the turnover ratio and total value traded, the results
suggest that stock market liquidity positively predict growth in the long-run. The rela-
tionship, between stock market development and long-run growth, remains robust even
after controlling for initial conditions, inflation, the size of the government, the black mar-
ket exchange premium and the financial depth measured by the ratio of liquid liabilities.
Also, the findings confirm the views that financial markets provide essential services for
growth and that equity markets provide different services from banks. Finally, the find-
ings suggest a negative relationship between the size of the stock exchange and volatility
with economic growth.
During the same period, some economists declared different views regarding the rela-
tionship between financial development and economic growth. According to these views,
economic development creates demands for financial system development. Saint-Paul
(1996) presented a model which explains financial development as being triggered by an
unusual increase of demands for financial services. The increase of financial services de-
mand was a result of higher public debt or from technological innovations associated with
increasing returns of scale, only funded by large amounts of savings. He related this
model to the empirical findings from the historical experiences of financial development
in England.
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In a different study, Levine (1997) analyzed the existing theory of the finance-growth
nexus to shed light on different views by economists. The author organized the literature
on finance and economic activity by breaking the financial functions into five essential
functions: the mobilizing of savings, the allocating of resources, the facilitating the risk
management (trading, hedging, diversifying), the facilitating of the exchange of goods
and services and the monitoring and exerting corporate control. He used two channels
through which each financial function may affect economic growth: capital accumulation
and technological innovation. However, considering the cross-country empirical studies,
there is persistent evidence consistent with the view that the level of financial development
affects economic growth. Similarly, the body of country-studies suggests that the well-
functioning the financial system has, in some cases, during some periods, considerably
boost the economic growth. Finally, there is no sufficient understanding of the long-run
economic growth because there was not full evolution of the financial system.
Throughout another important study, the investigation of the legal, regulatory systems
and financial reforms, and how these, in turn, are linked to long-run economic growth
were investigated using cross-country data. In particular, Levine (1999) studied the effect
of the legal and regulatory environment on intermediary financial development as well as
the causal link between intermediary financial development and economic growth employ-
ing Generalised Methods of Moment (GMM). He used the legal and regulatory indicators
of creditor rights, as instrumental variables for financial development, contract enforce-
ment, and information disclosure. Also, he placed a sample of 49 countries into four legal
families, English, French, German, or Scandinavian. First, the findings indicated that
the legal and regulatory environment matters for financial development. Specifically, the
results are consistent with the argument that cross-country differences in legal systems
affect the relationship between entrepreneurs and creditors (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Second, the findings indicate that the exogenous component of intermediary financial
development (the legal and regulatory environment defined the element) has a positive
relationship with economic growth. Also, the results show that countries with regulatory
systems that give a high priority to creditors had a better functioning of financial inter-
mediaries.
Later studies that employed cross-sectional data investigated the primary mechanism
through which financial development has a positive and significant impact on economic
growth. According to these studies reviewed, the former affects the latter by increasing
the productivity of investments and not by savings and physical capital accumulation.
However, the results showed substantial evidence that investment is an important chan-
nel through which financial development positively affects economic activity. Trabelsi
et al. (2002), when conducting his study for 69 developing countries and sample period
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from 1960-1990, employing cross-country and pooled cross-section regressions, found that
financial development is a significant determinant of economic growth and the channel of
the effectiveness is mainly through an increase in investment efficiency. In a related study
for the relationship between investment and economic growth, there is new evidence on
the concept of threshold effects. Azman-Saini et al. (2010) employed a threshold regres-
sion model using cross-country data set from 91 countries over the period from 1975 to
2005. The findings suggest that the positive impact of foreign direct investment (FDI) on
growth is activated after financial market development exceeds a threshold level. Until
then, the benefit of FDI is non-existent.
According to the aforementioned theoretical background, Rajan and Zingales (2003) con-
firmed that greater financial development accelerates the growth of financial dependent
industries, but the financial structure does not matter. In a later study, Vlachos and
Waldenström (2005) examined the growth effects of financial liberalisation employing the
OLS and instrumental variables (IV) methods, and examined 42 countries over the period
1980-1990. The authors used as a proxy for financial development the total capitalisation
measured as the sum of domestic credits and stock market capitalisation over GDP. Cap-
ital account liberalisation, equity market liberalisation, actual flows, and international
capital flows were used as indicators of financial liberalisation. The main result is that
firms highly dependent on external financing, do not present high value-added in countries
with the liberalised financial system. However, liberalization increases the growth rates
of both output and firm creation among externally dependent industriesgiven that the
countries have reached a relatively high level of financial development.
In a more recent study, Allen et al. (2012) studied the link between the structural charac-
teristics of the financial system of countries that experienced banking and market crises
in the years 1970-2009. They employed a cross-country regression, covering 75 banking
crises and 17 market crashes. Their results show that there is a significant short-term
reversal in the bank sector development and stock market development, with the bond
market moving to the same direction as bank credit. Also, their results are insignificant
for bank-based economies but statistically and economically significant for market-based
economies during the banking crises. This can explain why emerging markets take more
time for them to recover from an economic downturn after a crisis because they are mainly
bank-based. Moreover, findings suggest that financial reform did not make many contri-
butions to alleviating the crises. Policy implications that emerge from their results are
that regulators need to pay more attention to the financial system structure, and they
should not only focus on the banking sector.
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2.3.1.2 Empirical findings that do not support the hypothesis of positive
relationship between financial development and economic growth
Contrary to the conclusions of several previous studies based on cross-country data that
have been used in most research on the subject, there are some studies that suggest dif-
ferent results. However, when the regression model varies across subgroups, a parametric
heterogeneity is observed and the results do not support the hypothesis of positive rela-
tionship between financial development and economic growth.
Ram (1999) studied the relationship between financial development and economic growth
for 95 countries over the period 1960-1989. He used as indicator of financial development
the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP. The findings reveal that out of the entire set of 95
countries, the finance-growth relationship is significantly positive in 9 countries, while in
16 countries if found significantly negative. However, the preponderance of evidence sug-
gests a negligible or weakly negative association between economic growth and a prime
proxy for financial development. Finally, when the regression model is permitted to vary
across three subgroups, a parametric heterogeneity is observed, and the overall result is
that of a negligible or negative association between financial development and growth.
Similarly to the results of a negligible association between financial development and
growth, in a meta-analysis study, Bumann et al. (2013) studied the empirical literature
on the relationship between financial liberalization and economic growth to explain the
reported heterogeneity of results. The authors in the meta-analysis method explored 441
t-statistics reports from 60 empirical studies. The results suggest that there is a posi-
tive effect of financial deregulation on growth, and the significance of this effect is only
weak. In contrast to the conclusions reached in several recent studies through a cross-
sectional regression, investigations for individual countries suggest different results. Also,
for most of the variables that may help explain the heterogeneity of results, the findings
do not indicate any significant effects. These results remain valid after employing several
robustness tests including a test for publication selection bias.
2.3.1.3 Evaluative summary for cross-sectional studies
In summary, having review the cross-sectional studies in Table 2.2, the seminal papers of
King and Levine (1993a,b,c), Levine and Zervos (1996), Levine (1997, 1999) as well as
Allen et al. (2012), have provided a comprehensive analysis and bring together e major
contributions to the study of finance and growth relationship. They consider conceptual
and empirical studies to discover the link between financial systems-including indica-
tors from financial intermediaries, financial markets and the functioning of the economy-
including economic growth. However, when considering some qualitative indicators, such
25
that of legal, institutional, and policy determinants of financial development, marginal
contribution to the study is provided.
However, in terms of bank sector development or stock market sector development,
there is still no consistent view on whether the former is better than the later for the real
economy. So much more research was needed to be conducted on determinants of stock
market development together with indicators of the bank sector. Nevertheless, Levine
and Zervos (1996) conducted this research, finding that equity markets provide different
services from banks being positively related to economic growth, but on the other hand,
there is a negative relationship between the size of the stock exchange and volatility with
economic growth.
The main conclusion of the cross-sectional studies is that the finance-growth re-
lationship is positive, but their methodological approach failed in explaining the real
direction of causality as well as to analyze the behavior over time. Also, the timing of
collecting data is not guaranteed to be representative, and this potentially can lead to
selective bias.
The current study uses a panel data set consisting of a homogeneous group of
countries that implement the same regulations, thus capturing differences due to legal,
institutional, and other qualitative determinants. More accurate inference of model pa-
rameters are obtained than this of cross-sectional studies, and the dynamic relationship
is uncovered, as the economic behavior is inherently dynamic, and most econometrical
interesting relationship is explicitly or implicitly dynamic.
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2.3.2 Time series studies
In time series studies the econometric models use data that contain information about
their past value. There are two-time series models namely linear and non-linear. The
linear models for time series data can have many forms, and the one of major importance
is the autoregressive (AR) model. In particular, when a regression model includes one or
more lagged values of the dependent variable among its explanatory variables, it is called
an autoregressive model. It is also known as a dynamic model since it portrays the time
path of the dependent variable about its past value. An extension of this model is the
vector autoregressive model (VAR) model which can be considered as time series method.
A restricted VAR model is the vector error correction model (VECM), which is designed
to estimate if the underlying variables have a long-run stochastic trend, also known as
cointegration. The VECM has the advantage of including both long-run and short-run
information. However, for the analysis of both short and long run, the autoregressive
distributed lag (ARDL) approach is employed. The ARDL model is being used to model
the relationship between variables in a single-equation time-series setup. Furthermore,
another popular method in time series is the causality analysis which tests the direction
of causality between two variables (Granger causality tests). Causality in economics is
tested for by measuring the ability to predict the future values of a time series using
prior values of another time series. Finally, the non-linear time series models estimate the
changes of variance over time, which is called heteroscedasticity. These models represent
autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH), and a wide variety of the exten-
sion of ARCH model are the generalised (GARCH), threshold (TARCH), exponential
(EGARCH), and power (PGARCH) autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity models
respectively.
Table 2.3 provides a summary of the empirical time series studies of the relationship
between financial development and economic growth. These studies were conducted af-
ter 2000 and the most common econometric methods used were Granger causality, VAR,
VECM and ARDL models, focusing on developed and developing countries. The cov-
ered period is similar compared to cross-sectional studies, except those conducted by
Odhiambo (2013) and Phiri (2015), who extended the time period until 2011 and 2013
accordingly. The majority of studies have used one indicator for economic growth which
represents the dependent variable and various measures of financial development are used
as independent variables. Regarding the proxy of economic growth, the most widely used
was GDP per capita, while proxies for financial development are similar to those used in
cross-sectional studies. Various sources provide the data used in these studies, namely
International Financial Statistics (2002), World Bank Development (2002), Global Finan-
cial Development Database published by the World Bank and the IMF World Economic
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Outlook (WEO) Database (October 2017). However, in some cases, data were obtained
from the central banks, and commercial banks of countries studied (National bank of
Poland). They also used samples of countries which are no higher than 39 (n ≤ 39). The
period examined was no less 10 years (n ≤ 10) and no higher than 44 years (n ≤ 44).
In brief, studies that investigated one country, either developed or developing, concluded
in unidirectional causality results, where finance-led growth. On the other hand, in studies
that investigated more than one country the results do not provide conclusive evidence of
unidirectional causality hypothesis. On balance, the findings of these studies support the
bidirectional or two-way causality hypothesis. Studies that employed VAR and VECM
models examined the dynamic relationship between financial development and economic
growth and concluded that the former has a positive and statistically significant rela-
tionship with the latter. Finally, the mechanism linking the financial development and
economic growth is investment.
2.3.2.1 Empirical findings that support the hypothesis of positive relation-
ship between financial development and economic growth
Some studies examined the direction of causality between the two variables and concluded
that there is a unidirectional causality or one-way causality between finance and growth.
Particularly, the finance-led growth hypothesis suggests that financial development is the
leading factor in economic growth. From the literature, one can conclude that most of
these studies that they have focused on developing countries suggest that the relationship
between financial development and economic growth follows a supply-leading pattern.
Specifically, Ghali (1999) and Darrat et al. (2006) employed in their studies the Granger
causality test, and the results show a one-way causality from financial development to
economic growth.
Asteriou and Price (2000) investigated the effects of financial and stock market devel-
opment on the process of economic growth in the UK. They first presented two compet-
ing alternative hypotheses related to the financial development and economic growth in
terms of their causal relationships, in the context of supply-leading and demand-following
hypothesis. The results obtained from the cointegration and causality test support the
supply-leading hypothesis, which suggests that the causal directions run from the devel-
opment of the financial sector to the real sector (measured by real GDP per capita).
In another study, Andriesz et al. (2005) explored the linkage between financial liber-
alization and economic growth in Poland. They used monthly empirical data covering the
period 1990-2002, and the results indicate that not only there is evidence of a long-run
positive linkage between financial development and economic growth but also causation
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which runs from the former to the latter and not vice-versa.
Yang and Yi (2008) examined the causal relationship between financial development and
economic growth for Korea from 1971 to 2002, when Korea has experienced both eco-
nomic growth and a variety of financial liberalisation and reforms. Financial development
was measured by the ratio of the sum of loans and trading value of securities (stocks and
bonds) to nominal GDP. The authors employed a causality methodology, and the results
suggest that financial development causes economic growth, but the reverse is not true.
Also, the stability tests show that there are structural breaks, and since parameters for
financial development are not stable, it is obvious that there is no evidence for causality
from economic growth to financial development. The conclusion is that there exists a
unidirectional causality from financial development to economic growth. The main policy
implication is that Korea should give priority to financial reforms rather than any other
factors that lead to economic growth.
In several studies, the VAR model was employed to identify the dynamic interactions
between financial development and economic growth. All variables in a VAR enter in the
model in the same way and are based on its own lagged values and the lagged values
of the other model variables. Arestis et al. (2001) examined the relationship between
stock market development and economic growth for five developed economies, such as
Germany covering the period from 1973-1997, the United States during the period 1972-
1998, Japan, the United Kingdom over the time 1968-1997, and France over the period
1974-1998. The authors used quarterly data of the indicators for banking system develop-
ment proxied by the domestic credit as a percentage of GDP, stock market development
proxied by the stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP, and stock market
volatility proxied by the standard deviation of stock market prices. Employing a VAR
method and based on a VECM model, the results show that financial development has
an essential contribution to output in France, Germany, and Japan. In the United States
and the United Kingdom, the link between financial development and growth is found to
be statistically weak. Also, the findings suggest that both a bank-based financial system
and a capital-market-based promote long-run economic growth. However, the effects of
the former are more powerful. Finally, the stock market volatility hurts growth across all
countries, except Germany, where is found to be insignificant.
Federici and Caprioli (2009) studied the dynamic relationship between financial devel-
opment and economic growth in a period of very high degree of international financial
integration after 1990. The sample includes 39 countries over the period from 1990 to
2000. A set of measures was used that adequately capture the relevant aspects of financial
development. In particular, the primary indicators were the ratio of deposit-money bank
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assets, the credit to the private sector, the liquid liabilities, the market capitalisation, the
total value of shares traded to GDP, and the turnover ratio. The authors employed a
VAR model hand their results show that more financially developed countries can avoid
currency crises. On the opposite side countries with deficient financial development are
immunized by crises.
Ang (2008) investigated the mechanisms linking the two variables of financial development
and economic growth for a developing country such as Malaysia using annual data for the
period 1960-2003. He adopted a six-equation model to provide some insight into the
multiple channels that link financial development and economic growth. The author also
used the method of the principal component to measure the deregulation of the financial
sector, consisted of six series, such as maximum and minimum lending and deposit rates,
liquidity ratio, and policy controls translated into dummy taking the value one if control
is present and zero otherwise. Employing the ARDL bound tests, the results show that
financial development has a significant positive impact on economic growth throughout
both private saving and private investment. Also, findings provide evidence that finance
leads to higher growth through improved efficiency of investment. A key policy implica-
tion that emerges from the results is that it is critical for the government to develop the
financial sector since financial deepening facilitates mobilisation of saving, private capital
formation, and long-term economic growth. A sound financial system instills confidence
among savers so that resources can be mobilised efficiently to increase productivity in the
economy.
In a different study, the complementarity effects between bank development and stock
market development were investigated. Odhiambo (2013) studied the relationship be-
tween banks, stock markets, and economic growth in South Africa using annual time
series data over the period 1994-2011. Three determinants of stock market development
were utilised namely market capitalisation, total traded market value, and stock market
turnover ratio. The proxy for bank-based financial development was the ratio of credit
to the private sector and the real GDP per capita for economic growth. The authors em-
ployed the ARDL-Bounds testing method, and the results show that when stock market
capitalisation is used as a proxy for stock market development, complementarity between
bank-based financial development and stock market development exists both in the long-
run and in the short-run. On the other hand, when the stock market traded value is used
as a proxy for stock market development; the complementarity is rejected both in the
short-run and in the long-run. Finally, when the stock market turnover ratio is used as
a proxy, the complementarity is rejected only in the short run, and not in the long-run.
The overall empirical results show that the complementarity between bank development
and stock market development is weak and sensitive to the determinants used to measure
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stock market development.
2.3.2.2 Empirical findings that do not support the hypothesis of positive
relationship between financial development and economic growth
The bi-directional causality suggests a two-way causal relationship between financial de-
velopment and economic growth. A country with a well-developed financial system could
promote high economic activity, which in turn will create a high demand for financial
services. As the financial sector responds to these demands, it will stimulate increased
economic development. Thus, financial development can affect economic growth at a cer-
tain stage of development, and the reverse will be found later on. This is how the idea of
a bi-directional relationship comes in.
Demetriades and Hussein (1996) investigated the issue of causality between financial de-
velopment and economic growth for 16 developing countries. The selected countries in
the data set were not highly developed in 1960, including at least 27 continuous annual
observations. In the study were used two measures as proxies for financial development,
namely the ratio of bank deposits to GDP and the ratio of bank claims on the private
sector to GDP. The authors employed cointegration and causality tests between financial
development and real GDP. The evidence provides very little support to the view that
finance is a leading sector in the process of economic development. On the contrary, there
is evidence that in some countries, the direction of causality is from economic growth
to financial development. However, on balance, most of the evidence seems to favour
the view that the relationship between financial development and economic growth is
bi-directional. The countries that belong to this latter group are considered some of the
most successful examples of financial reform. What is also evident from their causality
tests is that the results are very much country-specific. That highlights the dangers of
statistical inference based on cross-section countries studies, which implicitly treat differ-
ent economies as similar entities.
Shan and Morris (2002) investigated the relationships between financial development and
economic growth for 19 OECD countries, China, and South Korea. They used quarterly
data over the period from 1985 to 1998 and as proxies of financial development the ratio of
total credit to GDP and the spread between borrowing and lending rates of interest as an
indicator of the level of efficiency. Also, the authors employed the Granger causality test
for the presence of causality relationships between financial development and economic
growth. The results show that the causality between total credit, financial efficiency,
and economic growth seems to be weak. Moreover, employing causality tests between
financial development productivity and investment do not support the hypothesis that
financial development has a significant impact on economic growth. Overall, the findings
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give little evidence to support the hypothesis that financial development leads to eco-
nomic growth. The few countries in which there is evidence of one-way causality from
financial development to economic growth is insufficient to draw any general conclusions.
On the other hand, there are signs of reverse causality and bi-directional causality in oth-
ers. Abu-Bader and Abu-Qarn (2008) examined the causal relationship between financial
development and economic growth in five Middle Eastern and North African (MENA)
countries for different periods ranging from 1960 to 2004, within a vector autoregressive
(VAR) framework and applying Granger causality tests. The empirical results show weak
support for a long-run relationship between financial development and economic growth,
and for the hypothesis that finance leads to growth. In cases where cointegration was
detected, Granger causality either was bidirectional, or it ran from output to financial
development.
Phiri (2015) investigated the asymmetric cointegration and causality effects between fi-
nancial development and economic growth in South Africa throughout 1992-2013. The
authors used the momentum threshold autoregressive (M-TAR) approach, which allows
for threshold error-correction (TEC) modeling and Granger causality analysis between
variables. The results indicate an abrupt asymmetric cointegration relationship between
banking activity and economic growth, on the one hand, and a smooth cointegration
relationship between stock market activity and economic growth, on the other hand.
Moreover, causality analysis reveals that while banking activity tends to cause economic
growth, stock market activity is, however, caused by economic growth increase.
In a recent study, the relationship between, on the one hand, financial institutions, po-
litical institutions, inflation, public deficit and trade openness and, on the other hand,
economic growth and growth volatility was explored. Campos et al. (2016) employed a
P-ARCH framework and used data for Argentina from 1890 to 2000. The findings suggest
that the primary explanatory factors, regarding their direct effects on economic growth,
turn out to be financial efficiency, informal political instability (either guerrilla warfare
or strikes), formal political instability and trade openness. Further, they found robust
evidence that both formal political instability (constitutional changes) and trade openness
affect growth negatively, indirectly by way of its volatility.
2.3.2.3 Evaluative summary of time-series studies
In summary, having review the time-series studies in Table 2.3, the research of Arestis
et al. (2001), Federici and Caprioli (2009), Odhiambo (2013) as well as Demetriades and
Hussein (1996) provide major contributions to the study of the finance-growth relation-
ship considering the causality effects from financial development to economic growth by
investigating more than one countries in a period of very high degree of international
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integration after 1990. Additionally, little contribution to the knowledge is provided by
empirical studies examining one country. They also investigated the direction of causality
from economic growth to financial development, thus capturing both, the unidirectional
and bi-directional effects of the finance-growth relationship.
However, the results from the time-series studies that bring together major contri-
bution are mixed. In general, the view that in developing countries, finance causes growth
in the earlier stages of economic development, and that in developed countries, growth
causes financial development, prevailed. Also, the results are country-specific-as the ob-
servations are collected for one country only-but when looking at many countries, there is
a risk in concluding that they treat different economies as similar entities. Additionally,
it is worth noticing that Odhiambo (2013) found that the complementarity between bank
sector and stock market sector is weak and sensitive to the determinants used to measure
stock market development. This also highlights that further research has to be conducted
on determinants of stock market development together with indicators of the bank sector.
Nevertheless, as the main advantage of time series analysis is that can be used
to understand the past as well as to predict the future, the main disadvantage of this
methodological approach is that the effects of many countries cannot be considered si-
multaneously, since basically in time-series data this is the case for one country. Also, the
observations are not mutually independent and the probability of finding a high correla-
tion is higher than is suggested by other econometric techniques, but not impossible to
be solved. However, one of the main disadvantages is that the effects of many countries
can not be considered simultaneously, since basically in time-series data this is the case
for one country.
The current study uses a panel data, which are multi-dimensional data involving
measurements over time. In particular, panel data contain observations obtained over
multiple time periods for the same entities (countries). Time series and cross-sectional
data can be thought of as special cases of panel data that are in one dimension only (one
panel member or individual for the former, one time point for the latter).
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2.3.3 Panel data studies
In panel data studies, the econometric models use data where the same cross-sectional
unit is surveyed over time. By combining time-series and cross-section observations, panel
data give more observations and are better suited to study the dynamics of change. In
particular, the panel data regression models, namely fixed effects and random effects are
considered as standard panel methods and static models, while a regression analysis of
panel data that includes one or more lags for the values of the dependent variable among
its explanatory variables, is considered as a dynamic panel data model. Similarly to the
time-series data, the extension of the dynamic panel data models is the panel vector au-
toregressive model, the panel vector error-correction model, the panel cointegration, all
designed to estimate if the underlying variables have a long-run relationship. Also, the
Pooled Mean Group and Mean Group models are being used to model the relationship
between variables in the short and long run. Furthermore, in many studies, the direction
of causality is explored throughout the Granger causality test.
Panel data methods employed for the relationship between financial development and
economic growth have been increasingly used in empirical research, especially for those
conducted after 2000. Tables 2.4a to 2.4c provide a summary of these empirical studies.
Although cross-sectional studies concluded that financial development positively affects
economic growth, the studies that employed the panel data models arrived at a less
uniform conclusion. Similarly to the cross-sectional and time-series studies, the same
indicators were used for economic growth and financial development. Various sources
provide the data used in these studies, namely UNESCO, Penn World Table (PWT), In-
ternational Financial Statistics (2002), World Bank Development (2002), Global Financial
Development Database published by the World Bank and the IMF World Economic Out-
look (WEO) Database (October 2017). However, in some cases, data were obtained from
the central bank, and commercial bank of countries studied. Finally, approximately more
than 60% of the studies have samples of countries superior or equal at 52 (n ≥ 52), sample
much higher than the equivalent in empirical studies on time-series.
On balance, studies that investigated the direction of causality do not provide substantial
evidence supporting the view that financial development is a significant factor for eco-
nomic growth. Also, the less uniform conclusions seem to be due to the specific charac-
teristics of the countries, which can be estimated by employing the variety of econometric
panel methods. More specifically, the extent of government intervention and the legal
environment of each country are important factors for financial development and hence,
economic growth. It is worth noticing that some studies which employed dynamic panel
models reveal insignificant or adverse effects in the short-run, while in the long-run there
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is a threshold point after which the finance-growth relationship is negative.
2.3.3.1 Empirical findings that support the hypothesis of positive relation-
ship between financial development and economic growth
Exploiting the dynamic nature of panel data methods, panel unit root test, panel coin-
tegration analysis, VECM model, and panel Granger causality, were applied to examine
the long-run relationship between financial development and economic growth. The use
of these models, give results with substantial evidence in respect to the hypothesis that
long-run causality runs from financial development to economic growth.
Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) studied the long-run relationship between the finan-
cial sector and economic growth for ten developing countries over the period 1970-2000.
The authors used as a proxy of financial development the ratio of total bank deposits
to nominal GDP. They employed threshold cointegration test for stationarity as well as
threshold effects, and cointegration test for the existence of a long-run relationship among
output, financial depth, and the control variables (investment and inflation). It is found
from the tests that the long-run equilibrium relationship exists among these variables, and
this relationship is estimated using fully modified OLS. The findings confirm that there is
a single equilibrium relation between financial depth, growth and ancillary variables, and
unidirectional causality from financial depth to economic growth. Also, the results from
the dynamic panel data estimation for a panel-based VECM model suggest that there is
no short-run causality between financial deepening and output, and the effect is in the
long-run.
Apergis and Fillipidis (2007) studied whether a long-run relationship between financial
development and economic growth exists in a group of 15 OECD and 50 non-OECD coun-
tries over the period 1975 to 2000. They examined as measures of financial development,
liquid liabilities, and credit to the private sector by banks and other financial institutions
all as a percentage of GDP. The authors employed a panel cointegration estimation, and
the findings support the existence of a positive and statistically significant long-run re-
lationship between financial deepening, economic activity, and a set of macroeconomic
variables. The results also suggest that the auxiliary variables, human capital, invest-
ment share, and international trade, have a significantly positive impact on growth, while
government spending exhibits a positive effect for the OECD countries, but an adverse
effect on the group of non-OECD countries. However, the results indicate a bi-directional
causality between financial development and economic growth and the implication is that
policies aiming at improving capital markets and their functions will have, in the long
run, a significant impact on economic growth.
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Hassan et al. (2011) studied the role of financial development in accounting for economic
growth in low-middle and high-income countries classified by geographic regions for a
panel dataset of 98 states and sample period from 1980 to 2007. As proxies for financial
development were used domestic credit provided to the private sector, domestic credit
from the banking sector, liquid liabilities and gross domestic saving all as a percentage of
GDP. The authors employed both panel regressions method and variance decompositions
of annual GDP per capita growth rates to investigate what measures of financial develop-
ment have a significant impact on economic development over time and their contribution
to economic growth across geographic regions and income groups. Their results show a
positive relationship between financial development and economic growth in developing
countries. Moreover, other variables from the real sector, such as trade and government
expenditure, play a significant role in explaining economic growth. Finally, their results
provided strong long-run linkages between financial development and economic growth.
Hsueh et al. (2013) investigated the causal relationship between financial development
and economic growth for 10 Asian countries during the period 1989 to 2007. Based on
previous studies they used four financial development indicators such as the ratio of private
claims and the ratio of money supply (M1) as well as (M2) and (M3), all as a percentage
to GDP. The authors employed a panel Granger causality analysis, and the results show
that the causal direction is sensitive to the financial development measures used in each
of the countries. Specifically, the results revealed that domestic claims cause economic
growth in six countries, while it does not exist for the others. Granger causality from
M1 to growth can be found only in two countries (China and Taiwan), while for the rest
countries the null hypothesis of no Granger causality can not be rejected. The causality
from the indicators M2 and M3 to economic growth exists in three and one countries,
respectively. On the other hand, the findings suggest that the causality from economic
growth to financial development is very weak in the ten Asian countries. The overall
findings support the supply-leading hypothesis and suggest that the causal directions are
from financial development to economic growth.
Pradhan et al. (2016) examined the interactions between innovation, financial develop-
ment, and economic growth in 18 European countries that are members of the monetary
union, covering the period from 1961 to 2013. They used eight different indicators for
financial development to construct a composite index of financial development (CFD)
applying a principal component analysis. These indicators were domestic credit to the
private sector provided by banks, domestic credit provided by the financial sector, market
capitalization, turnover ratio, and the total value of traded stocks. The authors employed
a VECM model and focused on whether causality run between innovation, financial de-
velopment, and economic growth in both ways, the one way, the other way or not at all.
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The results reveal that all variables are cointegrated, and there is clear evidence that the
enhanced innovative capacity and development of the financial sector in the Eurozone
contributes to long-term economic growth in the countries of the region. A country with
a well-developed financial system could promote high economic growth through techno-
logical change, as well as product and services innovations, which in turn will create high,
demand for financial services.
Love and Zicchino (2006) studied the dynamic relationship between financial develop-
ment and investment for 8000 firms of 36 countries and a sample period from 1988 to
1998. The authors constructed a financial development index by combining measures of
five indicators, namely stock market capitalization, the total value of shares traded, stock
market turnover ratio, liquid liabilities, and credit to the private sector. Also, they split
the countries into two groups based on the median of its indicator and referred to these
two groups as high (high financial development) and low (low financial development).
Employing a VAR analysis of panel data and impulse response, the results suggest that
the availability of internal funds is more important for investment in countries with less
developed financial systems. More specifically, the impact of a positive shock to cash flow
on investment is significantly higher in countries where the level of financial development
is lower than in countries with a higher level of financial development. Symmetrically,
it is found that a positive shock to marginal productivity has less impact on investment
of firms in countries with a low level of financial development. Overall, both of these
effects imply that financial under-development adversely affect the dynamic investment
behavior, thus leading to inefficient allocation of capital.
Based on the panel datasets, the studies that employed Two-Stage Least Square (TSLS)
method or GMM method also support findings of a positive link between financial de-
velopment and economic growth. However, the GMM dynamic panel estimation ignores
the integration and cointegration properties of the data. In this way, the estimated panel
models of GMM do not characterize a long-run equilibrium relationship between finance
and growth.
Benhabib and Spiegel (2000) examined the role of financial development in economic
growth and investment on a balanced panel group of four countries covering the period
from 1965 to 1985. Similarly to King and Levine (1993c) study, the authors used as indi-
cators of financial development the liquid liabilities, the credit to the private sector and
the money bank deposits, all as share to GDP. Employing the GMM estimation on panel
groups for five-year periods for the whole sample period, the results indicate that two
measures of financial development, liquid liabilities, and credit to private sector lead to
economic growth, while only money bank deposits positively influence investment. Also,
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the proxies of financial development are quite sensitive when fixed effects are employed.
This sensitivity might be as a result of broader characteristics of the countries. However,
the results indicate that the depth of financial and the private sector both have a posi-
tive effect on economic growth through total factor productivity, while the size of banking
sector influences investment through both physical and human capital accumulation rates.
Rioja and Valev (2004) investigated the channels through which financial development
influences the economic growth in a panel of 74 countries and sample period from 1961 to
1995. The data were averaged over five-year intervals, starting creating seven observations
for each state, and countries were grouped into low-medium and high income according
to their income per capita. To investigate the sources of growth, the authors used three
dependent variables, such as economic growth, capital growth, and productivity growth.
Following the empirical literature, they used three common financial development mea-
sures, namely credit to the private sector, commercial bank assets, and liquid liabilities.
Employing the GMM dynamic panel estimation, the findings suggest that financial de-
velopment has a significant impact on economic growth in the middle and high-income
regions and for low-income countries; finance may have an unwanted effect on growth.
Their results confirm that finance has a positive impact on production function growth
and primarily in well-developed economies. In less-developed economies, the effect of fi-
nancial development on economic growth occurs mainly through capital accumulation.
Anwar and Cooray (2012) examined the impact of the interaction of the quality of the
governance, financial development, foreign direct investments, and economic growth in
South Asia over the period 1970 to 2009. They used as measures of the quality of gov-
ernance the political rights and civil liberties indices, while money supply was the proxy
of financial development. Also, government size proxied by government expenditures and
foreign direct investments were estimated in the model. Employing panel fixed effects, and
GMM system estimation, the results suggest that financial development has contributed
to economic growth and enhanced the benefits of foreign direct investments. Moreover,
some control variables and interaction terms were added to the model, and additional tests
were employed to control for the robustness of the results above, and the main findings
of the study do not change. Finally, improvements in political rights and civil liberties,
through their interaction with financial development, have made a significant contribution
to economic growth.
Muhammad et al. (2016) studied the impact of financial development on the economic
growth of the six Gulf Cooperation Countries (GCC) using a panel dataset over the period
from 1975 to 2012. The study used two indicators that measure financial development,
which is the total domestic credit to the private sector and the money supply (M2), all as
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a percentage of GDP. The authors employed four estimation methods, pooled OLS, fixed
effect estimation, random effect estimation, and the system GMM estimation. The pooled
OLS and the random effect regression models show that financial development plays an
essential role in economic growth because both demonstrate a positive and statistically
significant impact on growth. The results from the fixed effect estimation show that
financial development does not contribute to economic growth even though their signs
are positive. Though the fixed effect is more appropriate than random effects after the
Hausman test, the system GMM shows that there is a positive effect of financial sector
development on the economic growth of GCC region and support the results of pooled
OLS and random effect regressions. Also, the results indicate that foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI), fixed capital formation, and oil production promote the economic growth of
this region. However, the findings suggest that there is substantial evidence that financial
development promotes growth in these countries.
Durusu-Ciftci et al. (2017) studied the role of financial development on economic growth
theoretically and empirically. In the theoretical part of the study, by developing a Solow-
Swan growth model augmented with financial markets, they show that debt from credit
markets and equity from stock markets are two long-run proxies for GDP per capita.
Turning to the empirical part, the long-run relationship is estimated for a panel of 40
countries over the period 1989-2011, and employing the augmented mean group (AMG)3
and common-correlated effects (CCE)4, both of which allow for cross-sectional dependen-
cies. The cross-sectional findings vary across countries, while the panel data analyses
show that both proxies have a positive long-run impact on steady-state level of GDP per
capita, and the contribution of the credit markets is substantially greater. As a policy im-
plication, they recommend that policymakers need to emphasize on implementing policies
that can lead in the deepening of financial markets, including institutional and legal mea-
sures to strengthen the rights for creditors and investors as well as contract enforcement.
Hence, by fostering the development of a countrys financial sector, economic growth will
be accelerated.
2.3.3.2 Empirical findings that do not support the hypothesis of positive
relationship between financial development and economic growth
In more recent studies, panel causality tests are employed to investigate the direction of
causality between financial development and economic growth, and the findings do not
support the hypothesis of their positive relationship. Kar et al. (2011) examined the di-
3AMG estimates the panel time series models and allows for heterogeneous slope coefficients across
group members and are also concerned with cross-section dependence.
4CCE estimates panel time series models and allows heterogeneous or homogeneous coefficients and
supports instrumental-variable regressions and unbalanced panels. The cross-sectional dependence test
is automatically calculated and presented in the estimation output.
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rection of causality between financial development and economic growth over the period
1980-2007 for fifteen the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries. Also, the
study used as indicators of financial development, the ratio of narrow money to income,
the ratio of deposit money bank liabilities to income, and the ratio of private sector credit
to income. They employed panel causality testing approach, and their results do not pro-
vide substantial evidence supporting the view that financial development is a significant
factor in economic growth. In particular, out of six financial development indicators, only
for two countries the findings have strong evidence that financial development causes
growth, while none or one or two of financial development indicators causes economic
growth for the rest 13 countries. This effect can be attributed to the main features of
the MENA region that the implementation of the financial reforms has been delayed and
the high information and transaction costs have hindered development in the financial
sector. Furthermore, in many of the MENA countries, the critical features of the financial
system were that banks were dominated by the state-owned. As a result, government in-
tervention in credit allocation and financing losses of public sector enterprises are which,
in turn, constrain to the role of the financial system in economic growth in these countries.
Menyah et al. (2014) examined the causal relationship between financial development and
economic growth for 21 African countries over the period 1980-2008. The authors used
a comprehensive index of financial development based on principal component analysis
and constructed from four commonly used indicators such as broad money (M2), liq-
uid liabilities (M3), domestic credit provided by the banking sector, and domestic credit
to the private sector all as a percentage of GDP. Employing a panel Granger causality
analysis the findings suggest that for fifteen countries or almost three-quarters of the sam-
ple, there was no causality in any direction between financial development and economic
growth, while for four countries there was a unidirectional causality running from finan-
cial development to growth, one country with the opposite direction and one county with
bi-directional causality. The results from panel causality between financial development
and trade openness indicate that for sixteen countries or almost three-quarters of the
sample, there was no causality in any direction between financial development and trade
openness, while for four countries there was a unidirectional causality running from finan-
cial development to openness, and one country with the opposite direction. Overall, there
is substantial evidence that financial development has no predictive power on economic
growth and trade openness.
Swamy and Dharani (2018) used an alternate approach in exploring the causal link
between financial development and economic growth for advanced economies as these
countries experience significantly higher levels of financial development. The authors em-
ployed a fully balanced panel of 24 economies from 1983 to 2013, and the results indicate
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a negative association of the finance-growth nexus in the long-run when imposing a linear
relationship. The panel Granger causality tests examine the bi-directional causality be-
tween the financial development variables and economic growth. Employing an alternative
approach of moderated mediation effect framework, they noticed that the relationship be-
tween financial development and economic growth is moderated by the negative impacts
of inflation, interest rate, and population dependency; and the positive mediation effect of
trade openness. The policy implication is that there is a need to rein in inflation and real
interest rates and enhance trade openness to optimise the benefits of growing financial
development on economic growth.
In many studies the researchers employed GMM estimator methods, and the results do
not confirm the positive relationship between financial development and economic growth.
Narayan and Narayan (2013) examined the finance-growth relationship for 65 developing
countries grouped in four regional panels, (Asian, European, African, South American,
and Middle Eastern) and sample period from 1995 to 2011. The banking sector is proxied
by domestic credit to the private sector, and the financial sector is proxied by the market
capitalization of listed companies and the total value of stocks market traded, all as a
percentage to GDP. The authors employed a system-GMM estimator, and their findings
suggest that financial sector has a positive and statistically significant effect on economic
growth, while the banking sector has a negative and statistically significant impact on
economic growth. At the regional level, the Asian panel has similar results. In the Middle
Eastern group, none of the financial development measures is found to be statistically sig-
nificant. In the European and African panels, only market capitalization has presented a
positive and significant impact on their economy, while the banking sector development is
found to have a statistically significant and adverse effect on economic growth. Finally, in
the South American panel, only the banking sector presented significant negative results.
Ductor and Grechyna (2014) investigated whether the effect of financial development
on economic growth depends on the relative speed of the financial and real sector devel-
opment for 101 developed and developing countries over the period 1970-2010. Financial
development is proxied by the amount of private credit by banks, private credit by banks
and other financial institutions, and liquid liabilities. Accordingly, the real sector is prox-
ied by the industrial production growth. The authors employed OLS and GMM methods
using cross-sectional and panel data. The results from the OLS method show that finan-
cial development and economic growth have an inverted U-shaped relationship because
the acceleration of credit growth is not accompanied by growth in the real sector. The re-
sults from GMM show that an increase in credit growth leads to an increase in economic
growth if private credit and real output grow at the same rate. Finally, the findings
suggest that one of the leading channels through which financial development may harm
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economic growth is an unbalanced growth between private credit and real output. For
example, the expansion of credit is not followed by the expansion of the demand for funds
by the productive sector of the economy, thus increasing the likelihood of funding risky
investments and leading to lower economic growth.
A different study provides new evidence on the relationship between finance and eco-
nomic growth using an innovative, dynamic panel threshold technique. Law and Singh
(2014) investigated this issue throughout a sample of 87 developed and developing coun-
tries over the period 1980 to 2010. The measures of financial development were liquid
liabilities and credit to the private sector. The authors employed a GMM estimator based
on threshold regression, and the empirical results indicate that there is a threshold impact
on the finance growth relationship. In particular, they found that the level of financial
development is beneficial for growth only up to a threshold; beyond the threshold level,
further development of finance tends to affect growth adversely. These results show that
more finance is not always good for economic growth and highlight that an optimal level
of financial development is more crucial in facilitating growth.
Cojocaru et al. (2015) studied the impact of financial development on economic activity
in the transition economies of Central and Eastern European countries and the indepen-
dent states, every one of which is a former Soviet republic, during the transition years
from 1990 through 2008. The interest rate spread, the overhead costs, and the bank
concentration measure the efficiency of financial sector development, while the amount of
private sector credit provided by the banking system measures the size or the depth of the
financial sector. Employing a GMM panel data in their estimation, and including both,
the amount of private sector credit and the efficiency of the banking system, the findings
suggest that measurement of the financial efficiency, is more important and statistically
significant, while the impact of private credit is quantitatively smaller and statistically
insignificant, regarding promoting economic growth. Furthermore, problems unique to
the transition period in these countries, such as soft budget constraints and small bank
competition, could have weakened the potential positive effects of financial development
on economic growth.
Caporale et al. (2015) investigated the relationship between financial development and eco-
nomic growth for new European Union members which were centrally planned economies.
The panel consisted of data for ten transition countries from Central and Eastern Europe
over the period from 1994 to 2007. The proxies for financial development are domestic
credit to private sector, liquid liabilities, and stock market capitalization. Additionally,
the interest rate margin is used to measure the efficiency of the banking sector and the
reform index for financial institutional development. The authors employed the system-
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GMM estimator, and the results suggest that credit to the private sector is insignificant,
possibly as a result of many banking crises caused by a large number of non-performing
loans at the beginning of the transition process. Further, the stock market capitalization
has a positive but minor effect on economic growth, mainly because of the small size of
their stock markets, and liquid liabilities has a positive and significant effect on economic
growth, which is consistent with the idea that money supply helps growth by facilitating
the economic activity. Finally, the margin of interest rates and reform index appear to
be highly significant.
Ayadi et al. (2015) explored the impact of financial development on economic growth,
using a group of north and south Mediterranean countries for the years 1985-2009. The
authors employed a GMM method and included variables to measure the financial sector
to account for the quantity and quality effects. The results show that credit to the private
sector and bank deposits are negatively related to growth, which confirms deficiencies in
credit allocation in the region and suggests the weaknesses of financial regulations and
supervision. On the other hand, the results for the stock market, indicate that stock
market size and liquidity play an essential role in growth, specifically when estimating the
quality of an institution. Investment, whether domestic or in the form of foreign direct
investment, contributes significantly to economic growth. Stronger institutions and low
inflation are key growth factors.
A new method to estimate the dynamic impact of financial development on economic
growth was the error correction based pooled mean group (PMG), mean group (MG), dy-
namic fixed effect (DFE) model for analysing dynamic heterogeneous panel data. Deme-
triades and Hook Law (2006) examined the impact of financial development and financial
institutions on economic growth for 72 countries over the period 1978-2000. The authors
used a panel data set and employed PMG and MG models. The financial development
indicators were from the bank sector (liquid liabilities and credit to the private sector)
and the main indicators to measure the overall institutional quality, were corruption,
bureaucratic quality, and the rule of law. The findings suggest that financial develop-
ment has highly significant effects on GDP per capita when the financial system follows a
sound institutional framework. Moreover, financial development is most potent in middle-
income countries, where its effects are particularly large when institutional quality is high.
Importantly, the findings suggest that in low-income countries the influence of financial
development is at its weakest; in these countries, more finance without sound institutions
may not succeed in delivering long-run economic benefits.
Loayza and Rancière (2006) studied two opposing aspects of the literature on the of
the financial system on economic activity. In particular, they investigated the impact of
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financial development and financial fragility on economic growth for 75 countries using
annual data during the period from 1960 to 2000. The measure of financial develop-
ment was the credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP, and for the financial
fragility is proxied by the number of banking crises and the financial volatility measured
from the standard deviation of the growth rate of private domestic credit to GDP. They
employed a PMG and MG estimator through a panel of cross-country and time-series
observations. The results suggest different effects of financial development and credit
expansion on economic growth. In particular, there is a positive impact of financial size
on economic activity in the long-run and co-exists with a mostly negative effect in the
short-run.In order to explain the short-run finance-growth relationship, the study esti-
mated the relationship between the short-run coefficients and financial fragility (banking
crises and financial volatility). The results confirm that for financially fragile countries,
namely those that experience banking crises or suffer high volatility, present significantly
negative short-run effects of financial development on economic growth.
Samargandi et al. (2015) revisited the relationship between financial development and
economic growth for a panel of 52 middle-income countries in a sample period from 1980
to 2008. The variables for financial development are widely used in the literature, such as
the ratio of liabilities and the ratio of total bank assets. The authors combined these three
variables into a single indicator by using the principal component analysis (PCA). Also,
the employed the dynamic model of Pooled Mean Group (PMG) and the quadratic form
of financial development series to consider the short and long-run equilibrium as well as
the nonlinear relationship between the financial development and economic growth. The
findings suggest that there is an insignificant impact of financial development on eco-
nomic growth in the short-run and an inverted U-shaped relationship between finance
and growth in the long-run. Thus there is a threshold point after which the impact of
financial development on economic growth is negative, demonstrating that the financial
development and economic growth are not linearly related. Overall, the impact varies
across the countries due to the heterogeneous nature of economic structures, institutional
quality, and financial markets.
Sohag et al. (2015) examined whether there is any significant impact in the short run
or long run, of financial development on economic growth from nine island economies
over 30 years (1980 to 2009). Using a panel data set the authors employed error cor-
rection based PMG, MG, and dynamic fixed effect (DFE) model for analysing dynamic
heterogeneous of their data. The results from the PMG estimates demonstrate that fi-
nancial development has a negative short-run impact on economic growth. , in the long
run, there is a positive and a homogenous effect of financial development on growth across
the island economy.
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2.3.3.3 Evaluative summary of panel-data studies
In summary, having review the panel data studies in Table 2.4, Pradhan et al. (2016),
Anwar and Cooray (2012), Narayan and Narayan (2013), and Samargandi et al. (2015)
bring together significant contribution to the knowledge, considering the dynamic proper-
ties of panel data and reducing the country heterogeneity effects, since they investigated
more homogeneous group of countries. Additionally, the periods examined include the
year 2008, thus capturing the stress time when the crisis erupted. However, studies that
include the period of crisis, provide little contribution to the knowledge, since the num-
ber of countries examined is either too small (Muhammad et al., 2016), or too big and
heterogeneous, thus failing to reduce the panel heterogeneities (Ductor and Grechyna,
2014; Durusu-Ciftci et al., 2017). Furthermore, the study of Swamy and Dharani (2018)
which covers the longest examined period (1983-2013), provides substantial evidence of
bidirectional effect of financial development on growth, but has marginal contribution,
since it examines causality effects, a research that has been largely conducted in previous
studies.
However, the results from the panel data studies that have a major contribution
are mixed. In general, the view that the well-developed financial system, technological
changes (innovation) and the quality of governance contribute to economic growth across
all panel of countries whether developed or developing. Nevertheless, as panel data studies
enable a researcher to analyze over a long period for the same countries a number of
important financial issues that cannot be addressed using cross-sectional or time series
data sets, there are still issues to be considered. In particular, Pradhan et al. (2016),
Narayan and Narayan (2013) and Samargandi et al. (2015) do not examine simultaneously
the impact of the bank and stock market sector on economic growth. Instead, they
used either bank or stock market indicators as proxies of financial development and the
interaction of both was never the case. Also, their prime objective was to investigate the
finance-growth relationship by employing a new panel econometric technique, thus not
capturing any structural change because of the crisis period. This highlights the need for
further research to be considered as the results for the studies covering periods tend to
be more negative.
What merits in the current study, is that using a panel data set examined two
new aggregate indices to investigate the effect of the financial bank and stock market
sector development on economic growth, through a comparative approach before/after
the crisis, which leads to more accurate results and clarifies the queries arising from the
mixed results of the abovementioned studies.
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2.4 Conclusions of empirical literature
To summarise, the cross-sectional studies provide conclusive evidence that financial devel-
opment positively affects economic growth, but failed in explaining the direction of causal-
ity between finance and growth. The time-series studies focused more on the causality
direction and the characteristics of each country, arriving at a less uniform conclusion.
In particular, when one country was investigated, concluded in unidirectional causality
results, where finance-led growth, while for studies that more than one country was exam-
ined, the results do not provide conclusive evidence of unidirectional causality hypothesis.
Nevertheless, the dynamic relationship (VAR-VECM models) is found significantly pos-
itive. The results from the panel data studies, in turn, are not conclusive due to the
specific characteristics of the countries, while there is substantial evidence of a signifi-
cantly positive long-run relationship.
A general view obtained from the review of the empirical research is that the finance-
growth relationship differs across developing and developed countries. In developing coun-
tries, finance causes growth in the earlier stages of economic development, while on the
contrary, in developed countries, growth causes financial development. Additionally, the
causal relationship between financial development and economic growth depends on which
measures of financial development were used as well as the level of development of the
financial sector. Furthermore, the main channels through which financial development
lead to a higher level of economic growth is the efficiency of investment and increased
productivity through the capital accumulation of savings. Finally, the level of govern-
ment intervention, the quality of financial institutions, and the financial reforms might
be the main reasons for country-specific results or in other words, country heterogeneity.
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Chapter Three
Data
3.1 Introduction
The chapter describes the dataset in detail. The decision on the type of data collected
depends on the nature of the analysis of this survey. In particular, the study is based
on panel data analysis. This statistical method is widely used in econometrics to analyze
two-dimensional data over time for the same entities, such as countries. Datasets come in
various forms, and the most commonly used in empirical research for the relationship be-
tween economic growth and financial development are cross-sectional, time series, pooled
cross-sectional and panel data. Before proceeding with the description of the dataset, it
is worth analyzing more profound the nature of the data as follows:
(1) First, the cross-section data is a set of observations collected at the same point of
time for subjects, such as individuals, firms, countries or regions. This type of data has
applications when analysing differences among subjects.
(2) Second, the time-series data that is a set of observations on values collected at dif-
ferent points of time. They are usually collected at fixed intervals, such as daily, weekly,
monthly, quarterly, annually basis. This type of data has applications in macroeconomics,
primarily in financial economics.
(3) Third, the pooled cross-sectional data is a set of observations that is a combina-
tion of time series and cross-section data. What is remarkable in this type of data is that
they do not refer to the same unit. They are randomly collected from a large population
independently of each other at different points in time.
(4) Fourth, panel data or longitudinal data is a type of pooled data in their nature.
The difference between pooled data and panel data is that panel data are repeated ob-
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servations on the same cross-section, observed for several periods. In other words, it is
randomly selected the cross-section only once, and once that is done, it is followed by
each statistical unit within this cross-section over time.
An additional distinction to be made is that of a balanced and an unbalanced panel.
A balanced panel has the same number of time-series observations for each cross-section
unit and viewed the other way around, the same number of cross-sectional units at each
time point. An unbalanced panel has some cross-sections with fewer observations or ob-
servations at different times to others. In both cases, the same techniques are used to
estimate the model, and the software package automatically calculates the missing obser-
vations.
This thesis follows the most relevant and recent literature in selecting an appropriate
framework of data for the estimation and uses a dataset consisted of an unbalanced
panel. Panel estimation techniques include both time series and cross-sectional elements
of data (Wooldridge, 1999; Pesaran et al., 1999; Arellano, 2003; Hsiao, 2014) and a con-
siderable number of studies in the literature discussed in this study used the panel data
estimation. For the relationship between financial development and economic growth,
King and Levine (1993c) used in his research four different bank development measures.
The four measures were the bank credit plus central bank domestic assets to GDP, the
ratio of credit allocation to private business to total domestic credit, liquid liabilities of
banks and non-banks, and the ratio of credit to private business to GDP. Since then,
many studies have applied panel data estimation in its empirical work. However, it is
important that much literature has found that the power of finance weakens when esti-
mation is changed from pure cross-section data to annual data (Favara, 2003; Beck and
Demirguc-Kunt, 2009).
Apart from the analysis of the types of datasets being used within the empirical liter-
ature, advantages or disadvantages and any limitations that are relevant for the analysis,
it is crucial to becoming familiar with the data. The following section provides the list of
countries and describes the data as well as the sources from where are obtained. Section
3 provides all graphs of the variables used in this study.
3.2 The sample
This study employs annual data for 26 EU countries over the period 1990 to 2016. The
list of countries is provided in Table 3.1 below. The economies with a population of less
than 500,000 in 1990 are excluded from the sample. Also, the sample period is intention-
ally selected to include the transition economies when changing from a centrally planned
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economy to a market economy. If all data were available, theoretically, it could give
strongly balanced panels with 702 observations (26 cross-sectional observations times 27
time-series observations), but there are some missing observations and make the dataset
unbalanced.
However, in the present study, the missing observations for the dependent variable and
for the variables that are proxies for the banking sector are approximately from 1% to
2%, while for the financial market sector do not exceed 10%. Regarding the macroe-
conomic variables, the lack of observations is approximately 4%. The precise number
of observations is described in Table 5.1 (Descriptive statistics) of chapter five, in the
last row in each group of countries examined. All variables are expressed either as the
share of GDP (%) or as a ratio in percentage. The data for the financial development
measures and macroeconomic variables are collected from the Global Financial Develop-
ment Database (2017), the World Bank Data, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and
Eurostat Database.
3.2.1 List of countries
The research also explores three regional panels of countries to capture the heterogeneity
in the EU. The advantage of regional panels is that the finance-growth relationship can
be investigated for a more homogeneous panel of countries and compare the results for
different regions. Also, the countries Luxembourg and Malta have a population less than
500,000 in 1990 and are excluded from the sample (World Bank Global Development
Network Database). The full sample of EU countries is divided into three regional groups
according to the background of their economy and geography and are displayed in Table
3.1 below.
Table 3.1: Regional panels list of countries
Panel A Panel B Panel C
Austria Bulgaria Cyprus
Belgium Croatia Greece
Denmark Czech Republic Italy
Finland Estonia Spain
France Hungary Portugal
Germany Latvia
Ireland Lithuania
Netherlands Poland
Sweden Romania
United Kingdom Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Note: PANEL A : North-West EU countries. PANEL B: Central Eastern
EU countries or transition economies. PANEL C: South EU countries.
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3.2.2 List of variables
Table 3.2 below provides a brief description of all variables used in the study.
Table 3.2: List of variables
variables Description of variables Sources
GGDP Annual growth rate of GDP (%) World Bank
LLY Liquid liabilities to GDP(%) World Bank-IMF
PRIVY Credit to private sector to GDP(%) World Bank-IMF
BTOT Total banks assets ratio (%) World Bank-IMF
MCAP Stock market capitalization to GDP (%) World Bank-IMF
TVT Stock market total value traded to GDP(%) World Bank-IMF
TOR Stock market turnover ratio (%) World Bank-IMF
INFL Inflation rate (%) World Bank
CPI Consumer Price Index World Bank
FDI Net inflows of foreign direct investments to GDP(%) World Bank
OPEN Trade openness to GDP(%) World Bank
DEBT Central government debt to GDP(%) World Bank
TAX Tax revenue to GDP(%) World Bank
Cr0809 Dummy variable for the sub-prime crisis (2008-2009)
Cr0816 Dummy variable for the ongoing crisis (2008-2016)
3.2.3 Description of data
3.2.3.1 Dependent variable
Annual GDP growth rate (GGDP %) is the annual percentage growth rate of
Gross Domestic Product at market prices based on constant local currency (aggregates
are based on constant 2010 U.S. dollars). GDP is the sum of gross value added by
all resident producers in the economy plus any product taxes. The GDP growth rate
measures the change in the volume of its output or the real incomes of its residents. In
other words, it estimates how fast the economy is growing, where GDP is the economic
output of a nation and is the primary indicator of economic health. The data are obtained
from World Bank national accounts data, and OECD National Accounts data files.
3.2.3.2 Measures of financial development
Cihak et al. (2012) introduced the Global Financial Development Database that is an
extensive dataset of financial system characteristics and includes the following categories
of measures: First, the size of financial institutions and markets (financial depth); sec-
ond, the degree to which individuals can and do use financial services (access); third, the
efficiency of financial intermediaries and markets in intermediating resources and facili-
tating financial transactions (efficiency); four, the stability of financial intermediaries and
markets (stability).
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The conventional measures of financial development on which the research is based are
divided into two groups. The first group measures the financial banking sector devel-
opment, while the second measure the stock market development. The ratio of liquid
liabilities to GDP, credit to the private sector by deposit money banks and other financial
institutions to GDP and the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of the commercial
bank plus central bank assets to GDP-comprise the banking sector. The stock market
capitalization to GDP, the stock market turnover ratio to GDP, and the total value of
all traded shares-comprise the market sector. The variables have received much attention
in the empirical literature, but the stock market indicators are available for a smaller
number of countries.
Measures of bank sector
Liquid liabilities (LLY to GDP %) is the ratio of liquid liabilities to GDP, which is
widely known as broad money to GDP (M3). They are calculated as the sum of currency
and deposits in central banks (M0), adding the transferable deposits and electronic cur-
rency (M1), as well as time and saving deposits, foreign currency transferable deposits,
certificates of deposits and securities of purchase agreements (M2), plus travelers checks,
foreign currency time deposits, and shares of mutual funds or market funds held by resi-
dents. Liquid liabilities is one of the primary indicators used to measure the size, relative
to the economy, financial intermediaries, including three types of financial institutions:
the central bank, deposit money banks and other financial institutions. It is calculated
as the liquid liabilities of banks and non-bank financial intermediaries over GDP.
Credit to the private sector (PRIVY to GDP %) is the ratio of credit to the
private sector by deposit money of banks and other financial institutions to GDP. Credit
to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector by financial
corporations and other financial intermediaries divided to GDP, excluding credit issued
to the government and public enterprises. Private credit also excludes credit issued by
central banks. The higher this measure results in, the larger financial resources provided
to the private sector of a country and so the greater space for the private sector to develop
and grow. The better the private sector gets and the more extensive the role it has in the
national economy, the better is generally the health and development of the economy of a
country. It measures the general financial intermediary activities provided to the private
sector.
Total banks assets (BTOT %) is the ratio of commercial bank assets to the sum of
the commercial bank plus central bank assets. Commercial bank assets are the total assets
held by deposit money banks and include the deposit money banks and other financial
institutions that accept transferable deposits, such as demand deposits. It proxies the
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advantage of financial intermediaries in channeling savings to investments, monitoring
firms, influencing corporate governance, and undertaking risk management relative to the
central bank. It is a comprehensive measure of the size of the banks and indicates the
capital adequacy for protecting depositors according to the Guarantee Deposit Scheme.
However, it is available for a smaller number of countries and has been used less.
Measures of the stock market sector
Stock market capitalization (MCAP to GDP %) is the ratio of the total value
of listed domestic shares in a stock market as an indicator of market size, namely stock
market capitalization to GDP. Stock market capitalization (also known as market value)
is the share price times the number of shares outstanding for listed domestic companies.
Investment funds, unit trusts, and companies whose only business goal is to hold shares
of other listed companies are excluded. The rationale behind this measurement is the size
of the stock market of the economy.
Total value traded (TVT to GDP %) is the ratio of the total value of all traded
shares, which is calculated by multiplying the number of domestic shares traded by their
respective matching prices in a stock market exchange as a percentage of GDP and can be
used to gauge market liquidity on an economy-wide basis. According to the World Data
basis, the figures are single estimated (one side of the transaction is counted). Companies
which are admitted to listing and admitted to trading are also included in the data. Data
are the end of year values. This measure is an indicator to measure market activity,
namely stock market total value traded.
Turnover ratio (TOR %) is the ratio of domestic shares traded on domestic exchanges
for a period divided by the average of the stock market capitalisation for this period,
namely stock market turnover ratio. It also indicates how easy, or difficult; it is to sell
shares of a particular stock on the market. Furthermore, the more active the market, the
higher the trading volume and the higher the share turnover ratio will be. This measure
is an indicator to measure market liquidity and efficiency. A high value of the turnover
ratio will indicate a more liquid and potentially more efficient equity market.
3.2.3.3 Control variables
Inflation rate (INFL %) is a proxy for macroeconomic stability. It is measured by
the consumer price index and reflects the annual rate at which prices increase over time,
resulting in a fall of the purchasing value of money.
Foreign direct investments (FDI to GDP %) is the net inflows of foreign direct
investments to GDP, which is the main channel of transmission from financial develop-
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ment to economic growth. This series shows net inflows (new investment inflows less
disinvestment) in the reporting economy from foreign investors and is divided by GDP.
Trade openness (OPEN to GDP %) is the trade openness to GDP, which is the
sum of exports plus imports and is an indicator of the relative importance of international
trade in the economy of a country.
3.2.3.4 Measures for Fiscal policy
Debt (Debt to GDP %) is the total stock of government contractual obligations to
others expiring on a particular date. It also includes domestic and foreign liabilities such
as currency and money deposits, securities other than shares, and loans. It is the gross
amount of government liabilities reduced by the amount of equity and financial derivatives
held by the government. Because debt is a stock rather than a flow, it is measured as of
a given date, usually the last day of the fiscal year.
Government expenses (EXP to GDP %) is the cash payments for operating ac-
tivities of the government to provide goods and services. It includes compensation of
employees (such as wages and salaries), interest and subsidies, grants, social benefits, and
other expenses such as rent and dividends.
Taxrevenues (TAX to GDP %) is the cash receipts from taxes, social contributions,
and other revenues such as fines, fees, rent, and income from property or sales.
3.2.3.5 Dummy variables for crisis periods
In the study, the dummy variables take the value 1 to capture the sub-prime crisis period
or the ongoing crisis period; and take the value 0 to capture the remaining regular/normal
periods.
Cr0809 covers the sub-prime crisis period from 2008 and 2009, when the financial crisis
unfolded.
Cr0816 covers the ongoing crisis period from 2008 to 2016, which corresponds to the
whole period after the crisis.
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3.3 The Figures of data
3.3.1 Figures of the dependent variable
Figure 3.1: The mean of GDP growth rate over the period 1990-2016.
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
90 92 94 96 98 00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16
G
D
P 
G
R
O
W
TH
 %
YEARS  
Figure 3.1 above illustrates the mean of GDP growth rate of 26 EU countries over the
period 1990-2016. As the figure demonstrates, there is a sharp fall in 1991 and 1992,
where the average declines from 1.9% to -1.4% (approximately -3.3%). Turning to figure
3.1, it can be easily observed that the growth rate from 1994 to 2007 is moving slightly
over 4% and in 2007 it is slightly less than 5%. In the years 2008 and 2009, when the great
recession broke out, the economic growth shrunk by around 6%. After 2009, the growth
rate is close to 1.3%. Due to the continued recession and subsiding domestic demand, in
2012, growth drops (-0.4%) and remains slow until 2013 (0.3%). After 2014, even though
signs of improvement have appeared and growth moves close to 2%, it seems that recovery
remains uncertain and fragile and is not approaching the pre-crisis levels.
As seen in the individual cross-sectional graph (figure 3.2), the decrease in growth rate in
the years 1991-1992 is from the transition economies. After their liberalization from the
centralised socialist economic system, all these countries experienced budget deficits and
hyperinflation, which in turn led-drastic falls in output and economic collapse. In partic-
ular, in 1991, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Romania had approximately -12%, while
in 1992, the outliers were from Latvia 35%, Lithuania -21.3% and Estonia -21%. After
1992, there is an upward trend, and Central-Eastern Europe and the Baltic states succeed
in their early stabilization effects. Also, it is worth noticing that Estonia, Latvia, and
Lithuania faced the most profound economic decline across all EU countries and reached
approximately -14.7% in 2009.
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3.3.2 Figures of financial development measures
Figures of the Bank sector measures
Figure 3.3: The mean of liquid liabilities (LLY) as shared of GDP (%)
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Figure 3.3 above shows the liquid liabilities shared to GDP of 26 EU countries. The
degree of liquid liabilities had increased steadily over fourteen years (1995-2009), and the
average value of 53.6% reached more than 91%. After the financial crisis, the average
value did not exceed 91% and had been moving steadily at this level.
Figure 3.4 illustrates the individual cross-section of liquid liabilities in 26 EU countries.
Aside from Cyprus, which have the highest share, UK, Germany, Netherlands, and Spain
also have high ratios to GDP that are much more than 100%, while other countries have
less than 100%. Transition economies have a lower ratio of liquid liabilities than the
rest of European countries. Furthermore, the graph shows that Romania, Lithuania, and
Slovenia are the countries with the smallest ratios.
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Figure 3.5: The mean of credit to private sector (PRIVY) as shared of GDP (%)
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Figure 3.5 above shows the mean of credit to the private sector of 26 EU countries. A
rapid expansion since 1995, reaching from 50% to 105% by end-2008, implies that bank
credit was growing on an average annual rate of about 4 percent. Bank credit to the
private sector slowed and by the end of 2009 turned negative, reaching from 105% by-end
of 2016 to 86%. The average rate dropped at an annual rate of about 3%, slightly less
than the rapid expansion in fourteen years.
Figure 3.6 illustrates the individual cross-section of credit to the private sector in 26
EU countries. Similarly to liquid liabilities, Cyprus presents the highest share, reaching
from 213% in 2008 to 261% in 2013. UK, Spain, and the Netherlands also have high ratios
to GDP that are much more than 100%, reaching 194%, 172% and 124% in 2009 respec-
tively, while other countries have less than 100%. Transition economies have a lower ratio
of liquid liabilities than the rest of European countries. Furthermore, the graph shows
that Romania, Lithuania, and Slovenia are the countries with the smallest ratios Bank
credit.
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Figure 3.7: The mean of the total bank assets (BTOT %)
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Figure 3.7 above shows the mean of the total commercial bank assets of 26 EU countries.
Since 1992, the mean from 90% reached to 99% by -2006, and then the average moves
slightly more than 99%. From 2010 slowed, reaching by-end of 2015 to 97.2%, and 98.3%
in 2016. A directive of the European Parliament on deposit guarantee schemes requires
all members to create deposit insurance for at least 90% of the deposited amount. The
purpose was to prevent the bank runs from an insolvent bank.
Figure 3.8 illustrates the individual cross-section of commercial bank assets in 26 EU
countries. Over the period 1991-1994, some of the transition economies presented low
ratios. In particular, Hungary had the lowest ratio of 43% and Estonia 44% in 1991.
Also, Poland had 68% in 1994. Other outliers of low ratios were from Greece in 1994,
with a ratio by about 68%, Bulgaria by about 64% in 2000, and Ireland by about 81% in
2015.
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Figures of the stock market sector measures
Figure 3.9: The mean of the stock market capitalisation (MCAP) as shared of GDP (%)
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Figure 3.9 above illustrates the stock market capitalisation of 26 EU countries. As it is
evident, in the years 1992 and 1993 the average is slightly more than 20% and by the end
of 2000 reached 65%, and the main reason for the rapid growth might be the information
technology bubble that was a period of extreme growth in the usage and adaptation of
the Internet by businesses and consumers. Some other reasons might be the sharp fall in
exchange rates in some Asian countries (1997-1999), the growth stimulus that was pro-
vided by the reductions in interest rates across European countries, and restrictive policies
designed to reduce fiscal deficits to ensure compliance with economic and monetary union
(EMU) entry criteria of 3% of GDP. In 2001, stock market prices took a sharp downturn,
and many internet-based companies, commonly referred to as dot-coms, failed, and the
bubble collapsed. Also, after the terrorist attack on the 11th of September on 2001, the
market fell by about 20%, and the average of stock market capitalisation across Euro-
pean countries in 2003 reached 44%. Then the newly created currency area of the twelve
participating European Union Member States created a rapid growth from 2002 until
2007 and reached to 69%. During the crisis, the stock market activity sharply declined
to reach 35% in 2009 and moving by around the same level until 2012 reached 57% in 2016.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the cross-section individual MCAP and the majority of transi-
tion economies move around 40%, with the lower rate in Latvia, where the ratio does not
exceed 14%. The higher ratio becomes from North-west countries, where the ratio exceeds
40%. The outliers as shown from the graph, are from Spain in 1999 (198%), Finland and
UK in 2000 (238%, 171% respectively), and the Slovak Republic in 2006 (210%).
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Figure 3.11: The mean of the total value traded (TVT) as shared of GDP (%)
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Figure 3.11 above illustrates the total value traded of 26 EU countries. As it is demon-
strated in the years 1992 and 1993 the average is 7%, while in 1994 and 1995 is 10%. The
reasons are the same as those of the stock market capitalisation. Then, by the end of 2001,
an expansion of reached 49%. After 2001, the total value traded fell by about 24%, and
the average across European countries in 2003 reached 25%. Then it was increased until
2007 and reached to 52%. From 2007 and after the crisis, the stock market activity sharply
declined to reach 35% in 2009, and 24% in 2012. After 2012, there is a recovery, and the
recent ratio of total value traded reached 48% in 2016, which is 4% less than the 2007 level.
Figure 3.12 illustrates the cross-section individual of total value traded and the majority
of transition economies move around 40%, with the lower rate in Latvia, where the ratio
does not exceed 12%. The higher ratio becomes from North-west countries and Spain,
where the ratio exceeds 40%. The outliers as shown from the graph, are from Spain in
1999 (198%), Finland and UK in 2000 (238%, 171% respectively), and the Slovak Republic
in 2006 (210%).
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Figure 3.13: The mean of the turnover ratio (TOR%)
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Figure 3.13 above shows the stock market turnover ratio of 26 EU countries. It is evident
that from 1992, where the ratio was 33%, in 2000 reached 69%. After 2000, the ratio fell
by about 25%, and the average across European countries in 2002 reached 44%. Then a
rapid growth achieved until 2007 and reached to 75%. From 2007 and after the crisis, the
stock market liquidity declined to reach 45% in 2012. After 2012, there is rapid growth,
and the recent ratio of stock market turnover ratio reached 60% in 2016.
Figure 3.14 illustrates the individual cross-section of stock market turnover ratio. As
previous stock market development variables, the majority of transition economies move
at the lower level. The outliers as shown from the graph, are from Poland in 1994 (198%),
Slovakia in 1996 (138%), Germany in 1997 (141%), France in 1998 (147%), Cyprus in
2000 (177%), Spain in 2001 (310%), Finland, Netherland, UK, Sweden in 2007 (around
160% to 170%), Germany in 2008 (248%), and Italy in 2014 (341%).
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3.3.3 Figures of the control-macroeconomic variables
Figure 3.15: The mean of the inflation rate (INFL%)
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Figure 3.15 illustrates the mean of the inflation rate of 26 EU countries. As can be seen
it is obvious that inflation rate declines from approximately 7% in 1990 to 2.1% in 2003.
Apparently, there are some fluctuations before and after 2001 where the rate arrived 3.5%,
and before after 2008, where it reached 4.3%. Between 2009 and end-2011, inflation rate
was expected to be lower (around 1%), given the severity and length of the recession.
After 2012, it has been persistently low despite the progressive economic recovery, and
this might be mostly related to the fall in the price of oil since 2011. Since mid-2014, the
fall of inflation rate has become even more severe and is moving around 0.2%.
Turning now to the cross-sections individual graph (3.16) the most extreme observa-
tions (outliers) are in Central-Eastern and Baltic countries and specifically in Poland
(600% in 1990) and Bulgaria (1200% in 1997). Indeed, excessively high inflation rates in
a large number of countries in the sample is a useful information and deletion of outliers
is controversial.
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Figure 3.17: The mean of the net foreign direct investments (FDI) as shared to GDP (%)
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Figure 3.17 above shows the mean net foreign direct investments of 26 EU countries. As
demonstrated from the graph, FDI presents an upward trend from 1990 (1.6%) to 2000
(9.6%), and as evidenced in figure 3.18, the increase may be partly due to higher invest-
ments in transition economies. Also, in the cross-section individual graphs (3.18), can
easily be observed an extreme observation in Netherlands (approximately 700%) in 2007.
This occurred due to the takeover of ABN AMRO (Algemene Bank Nederland-Amsterdam
Rotterdam Bank) bank from the consortium (Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC and
Banco Santander) of foreign banks, which boosted FDI inflows into the Netherlands. By
2007, ABN AMRO was the second-largest bank in the Netherlands and the eighth-largest
in Europe by assets.
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Figure 3.19: The mean of the trade openness (OPEN) as shared to GDP (%)
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Figure 3.19 above shows the trade openness (OPEN) as shared to GDP (%) of 26 EU
countries. As shown by the upward trend, 70% in 1990 and 103% in 2008, the ratio of
trade to GDP, has grown for most EU countries as a result of globalisation and trade
liberalisation. Also, transition economies that have become members of the EU have en-
couraged the role of the private sector through strong privatization programs and opened
up their economy to international trade. Moreover, as was expected, there is a sharp drop
in 2009 by 12%, as the trade to GDP reached to 91%, but shortly after the full recovery
took place and the international trade reached to 114% of GDP in 2016.
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3.3.4 Figures of the fiscal policy measures
Figure 3.21: The mean of the government debt as shared to GDP (%)
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The graph above illustrates the government debt of 26 EU countries. As it is evident, in
the years 1990 to 1993 the average from 63% raised to 75%, while two years after sharply
declined to 56% and in the early of 2000 reached 49.5%. In 1992, the countries-members
of the European Union signed the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, under which they pledged to
reduce their budget deficit and debt levels. However, in the early 2000s, some EU mem-
ber states were failing to stay within the confines of the Maastricht criteria and turned to
securitizing future government revenues to reduce their debts to the lowest average level
of 44% in 2007. After the financial crisis, several European countries experienced the
collapse of financial institutions, high government debts, and rapidly rising bond yield
spreads in government securities. The sovereign debt crisis peaked between 2008 and
2014, where the average reached 76.6%. After 2014 the average is slightly less than 74%,
and the main reason of this reduction of public debt might be the policy of buying gov-
ernment bonds and other public assets designed to boost the economy for the Eurozone
countries, which are 19 countries out of 26 in the sample.
Figure 3.21 illustrates the cross-section individual DEBT and the lowest average of debt
is displayed in transition economies moving around 40%, with the lower rate in Estonia
not exceeding 10% in 2016. The higher ratio becomes from South countries, where the ra-
tio exceeds 87%, while for North-West countries, the average debt is approximately 63%.
The outliers, as shown from the graphs, are from Greece in 2016 (181%), followed by Italy
133% and Portugal 130% in 2016 as well. It is worth noticing that Ireland reduced the
debt from 120% in 2012 to 75% in 2016.
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Figure 3.23: The mean of the government expenditures as shared to GDP (%)
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Figure 3.23 above illustrates the mean of government expenditures of 26 EU countries.
Similarly to public debt, in the years 1990 to 1993 the average from 37.5% raised to
40.5%, while in the early of 2000 reached 34%. As described in the previous graph, the
main reason is the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty criteria (also known as the
convergence criteria), under which they pledged to limit their deficit spending as well as
the private funding of a significant part of social services influence the structure and the
amount of government spending. However, after the financial crisis, public expenditures
peaked between 2008 and 2013, where the average reached approximately 40%. After
2014 the average is 38.3%, and the main reason for this reduction of public expenditures
might be the priority of governments to reduce the budget deficits and in turn the public
debt.
Figure 3.24 illustrates the cross-section individual Government expenditures and the low-
est average is illustrated in transition economies moving around 32%, with the lower rate
in Estonia and the ratio did not exceed 3% in 2016. The higher ratio becomes from South
countries, where the ratio is approximately 40%, while for North-West countries the aver-
age public spending is slightly less than 39%. The outliers, as shown from the graphs, are
from Croatia in 2014 (87%), followed by Greece 60% in 2013, and Ireland 62% in 2010.
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Figure 3.25: The mean of the taxrevenues as shared to GDP (%)
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Figure 3.25 above illustrates the mean of tax revenues of 26 EU countries. It is evident,
in the years 1990 to 2011, the average moves around 40% to 42% and reached in 2016
42.5%. The diagram 3.26 illustrates the cross-section individual Taxrevenues, and the
lower average is presented in transition economies moving around 37%. The higher average
becomes from North-West countries, which is around 77.6%, while for South countries the
average tax revenues are approximately 40%. The outliers, as shown from the graphs,
are from Finland 54% in 2016, followed by Denmark 51%, Greece 50%, Sweden 49%, and
Italy 48% in 2016 as well. It is worth noticing that Ireland has the lowest ratio of tax
revenues, 27% and Romania 29% both in 2016.
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Chapter Four
Methodology
4.1 Introduction
This chapter describes the estimation techniques that will be employed to compute the
estimates of the parameters of the econometric models. The models are outlined and
explained using equations, noting any weaknesses in the approach. In particular, it de-
scribes important features of panel analysis and the advantages and disadvantages of
working with panels.
The simplest way to deal with panel data is to estimate a pooled regression, which involves
estimation of a single equation on all data together as described in details in section 4.2
below. Pooling the data, it is implicitly assumed that the average values of the variables
and the relationship between them are constant over time and across all cross-sectional
units in the sample. While this is a simple way to proceed and requires as few parameters
as possible, it has some severe limitations. Indeed, it can be estimated separately by
employing time-series regressions of each country, but this may be a sub-optimal way to
proceed since this approach does not take into account any common structure present in
the series of interest. Alternatively, it can be estimated separately by employing cross-
sectional regressions for each of the periods, but again this may be not wise if there is
common variation in the series over time.
According to Baltagi (1997) and Hsiao (2014), the important advantages of making full
use of panel data structure are:
• First, the techniques of panel data estimation can take into account the individual
heterogeneity by allowing subject-specific variables.
• Second, it can be addressed a broader range of issues and deal with more complex
problems with panel data than would be possible with pure time series or pure
cross-sectional data alone.
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• Third, it is often of interest to explore how variables change over time. Thus, using
pure time-series data would usually require a long run of data to get a sufficient
number of observations to conduct meaningful hypothesis tests. By combining time-
series and cross-sectional data, the number of degrees of freedom can be increased,
and thus the power of tests.
• Four, employing the dynamic behaviour of a large number of countries at the same
time, introduces additional variation which can help to mitigate problems of multi-
collinearity that may arise if time series are modelled individually.
• Five, by appropriately structuring the model, the impact of certain forms of omitted
variables bias in regression results can be removed.
Asteriou and Price (2001) argue that the basic idea behind panel data analysis is that
the individual relationships will all have the same parameters, which is known as pooling
assumption. Then, if the pooling assumption is correct, panel data estimation can offer
the following considerable advantages:
• First, an increase in the number of observations.
• Second, pooling several periods of data increases the precision in estimation.
• Third, the problem of omitted variables, which may cause biased estimates in a
single individual regression, might not occur in a panel context.
The disadvantage of panel estimation is that if the pooling assumption is not correct,
there may be problems, which are often referred to a heterogeneous panel (because the
parameters are different across the cross-sections), and usually the panel data estimator
would be expected to give a representative average estimate of the individual parameters.
Also, in the case of pooled data, the residuals are not assumed as serially correlated when
we apply a regression analysis. In the case of panel data, it cannot be assumed that
the observations are independently distributed across time, and the serial correlation of
regression residuals becomes an issue. Thus, panel data studies must be prepared that
unobserved factors while acting differently on different cross-sectional units, may affect
the same statistical unit when followed through time. This makes the statistical analysis
of panel data more difficult. However, panel data provide useful information on individual
behavior both across time and across individuals and this major advantage is analyzed
more detailed in the linear panel data models.
The remainder of this chapter presents the methodological approaches employed for the
empirical investigation of the data. Section 2 of this chapter describes the panel data
estimation methods, including the linear panel models, pooled OLS models as well as the
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fixed and random effects methods. Section 3 describes the diagnostic test used for panel
data methods, namely the Hausman test and section 4 presents the correlation analysis
including multicollinearity test. In section 5 is analysed the cross-sectional dependence
tests, while section 6 describes the testing for stationarity, including panel unit root tests
in order to examine which of the variables are stationary or non-stationary. Section 7
presents the panel cointegration tests to examine if the series has a long-run equilibrium.
In section 8, the dynamic panel models are described including the pooled mean group
(PMG), mean group (MG), and dynamic fixed effects (DFE). Finally, section 9 presents
the multivariate factor analysis, including the principal component analysis (PCA).
4.2 Panel data models
4.2.1 Linear panel models
The panel data set is formulated from a sample that contains N cross-sectional units (for
example, countries) that are observed at different T time periods. A simple panel linear
model with one explanatory variable is given as below:
Yit = α + βXit + uit (4.1)
where α is the constant and β is the coefficient of the independent variable X. The
dependent variable Y and the independent variable X have both i and t subscriptions for
i = 1, ....N and t = 1, ....T ; time periods. If the same sample set consists of a constant
T for all cross-sectional units, then the data set is called balanced. Otherwise, when
observations are missing for the periods of some of the cross-sectional units, then the
panel is called unbalanced. In this simple panel, the coefficients α and β do not have any
subscripts, suggesting that are same across all units and for all years. By relaxing the
rule that the constant α is identical for all cross-sections, it is introduced some degree
of heterogeneity. For better understanding, consider a case where the sample includes
different subgroups of countries, and that differences are expected in their behaviour.
Thus, the model becomes:
Yit = αi + βXit + uit (4.2)
where αi can now differ for each country in the sample. There are different methods of
the panel data models estimation. In general, linear panel data models can be estimated
using three different methods.
1. Pooled OLS method of estimation (also called with common constant)
2. Allowing for fixed effects
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3. allowing for random effects
4.2.2 Pooled OLS model
The pooled OLS model, also known as the common coefficient model, has a common
constant and implies that there are no differences between the estimated cross-sections.
The principal assumption of the pooled OLS method is that the model estimates a common
constant for all cross-sections. This assumption is useful under the hypothesis that the
data set is a priori homogeneous. Thus a pooled model is the most restrictive model
because it specifies constant coefficients, and is given as below:
Yit = α + β
′
Xit + uit (4.3)
where Yit is the dependent variable, α is the intercept term, β is a κ×1 vector of parame-
ters to be estimated on the explanatory variables, and Xit is a 1×κ vector of observations
on the explanatory variables, t = 1, ....T ; i = 1, ....N . The way to deal with such data
would be to estimate a pooled regression, which involves the estimation of a single equa-
tion on all the data together. Thus, the data set for y is stacked up to a single column
containing all cross-sectional and time-series observations, and similarly, all the obser-
vations on each explanatory variable are stacked up to single columns in the X matrix.
Then this equation would be estimated employing the usual OLS method. In this simple
panel, the coefficients α and β do not include any subscripts, denoting that they are same
across all units and all years.
Aditionally, if this model is correctly specified and the assumption that regressors are
uncorrelated with error term E[Xit|uit] = 0, then it can be consistently estimated by
pooled OLS. If the assumption above is violated, and the error term is correlated over
time for a given individual, then the reported standard errors should not be used as they
can be significantly downward biased. In particular, the usual formula for OLS standard
errors in a pooled OLS regression leads to underestimated standard errors and t-statistics
can be greatly inflated. For valid statistical inference, it is necessary to control for pos-
sible correlation of regression model errors over time for a given individual. An efficient
solution to the problem is to pool the data into a panel of time series from different cross-
sectional units.
The pooling of the data generates differences among the different cross-sectional or time-
series observations, and there are broadly two cases of panel estimator approaches that
can be employed in the research, the fixed effects models and the random effects models.
In particular, the first model uses dummy variables to capture the systematic differences
among panel observations results and then removes the unobserved effect before esti-
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mation. The second model, where the unobserved effect is thought to be uncorrelated
with all explanatory variables and any neglected leftover heterogeneity only induce serial
correlation in the composite error term, but it does not cause a correlation between the
composite errors and the explanatory variables.
4.2.3 Fixed effects method
In the fixed effects method, the constant is treated as group-specific. This means that
the model allows for different constants for each group. The fixed effects estimator is
also known as the least square dummy variable (LSDV) estimator because it includes a
dummy variable for each group allowing for different constants for each group. A very
general linear model for panel data is as below:
Yit = αi + β
′
Xit + uit (4.4)
where y is the dependent variable, the dependent and independent variables have both
i and t subscripts for i=1,2,...,N countries and t=1,2,...,T time periods. Then, αi that
can differ for each country in the sample; β is the vector of coefficients; Xit is a vector of
independent variables and uit reflects an error term. The equation above can be written
as below:
Yit = β1X1it + β2X2it + ...+ βkXkit + νit (4.5)
In the generic panel data model, the error term is considered as a composite error term:
νit = αi + uit, where αi is the unobserved individual-specific time-invariant effects (for
example in EU countries this could include geography, climate, culture etc.) which are
fixed over time and uit is time-varying random component effects that are not constant
over time. This model is too general and is not estimable as there are more parameters
to estimate than observations.1To understand this better consider the following model:
Yit = β1X1it + β2X2it + ...+ βkXkit +
DN︷ ︸︸ ︷
α1D1i + α2D2i + .....αNDNi +uit (4.6)
where Yit is the dependent variable, βs are the coefficients of the independent variables
Xs, αs are the coefficients of cross-sectional dummy variables Ds. D1i takes the value 1 for
all observations on the first entity (e.g the first country) in the sample and zero otherwise.
D2i takes the value 1 for all observations on the second entity (e.g the second country)
and zero otherwise, and so on. The matrix notation of the model can be rewritten as:
Y = Dα+Xβ
′
+ u (4.7)
1The number of dummies for panel observations plus the observations for independent variables
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where,
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,
where the dummy variable is the one that allows taking different group-specific esti-
mates for each of the constants for each different section. The composite error νit is
assumed that is uncorrelated with Xs, that is a strong or strict exogeneity assumption
E[uit|αi, Xit, ..., XiT ] = 0, where t = 1, ..., T, so that the error term is assumed to have
zero mean conditional on past, current, and future values of the regressors. If αi is not
correlated with any of the independent variables, ordinary least squares linear regression
methods can be used to yield unbiased and consistent estimates of the regression param-
eters. The fact that αi does not have subscript t, tells us that it does not change over
time and captures all unobserved, time-constant factors that affect Yit. If αi is unobserved
and correlated with at least one of the independent variables, then it will cause omitted
variable bias, and the assumption of strong exogeneity is violated. Thus, the pooled OLS
is biased and inconsistent. This unobserved factor is called the unobserved effect or fixed
effect, which helps us to remember that αi is fixed over time. The resulting bias is called
heterogeneity bias, from omitted time-constant variables.
Within transformation
One of the many ways to eliminate the unobserved effect or fixed effect αi is called fixed
effects transformation. This transformation, known as the within the transformation, in-
volves subtracting the time mean for each entity away from the value of variables. So if
it is defined Ȳi =
1
T
∑T
t=1 Yit as the time mean of the observations on Y for cross-sectional
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unit i, the transformation will be as the following process:
First, consider the model for each i and for one explanatory variable as below:
Yit = αi + βXit + uit (4.8)
where uit is independent, identically distributed (iid) over i and t. The αi are random
variables that capture unobserved heterogeneity, already mentioned above. Now, for each
i, average this equation over time is as below:
Ȳi = αi + βX̄i + ūi (4.9)
where Ȳi = T
−1∑T
t=1 Yit, and so on. Because αi, is fixed over time, it appears in both
above equations. Subtracting (4.8) from (4.9) each t the following results are obtained:
Yit − Ȳi = αi − ᾱi + β(Xit − X̄i) + uit − ūi (4.10)
or
Ÿit = β1Ẍit + üit, t = 1, 2, ..., T, (4.11)
where Ÿit = Yit − Ȳi is the time-demeaned data on Y, and similarly for Ẍit and üit. Also,
αi is constant, hence ᾱi = αi and the effect is eliminated. Thus, the fixed effects transfor-
mation, also called within transformation method, has disappeared the unobserved effect
αi suggesting that the (4.10) equation should be estimated by pooled OLS method. This
pooled OLS based on time-demeaned variables is called fixed effect estimator and also
known as the within estimator. The latter name comes from the fact that OLS on (4.11)
uses the time variation in Y and X within each cross-sectional observation. Under a strict
exogeneity assumption on the explanatory variables, the fixed effects estimator is unbi-
ased, because the idiosyncratic error uit should be uncorrelated with each explanatory
variable across all periods.
It is also possible to extend the fixed effect model by including a set of time dummies.
This is known as the two-way fixed effect model and has the further advantage of captur-
ing any effects that vary over time but are common across the whole panel. Such a model
combines both entity fixed effects and time fixed effects within the same model, and the
LSDV equivalent model contains both cross-sectional and time dummies. However, the
number of parameters to be estimated would now be k+N + T , and the within transfor-
mation in this two-way model would become more complex.
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Before assessing the validity of the fixed effects method, it is necessary to apply tests
to check whether fixed effects should be included in the model. Thus, the standard F-test
can be used to check the fixed effect against the simple common constant OLS method.
The null hypothesis is that all constants are the same (homogeneity) and that therefore,
the common constant method is applicable:
H0 : α1 = α2 = ... = αN (4.12)
The F-statistic is:
F =
(R2FE −R2CC)/(N − 1)
(1−R2FE)/(NT −N − k)
∼ F (N − 1, NT −N − k) (4.13)
where R2FE is the coefficient of determination of the fixed effect model and R
2
CC is the
coefficient of determination of the common constant model. If F-statistic is bigger than
F-critical the null hypothesis is rejected.
4.2.4 Random effects method
The second case of panel estimator approaches that can be employed in the research is
another panel data estimation technique, which is known as the random-effects model.
The difference between the fixed effect and the random effect is that the latter handles the
constants for each section not as a fixed, but as random parameters. Hence the variability
of the constant for each section comes from:
αi = α + µi (4.14)
where µi is a zero mean standard random variable. Now, consider the equation (4.2)
above the general linear model with one explanatory variable for panel data is as below:
Yit = αi + βXit + uit (4.15)
where similarly to the analysis of fixed effects method above, the error term is considered
as a composite error term: νit = αi + uit, but unlikely to the fixed effect model, there
are no dummy variables to capture the heterogeneity (variation) in the cross-sectional
dimension. Instead, this occurs through the µi terms. In the random-effects model, the
assumption requires the cross-sectional error term, which is the unobserved effect µi, to be
uncorrelated with each explanatory variable. Considering the (4.14), the above equation
becomes as below:
Yit = (α + µi) + βXit + uit (4.16)
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which can be written as
Yit = α + βXit + (µi + uit) (4.17)
where the assumption is Cov(Xit, µi) = 0, but the cross-correlations between error terms
for a given cross-sectional unit at different point of times give the following results:
Cov(νit, νis) = Cov(µi + uit, µi + uis) = V ar(µ
2
i ) = σ
2
µ > 0 (4.18)
and the correlation is as below:
Corr(νit, νis) =
Cov(νit, νis)
V ar(νit, νis)
=
σ2µ
σ2µ + σ
2
u
, t 6= s (4.19)
where σ2µ = V ar(µi) and σ
2
u = V ar(uit). The positive serial correlation in the error term
can be substantial, and, if the usual pooled OLS standard errors ignore this correlation,
they will be incorrect in the usual test statistics. Generalized least squares (GLS) can
be used to estimate models with autoregressive serial correlation and solve the serial
correlation problem. This method can be used both for balanced and unbalanced panels.
The transformation involved in the GLS procedure is to subtract a weighted mean of the
Yit and Xit over time (part of the mean rather than the whole mean).
2 This weighted
mean of the Yit and Xit is defined as ’quasi-demeaned’ data as follows:
Yit − θȲi = α(1− θ) + β1(Xit − θX̄i1) + · · ·+ βk(Xit − θX̄i) + (uit − θūi) (4.20)
where
θ = 1−
[
σ2u
(σ2u + Tσ
2
µ)
]1/2
(4.21)
which is between zero and one. Thus, the random effects transformation subtracts a
fraction of that time average, where the fraction depends on σ2u, σ
2
µ, and the number of
periods, T. The parameter θ is a function of the variance of the observation error term,
σ2u, and the variance of the entity error term, σ
2
µ. This transformation is required to
ensure that there are no cross-correlations in the error terms. Equation (4.20) allows us
to relate the RE estimator to both pooled OLS and fixed effects. Pooled OLS is obtained
when θ = 0, and FE is obtained when θ = 1. In practice, the estimate θ is never zero or
one. But if θ is close to zero, the RE estimates will be close to the pooled OLS estimates.
This is the case when the unobserved effect, µi, is relatively unimportant (because it has
a small variance relative to σ2u). It is common for σ
2
µ to be large relative to σ
2
u, in which
2The fixed effects estimator subtracts the time averages from the corresponding variable. The random-
effects transformation subtracts a fraction of that time average.
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case θ will be closer to unity. As T gets large, θ tends to one, and this makes the RE and
FE estimates very similarly. The ideal random effects assumptions include all of the fixed
effects assumptions. In applications of FE and RE, it is usually informative also to com-
pute the pooled OLS estimates. Comparing the three sets of estimates help to determine
the nature of the biases caused by leaving the unobserved effect, µi, entirely in the error
term (as does Pooled OLS) or partially in the error term (as does the RE transformation).
Indeed, it must be noticed that even if µi is uncorrelated with all explanatory variables in
all periods, the pooled OLS standard errors and test statistics are generally invalid: they
ignore the often substantial serial correlation in the composite errors, νit = µi + uit.
Again, one needs to be very careful to check whether there are any implications when
using random-effects compared with the fixed-effects model. Comparing the two meth-
ods, it is expected that the use of the random effects estimator is superior to the fixed
effects estimator because the former is the GLS estimator and the latter is a limited case of
the random-effects model. However, the random-effects model is built under the assump-
tion that the fixed effects are uncorrelated with the explanatory variables, an assumption
that in practice creates strict limitations in panel data treatment.
In general, the difference between the two possible ways of testing panel data models
is that the fixed effects model assumes that each country differs in its intercept term,
whereas the random-effects model assumes that each country differs in its error term.
Also, when the panel is balanced, it might be expected that the fixed effects model works
better. In other cases, where the sample contains limited observations of the existing
cross-sectional units, the random-effects model might be more appropriate.
4.3 Hausman test
The Hausman test is formulated to choose between the fixed effects and random effects
approaches. Hausman (1978) first proposed such a test, essentially whether should be
using a random effect or a fixed effects estimation. Thus, consider the following model:
yit = β0 + β
′
Xit + µi + νit (4.22)
where µi is the unobserved effect. In the random effects it is essentially assumed that:
Cov(Xit, µi) = 0, then, β̂RE, β̂FE are consistent and se(β̂RE) < se(β̂FE). But if the
assumption Cov(Xit, µi) = 0 is not true and Cov(Xit, µi) 6= 0, then fixed effects is solely
consistent, and random effects is no longer consistent. On the basis of the statements
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above, Hausman (1978) suggested comparing β̂RE and β̂FE, the test as below:
W =
(β̂FE − β̂RE)2
V ar(β̂FE)− V ar(β̂RE)
H0∼ χ21 (4.23)
where the null hypothesis (H0), that random effects are consistent and efficient, versus
(H1), that random effects are inconsistent, follows the chi-square distribution. If the
value of the statistic is large, then the difference of the estimates is significant, so the
null hypothesis is rejected. Hence, under the full set of random effects assumptions, the
idea is that one uses the random effects estimates unless the Hausman test rejects. In
practice, a failure to reject means that both RE and FE estimates are sufficiently close
so that it does not matter which is used. A rejection using the Hausman test means that
the fundamental RE assumption is false, and then the FE estimates are used.
4.4 Correlation analysis
An implicit assumption when using OLS estimation method is that the explanatory vari-
ables are not correlated with one another. Generally, it occurs when one predictor variable
in a multiple regression model can be linearly predicted from the others. In this situation,
the coefficient estimates of the multiple regression may change erratically in response to
small changes in the model or the data. Multicollinearity does not reduce the predic-
tive power as a whole, but it only affects calculations regarding individual predictors.
Collinearity is a linear association between two explanatory variables. Two variables are
perfectly collinear if there is an exact linear relationship between them. In particular, two
variables X1 and X2 are perfectly collinear if there exist parameters λ0 and λ1 for all i
observations with the following linear relationship:
X2i = λ0 + λ1X1i (4.24)
where λs 6= 0.
Multicollinearity refers to a situation in which two or more explanatory variables in a
multiple regression model are highly linearly related. For k variables X1, X2, ...,Xk, an
exact perfect linear relationship is said to exist if the following condition is satisfied:
λ0 + λ1X1i + λ2X2i + · · ·+ λkXki = 0 (4.25)
where λs are constants. However, the term multicollinearity is used in a broader sense to
include the case of perfect collinearity, as shown Eq. (4.25), as well as the case where the
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X variables are intercorrelated but not perfectly as below:
λ0 + λ1X1i + λ1X2i + · · ·+ λkXki + νi = 0 (4.26)
where νi is a stochastic error term. In Eq. (4.26) above, there is no exact linear relationship
among the variables, but the Xj variables are nearly perfectly multicollinear if the variance
of νi is small for some set of values for the λs. To see the difference between perfect and
near or less than perfect the equation (4.25) can be written as
X2i = −
λ1
λ2
X1i −
λ3
λ2
X2i − · · · −
λk
λ2
Xki (4.27)
which shows that X2 is exactly linearly related to other variables or how it can be de-
rived from a linear combination of other X variables. In this situation, the coefficient of
correlation between X2 and the linear combination on the right side of equation (4.27) is
bound to be unity. Similarly the equation (4.26) above can be written as
X2i = −
λ1
λ2
X1i −
λ3
λ2
X2i − · · · −
λk
λ2
Xki −
1
λ2
νi (4.28)
which shows that X2 is not an exact linear combination of other X variables because it
is also determined by the stochastic error term νi. To see the problem of the estimation
in presence of perfect multicollinearity, consider the following model
Yi = β̂2X2i + β̂3X3i + ûi (4.29)
Let substitute X3i = λX2i,
Yi = β̂2X2i + β̂3(λX2i) + ûi (4.30)
which gives
Yi = (β̂2 + λβ̂3)X2i + ûi (4.31)
and if α̂ = (β̂2 + λβ̂3), then applying the usual OLS method the estimation parameter α̂
is given by
α̂ = (β̂2 + λβ̂3) =
∑
X2iYi∑
X22i
(4.32)
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Therefore, although α̂ can be estimated uniquely, there is no way to estimate β̂2 and β̂3
uniquely. Mathematically,
α̂ = β̂2 + λβ̂3 (4.33)
gives only one equation in two unknowns (note λ is given) and there is an infinity of
solutions to equation (4.33) above for given values of α̂ and λ.
Instead of perfect multicollinearity, it is possible the presence of high but imperfect mul-
ticollinearity as given below:
X3i = λX2i + νi (4.34)
where λ 6= 0 and where νi is a stochastic error. In this case, estimation for regression
coefficients β2 and β3 may be possible. A correlation matrix shows the correlation co-
efficients between sets of variables, and the probability values (p-values) to measure the
significance of their relationship. Considering that the implicit assumption made when
using OLS estimation method is that the relationship between the explanatory variables
are orthogonal, adding or removing a variable from the regression model would not cause
the values of coefficients on the other variables to change. In the context of very closed
explanatory variables, the consequence is the difficulty in observing the individual contri-
bution of each variable to the overall fit of the regression, which becomes very sensitive
adding or removing explanatory variables leading to significant changes in the coefficient
values or significance of the other variables. Also, the confidence intervals for the pa-
rameters become very wide, and significance tests might, therefore, give inappropriate
conclusions. Finally, the high pair-wise correlation among regressors is a suggested rule
of thumb, say over 0.8, is a serious problem. The problem with this criterion is that,
although high zero-order correlations may suggest collinearity, it is not necessary that
they be high to have collinearity in any specific case.
One of the methods of remedying multicollinearity is the transformation of variables
such as the first difference form which reduces the severity of multicollinearity, although
levels of regressors are highly correlated. Another method of remedying multicollinearity
is to employ multivariate statistical techniques such as principal component and factor
analysis.
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4.5 Cross-sectional dependence test
A common assumption in panel data models is that disturbances are cross-sectionally
independent, especially when the cross-section dimension N is large. There is, however,
considerable evidence that cross-sectional dependence is often present in panel regression
settings. A growing body of the panel-data literature concludes that panel-data models
are likely to exhibit substantial cross-sectional dependence in the errors, which may arise
because of the presence of common shocks and unobserved components that become a
part of the error term, spatial dependence, and idiosyncratic pairwise dependence in the
disturbances with no particular pattern of common components (Pesaran, 2004; Baltagi
et al., 2002) . One reason for this result is the increasing economic and financial integra-
tion of countries and financial entities, which implies strong interdependencies between
cross-sectional units.
The impact of cross-sectional dependence in estimation depends on the magnitude of
correlations across sections and the nature of cross-sectional dependence itself. If it is
assumed that cross-sectional dependence is caused by the presence of common factors,
which are unobserved but uncorrelated with the included regressors, the standard fixed
effects, and random effects estimators are consistent, although not efficient, and the es-
timated standard errors are biased. However, testing for cross-sectional dependence is
important in fitting panel-data models. Consider the standard panel-data model:
Yit = αi + β
′
Xit + uit (4.35)
where Yit is the independent variable, i = 1, ..., N , t = 1, ..., T , β
′
is a K × 1 vector of
parameters to be estimated, Xit is a K × 1 vector of to be estimated, and αi represents
time-invariant individual nuisance parameters. Under the null hypothesis, uit is assumed
to be independent and identical distributed (i.i.d) over periods and cross-sectional units.
Under the alternative, uit may be correlated across cross sections, but the assumption of
no serial correlation remains. Thus, the hypothesis of interest is
H0 : ρij = ρji = cor(uit, ujt) = 0 for i 6= j (4.36)
versus
H1 : ρij = ρji = cor(uit, ujt) 6= 0 for i 6= j (4.37)
98
where ρij is the product-moment correlation coefficient of the disturbances and is given
by
ρij = ρji =
∑T
t=1 uitujt(∑T
t=1 u
2
it
)1/2(∑T
t=1 u
2
jt
)1/2 (4.38)
The number of possible pairings (uit, ujt) rises with N . Below are described three statis-
tical procedures designed to test for cross-sectional dependence, namely Pesaran’s (2004)
cross-sectional dependence (CD) test, Friedman’s (1937) statistic, and the statistic test
proposed by Frees (1995).
4.5.1 Pesaran’s CD test
Breusch and Pagan (1980) proposed an LM statistic, which is valid for fixed N as T →∞
and is given by
LM = T
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρ̂2ij ∼ χ2
N(N − 1)
2
(4.39)
where ρ̂ij is the sample estimate of the pairwise correlation of the residuals
ρ̂ij = ρ̂ji =
∑T
t=1 ûitûjt(∑T
t=1 û
2
it
)1/2(∑T
t=1 û
2
jt
)1/2 (4.40)
and ûit is the estimate of uit in (4.17). LM is asymptotically distributed as χ
2 with
N(N −1)/2 degrees of freedom under the null hypothesis of interest. However, LM test is
likely to exhibit substantial size distortions when N is large and T is finite-a situation that
is commonly encountered in empirical applications, primarily because the LM statistic is
not correctly centered for finite T and the bias is likely to get worse with N large. Pesaran
(2004) has proposed the following alternative,
CD =
√
2T
N/(N − 1)
(N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
ρ̂ij
)
→ N(0, 1) (4.41)
and showed that under the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional dependence Pesaran’s
statistic follows a standard normal distribution (CD → N(0, 1) for N → ∞ and T
sufficiently large). For unbalanced panels, Pesaran (2004) proposes a slightly modified
version of the above as below:
CD =
√
2
N/(N − 1)
(N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
√
Tij ρ̂ij
)
(4.42)
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where Tij is the number of common time-series observations between units i and j.
4.5.2 Friedman’s test
Friedman (1937) proposed a non parametric test based on Spearman’s rank correlation
coefficient. In particular, if it is defined [ri,1, ..., ri,T ] to be the ranks of [ui,1, ..., ui,T ],
Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient equals
rij = rji =
∑T
t=1(rit − (T + 1/2))(rji − (T + 1/2))∑T
t=1(rit − (T + 1/2))2
(4.43)
Friedman’s statistic is based on the average Spearman’s correlation and is given by
RAV E =
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
r̂ij (4.44)
where r̂ij is the sample estimate of the rank correlation coefficient of the residuals. Large
values of Rave indicate the presence of non-zero cross-sectional correlations. He also
showed that
FR = (T − 1)[(N − 1)RAV E + 1] (4.45)
is asymptotically χ2 distributed with T −1 degrees of freedom, for fixed T as N gets large.
The CD and Rave share a common feature; both involve the sum of the pairwise cor-
relation coefficients of the residual matrix rather than the sum of the squared correlations
used in the LM test. This feature implies that these tests are likely to miss cases of cross-
sectional dependence where the sign of the correlation is alternative-that is, where there
are largely positive and negative correlations in the residuals, which cancel each other out
during averaging.
4.5.3 Frees’ test
Frees (1995, 2004) proposed a statistic that is not subject to this drawback as mentioned
above. In particular, the statistic is based on the sum of the squared rank correlation
coefficients and equals
R2AV E =
2
N(N − 1)
N−1∑
i=1
N∑
j=i+1
r̂2ij (4.46)
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As shown by Frees, a function of this statistic follows a joint distribution of two indepen-
dently drawn χ2 variables. In particular, Frees shows that
FRE = N [R2AV E − (T − 1)−1]→ Q (4.47)
where
Q = α(T )[x21,T−1 − (t− 1)] + b(T )[x22,T (T−3)/2 − T (T − 3)/2]
and x21,T−1, x
2
2,T (T−3)/2 are independently χ
2 variables with T − 1 and T (T − 3)/2 degrees
of freedom, respectively, α(T ) = 4(T+2)/[5(T−1)2(T+1)] and b(T ) = 2(5T+6)/[5T (T−
1)(T + 1)]. Thus the null hypothesis is rejected if R2AV E > (T − 1)−1 + Qq/N , where Qq
is the appropriate quantile of the Q distribution. In cases where T is not small, Frees
suggests using the normal approximation to the Q distribution by computing the variance
of Q as below:
FRE√
V ar(Q)
→ N(0, 1) (4.48)
where
V ar(Q) =
32(T + 2)2
25(T − 1)3(T + 1)2
+
4(5T + 6)2(T − 3)
5T (T − 1)2(T + 1)2
(4.49)
Thus, the density of Q is different for different values of T . However, for T as large as
30, the approximation does well. Contrary to Pesaran’s CD test, the test by Frees and
Friedman have been originally devised for static models, and the finite sample properties
of the tests have not been investigated yet in dynamic panels.
4.5.4 Driscoll and Kraay standard errors
Driscoll and Kraay presented a simple extension of common nonparametric covariance
matrix estimation techniques that yield standard error estimates that are robust to very
general forms of spatial and temporal dependence as the time dimension becomes large. In
particular, they showed that a simple transformation of the orthogonality conditions that
permit to construct a covariance matrix estimator which is robust to very general forms
of spatial and temporal dependence as the time dimension becomes large. Moreover, in
contrast to other techniques, the size of the cross-sectional dimension does not constraint
the feasibility of the estimator they proposed.
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4.6 Testing for Stationarity
4.6.1 Introduction
Many economic indicators present an upward trend, and it is important to confirm that
the values of the data set do not depend upon their previous values. If they are dependent,
this violates the fundamental assumptions of the regression model. This violation requires
testing for stationarity. There are several reasons why the concept of non-stationarity is
important and why it is essential variables that are non-stationary be treated differently
from those that are stationary. Standard estimation techniques are mostly invalid when
data is non-stationary. The use of non-stationary data can lead to spurious regressions.
Granger and Newbold (1974) employed a test of diagnosing whether the model has spu-
rious regression and found that if the estimation is made in non-stationary variables, is
obtained a significant regression with high explanatory power (R-square value). Another
indication that there is a spurious regression that is called more like a rule of thumb is
that the high R-square value (R2) is higher than the Durbin-Watson statistic.
The relevant concept of non-stationarity enabled Hendry (1980) to deduce what would oc-
cur and hence to construct the desired examples. In particular, trying to explain changes
in the price level across time found a strong correlation between two variables with high
explanatory power. These two variables were independent one another (prices and cu-
mulative rainfall within the UK) and should have no or insufficient explanatory power.
However, even though they were independent of one another, both variables were in-
creasing across time, and the results were statistically significant. The cause of spurious
results was the regressing of one non-stationary variable on another non-stationary vari-
able. Thus, in general, there is a problem called “spurious regression” when regressing
non-stationary variables and a spurious regression provides misleading statistical evidence
of a linear relationship between two non-stationary variables. In statistics, a spurious re-
lationship is a mathematical relationship in which two or more variables or events are not
causally related to each other, yet it may be wrongly inferred that they are, due to either
coincidence or the presence of a certain third, unseen factor.
The study needs to investigate the problem of spurious regression, which exists only
in the presence of non-stationarity. The remainder of this section defines the meaning of
stationary series and then describes the panel unit root and panel cointegration tests.
4.6.2 Stationary series
Stationary series can be defined as one with a constant mean, constant variance, and
constant auto covariances for each given lag. To offer one illustration, shocks to the
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system will gradually die away. Thus, a shock during time t will have a smaller effect
in time t + 1, a smaller effect still in time t + 2, and so on. This is in contrast with
the case of non-stationary data, where the persistence of shocks is infinite so that for a
non-stationary series, the effect of a shock during time t will not have a smaller effect in
time t+1, and in time t+2, etc. When one variable is regressed on the other, the t-ratio
on the slope coefficient would be expected not to be significantly different from zero, and
the value of R2 would be expected to be very low. The variables are not related to one
another. However, if two variables are trending over time, regression of one on the other
could have a high R2 even if the two are unrelated. Consider the generalised time series
model below:
yt = α + ρyt−1 + ut (4.50)
where yt is the dependent variable, the subscript t denotes the time period, α is the
intercept, yt−1 is the independent variable that is determined by the dependent’s variable
value on the preceding period, ρ is the coefficient of independent variable and ut is the
(white noise)3 error term. Dickey and Fuller (1979) developed a formal procedure to test
the non-stationarity by subtracting yt−1 as follows:
yt − yt−1 = α + ρyt−1 − yt−1 + ut (4.51)
that gives
∆yt = α +
γ︷ ︸︸ ︷
(φ− 1) yt−1 + ut (4.52)
where the series has individual intercept and of course γ = (φ−1). Now the null hypothesis
is H0 : γ = 0 and the alternative is H1 : γ < 0. If γ = 0 then the model contains a unit-
root. Dickey and Fuller (1979) also proposed two alternative regression equations that
can be used for testing the presence of a unit-root. The first, allows a non-stochastic time
trend in the model to obtain:
∆yt = α + β2t + γyt−1 + ut (4.53)
where the series has both intercept and trend. If H0 rejected, the series is stationary. This
is an important case, because the process presents a definite trend when γ = 0, which
is often the case of macroeconomic variables. The second does not include intercept and
3A time series is said to be “white noise” if the underlying variable has zero mean, a constant variance
and zero correlation between successive observations, i.e. no autocorrelation.
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trend:
∆yt = γyt−1 + ut (4.54)
where the null hypothesis (H0 : γ = 0) if rejected, the series is stationary. In general there
are three possible cases: If H0 :
• First case, |φ| < 1 and therefore the series is stationary. Statistical stationarity
means that the statistical properties such as mean, variance, autocorrelation, are
all constant over time.
• Second case, |φ| > 1 and therefore the series is non-stationary and explodes. In
contrast to the stationary process, the non-stationary process has a variance and a
mean that does not remain near, or returns to a long-run mean over time.
• Third case, |φ| = 1 where the series contains a unit root and is non-stationary.
The stationarity testis employed for all conditions, and if a series contains a unit root in
any two of them, it will be non-stationary series.
Although the relevant literature on time-series studies successfully answers stationarity
issues, the adoption and adjustment of similar tests on panel data are yet in progress,
mainly due to the complexity of considering relatively large T and N samples in the
later studies. Asteriou and Price (2001) summarizes the significant differences between
time-series and panel unit-root tests as follows: First, panel data allows to test the var-
ious approaches with different degrees of heterogeneity between individuals. Second, in
the panel data analysis, so far, one cannot be sure as to the validity of rejecting a unit
root. Third, the power of panel unit-root tests increases with an increase in N. Four, the
additional cross-sectional components incorporated in panel data models provide better
properties of panel unit-root tests, compared with the low-power standard ADF for time-
series samples. Panel unit roots tests and panel cointegration tests are presented below
and provide guidelines on how to use these tests in the study. Until recently, panel data
studies have ignored the crucial stationarity and cointegration tests. However, with the
growing involvement of macroeconomic applications in the panel data, where a large sam-
ple of countries constitutes the cross-sectional dimension providing data over long time
series, the issues of stationarity and cointegration have also emerged in panel data.
4.6.3 Panel unit root tests
Before proceeding the panel regression model, it is necessary to verify that all variables
are stationary. Both DF and ADF unit root tests are extended to panel data estimations,
to consider cases that possibly exhibit the presence of unit root. Most of the panel unit
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root tests are based on an extension of the ADF test by incorporating it as a component
in regression equations. However, when dealing with panel data, the estimation procedure
is more complicated than that used in time series. The crucial factor in panel data esti-
mation appears to be the degree of heterogeneity. In particular, it is important to realize
that all the individuals in a panel may not have the same property; that is, they may not
all be stationary or non-stationary or cointegrated/not cointegrated. So if a panel unit
root test is carried out where some parts of the panel have a unit root and some do not
the application for panel data becomes much more complicated than for single series.
A wide variety of procedures have been developed, with an emphasis on the attempt
to combine information from the time series dimension with that obtained from the cross-
sectional dimension, hoping that in taking into account the cross-sectional dimension the
inference about the existence of unit roots will be more precise and straightforward. How-
ever, a variety of issues arise from this: one is that some of the tests proposed to require
balanced panels missing any data for either i or t, whereas others allow for unbalanced
panels. A second issue is related to the formulation of the null hypothesis; which is a
generalization of the standard DF test where all series in the panel is assumed to be
stationary. On the other hand, one can formulate the null hypothesis in precisely the
opposite way, presuming that all the series in the panel are stationary processes, and
rejecting it when there is sufficient evidence of non-stationarity.
Another important theoretical consideration, is the complication that arises from dif-
ferent asymptotic distribution for the test statistics, and this may depend on whether
N identity is fixed, and T tends to infinity, or vice versa, or both T and N increase
simultaneously in a fixed ratio. However, since the power of individual unit root test can
be distorted when the span of data is short (Pierse and Snell, 1995) the use of panel unit
root tests are more powerful compared to performing a separate unit root test for each
time series (Levin et al., 2002).
Nevertheless, the study applies a variety of unit root tests for the panel data. These
are denoted by Levin et al. (2002), Breitung (2001), Im et al. (2003), Phillips and Perron
(1988) (Fisher-type tests) using either ADF or Phillips-Perron tests, and Hadri (2000).
All tests are to be considered, to conclude if the variables are stationary or non-stationary.
Levin et. al. (2002), Breitung (2000) and Hadri (2000) assume a common unit root pro-
cess (that means ρi is identical across cross-sections) while Im, Pesaran, and Shin (2003)
and Fisher ADF or Phillips-Perron tests assume individual unit root process (that means
it is conducted a separate unit root test).
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Tests with common unit root process
Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC), Breitung, and Hadri tests all assume that there is a common unit
root process so that ρi is identical across cross-sections. The first two employ a null
hypothesis of a unit root while the Hadri test uses a null of no unit root.
4.6.3.1 The Levin and Lin (LL) test
One of the first panel-unit root tests was that developed by Levin and Lin (2002). LLC
statistic is based on the Dickey Fuller unit root tests and their model takes the following
form:
∆Yit = αi + ρYi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
φiL∆Yi,t−L + δit+ θt + uit (4.55)
The model allows for two-way fixed effects, one coming from αi and the second from θt.
So both unit-specific fixed effects and unit-specific time effects are included. The unit-
specific fixed effects are a very important component because they allow for heterogeneity,
since the coefficient of the lagged Yi is restricted to being homogenous across all units of
the panel. Also, thae lag order pi is permitted to vary across individuals. The null and
the alternative hypotheses of this test for each individual time series are:
H0 : ρi = 0 (4.56)
H1 : ρi 6= 0 (4.57)
Since the lag order pi is unmown, LLC suggest a three step procedure to implement their
test: First, performing separate augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), two auxiliary regres-
sions for each cross-section are run to get orthogonalized residuals:
Run ∆Yit on ∆Yi,t−L and Yi,t−1 on ∆Yi,t−L, the residuals u1it and u2it are obtained from
both regressions as below:
u1it = ∆Yit −
pi∑
L=1
β̂iL∆Yi,t−L − αi − δit− θt (4.58)
and
u2it = Yit−1 −
pi∑
L=1
˙βiL∆Yi,t−L − αi − δit− θt (4.59)
where the model allows from two ways fixed effects, one coming from αi and the second
from θt. Second, the residuals from both regressions are standardised by dividing by the
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regression standard error:
ũ1it = û1it/σ̂εi (4.60)
ũ2it = û2it/σ̂εi (4.61)
where σ̂εi are the estimated standard errors from estimating ADF specification. Thus,
ũ1it and ũ2it both are equivalent to ∆Yit and Yit−1 but with the effects of the deterministic
components removed. Finally, ũ1it is regressed on ũ2it and the slope δ estimated from the
test regression is then used to construct a test statistic
ũ1it = ρũ2it + ηit (4.62)
The test statistic in the output of LLC unit root is the conventional t-statistic for H0 :
ρ = 0 and computed as:
tρ = ρ̂/se ˆ(ρ) (4.63)
and the adjusted t-statistic is:
t∗ρ =
tρ −NT̃ ŜN σ̂−2ε̃ σ̂ρ̃µ∗mT̃
σ∗
mT̃
(4.64)
Like most of the unit root tests in the literature, the LL test also assumes that the
individual processes are cross-sectionally independent. Under this assumption, the test
derives conditions for which the pooled OLS estimator of ρ will follow a standard normal
distribution under the null hypothesis.
4.6.3.2 The Breitung test
The Breitung method differs from LLC in two district ways. First, only the autoregres-
sive portion is removed when constructing the standardised residuals from the auxiliary
regression. Second, the standardised residuals are transformed and detrended. Breitung
and Das (2005) suggested a model that involves the following regressions for each i:
∆Yit = αi +
pi∑
L=1
φiL∆Yi,t−L + uit (4.65)
The first step is the same as for LLC, but only ∆Yi,t−L is used in obtaining the residuals of
the regression by ∆Yi,t−L and Yi,t−L on ∆Yi,t−L in computing tests. The obtained residuals
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are as below:
û1it =
(
∆Ỹit −
pi∑
L=1
φ̂iL∆Ỹi,t−L
)
/σ̂εi
and
û2it =
(
Ỹit −
pi∑
L=1
β̇iL∆Ỹi,t−L
)
/σ̂εi
where φ̂, φ̇, and σ̂εi are defined as for LLC. The proxies are transformed and detrended,
û∗1it =
√
(T − t)
(T − t− 1
(
∆Ỹit −
∆Ỹit+1 + ...+ ∆ỸiT
T − t
)
and
û∗2it = Ỹit − Ỹi1 −
t− 1
T − 1
(
ỸiT − Ỹi1
)
The persistence parameter α is estimated from the pooled proxy equation:
û∗1it = αû
∗
2it + νit
Breitung shows that under the null α = 0, the resulting estimator α∗ is asymptotically
distributed as a standard normal.
4.6.3.3 Hadri
Hadri (2000), derived a residual-based LM test, where the null hypothesis is that the
data are stationary and there is no unit root in any of the series in the panel, while the
alternative that at least one panel contains a unit root. The test is design for cases with
large and moderate N . In particular, Hadri (2000) considered the following model:
Yit = rit + βit+ εit (4.66)
where i = 1, ..., N ; t = 1, ..., T and rit is a random walk,
rit = ri,t−1 + uit (4.67)
where εit and uit are zero-mean i.i.d normal errors. Using back substitution, the model
above becomes
Yit = ri0 + βit+
t∑
s=1
uis + εit = ri0 + βit+ νit (4.68)
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where νit =
∑t
s=1 uis + εit. The stationarity hypothesis is H0 : σ
2
u = 0 in which case
νit = εit. The LM statistic is given by:
LM1 =
1
N
(
N∑
i=1
1
T 2
T∑
t=1
S2it
)
/σ̂2ε (4.69)
where Sit =
∑t
s=1 ε̂is are the partial sums of OLS residuals ε̂is from (4.68) and σ̂
2
ε =
1
NT
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 ε̂
2
it is a consistent estimate of σ
2
ε .
An alternative form of the LM statistic allows for heteroscedasticity across i :
LM2 =
1
N
[
N∑
i=1
(
1
T 2
T∑
t=1
S2it/σ̂
2
εi
)]
(4.70)
The test statistic is given by Z =
√
N(LM − ξ1)/ζ) where ξ = 1/6 and /ζ = 1/45, if the
model only includes constants, and ξ = 1/15 and /ζ = 11/6300, otherwise.
Tests with Individual Root Processes
The LLC and Hadri tests are restrictive in the sense that require ρ to be homogenous
across i. The Im, Pesaran, and Shin, and the Fischer-ADF and Phillips Perron tests all
allow for individual unit root processes so that ρi may vary across-sections. The tests are
all characterized by the combining of individual unit root tests to derive a panel-specific
result.
4.6.3.4 The Im, Pesaran, and Shin (IPS) test
Im et al. (2003) extended the LLC test, allowing heterogeneity on the coefficient of Yi,t−1
variable and proposing as a basic testing procedure one based on the average of the
individual unit-root test statistics. The IPS test provides separate estimations for each i
section and the model is given by:
∆Yit = αi + ρiYi,t−1 +
pi∑
L=1
φ̂iL∆yi,t−L + δit+ uit (4.71)
while the null hypotheses are formulated as:
H0 : ρi = 0 (4.72)
H1 : ρi < 0 (4.73)
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where H0 is for all i, and H1 allows for some but not for all of the individual series to
have unit-roots. Thus the alternative
H1 :
{
ρ < 0 for i = 1, 2, ..., N1
ρ = 0 for i = N1 + 1, ...N
(4.74)
Formally the alternative hypothesis requires the fraction of the individual time series that
are stationary to nonzero, where limN→∞(N1/N) = δ and 0 < δ ≤ 1. This condition is
necessary for the consistency of the panel unit root test. Thus, the null hypothesis of this
test is that all series are non-stationary processes under the alternative that a fraction of
the series in the panel are assumed to be stationary. This is in sharp contrast with the
LLC test, which presumes that all series are stationary under the alternative hypothesis.
The test is based on the average of the t−statistics for ρi = 0 for all i from the individual
ADF regressions, tρi :
t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
tρi (4.75)
Im et al. (1997) also showed that, under specific assumptions, tρi converges to a denoted
as tiT which is a standardised t̄. This average is then transformed into a standard normal
variate as follows:
WtNT =
√
N
(
tNT −N−1
∑N
i=1 E(tiT (pi))
)
√
N−1
∑N
i=1 V ar(tiT (pi))
→ N(0, 1)
or
WtNT =
√
N
(
tNT − µ
)
σ
→ N(0, 1)
This statistic is properly standardized, and it is asymptotically N(0, 1) distributed. Monte
Carlo simulations reveal that the small sample performance of the Im-Pesaran-Shin test
is better than Levin-Lin-Chu test. Im-Pesaran-Shin requires N/T → 0 for N → ∞. If
either N is small or if N is large relative to T, then the test shows size distortions4. Thus,
when N is modest relative to T, are sufficiently powerful. Additionally, the tests have
little power if deterministic terms are included in the analysis.
4.6.3.5 The Maddala and Wu (MW) test (Fisher-ADF-PP test)
Maddala and Wu (1999) attempted to improve to some degree the drawbacks of all pre-
vious tests by proposing a model that could also be estimated with unbalanced panels.
4Size is the probability of rejecting the null when it is true. Thus, a size distortion implies that the
null is rejected too often
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Maddala and Wu are in line with the assumption that a heterogeneous alternative is
preferable, but they disagree with the use of the average ADF-statistics by arguing that
it is not the most effective way of evaluating stationarity. Their approach is to derive
tests that combine the p-values from individual unit root tests. Assuming that there are
N unit root tests, MW test takes the following form:
P = −2
N∑
i=1
log(π)→ x22N (4.76)
where πi is defined as the p-value and P is the probability limit values from regular ADF
tests for each cross-section i. The test is asymptotically chi-square distributed with 2N
degrees of freedom (Ti →∞ for finite N. A significant benefit is that the test can handle
unbalanced panels. To consider the dependence between cross-sections, Maddala and Wu
propose obtaining the πi values using bootstrap procedures by arguing that correlations
between groups can induce significant size distortions for the tests. Furthermore, the lag
lengths of the individual augmented Dickey-Fuller tests are allowed to differ. A drawback
of the test is that the p-values have to be obtained by Monte Carlo simulations. The
null and alternative hypotheses are the same as for the as IPS. For both Fisher tests, it
must be specified the exogenous variables for the test equations. All in all, there is no
dominant performance of one particular test. Thus, in this study, given that the dataset
is relatively small (N = 26, T = 27), the study employs the summary of panel unit root
tests.
4.7 Panel cointegration tests
The main purpose of this section is to describe the panel cointegration tests. The moti-
vation is linked primarily with the need to investigate the problem of spurious regression,
which exists only in the presence of non-stationarity. A simple regression is spurious
when two variables Xit and Yit are integrated of the same order, and the residuals uit of
regressing Yit on Xit contain a stochastic trend-denoted I(1). On the other hand, it is
the case of both Xit and Yit being integrated of the same order, but the uit sequence is
stationary-denoted I(0). Thus, in order to test for cointegration, it is essential to ensure
that the regression variables are α priori integrated of the same order. However, when
a linear combination of several I(1) series is stationary, they are said to be integrated,
and this cointegration implies that the I(1) series are in long-run equilibrium and they
move together, although the group of them can wander arbitrarily. The study is based
on two methods for cointegration tests in panels. The first is the Engle-Granger two-step
method, which is residual-based, and if a set of variables are cointegrated, there always
exists an error-correcting formulation of the dynamic model. The second method is based
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on an asymptotic analysis of residuals, where the test statistic is constructed as a ratio of
variances and do not have the usual Dickey-Fuller distributions under the null hypothesis
of no-cointegration (Phillips and Ouliaris, 1990).
Test details
Before proceeding to present the methods and formulas, an overview is provided. Consider
the panel-data model
Yit = X
′
itβi +Z
′
itγi + eit (4.77)
where Yit is a non-stationary dependent variable for which the first difference is stationary,
i = 1, ..., N sections and t = 1, ...T ; time period. Xit is a k ×N matrix of I(1) variables.
βi denotes the cointegrating vector that varies across panels. Z
′
it is the deterministic
term that controls for panel-specific effects and linear time trends. γi is the vector of
coefficients on the deterministic terms Z
′
it. eit is an error term. The vector Z
′
it allows
for panel-specific means and panel-specific time trends, or nothing, depending on options
specified to cointegration tests. In the first option Z
′
it = 1 and the term Z
′
itγi represents
panel-specific means (fixed effects), while in the second option is z
′
it = 1, t, and the term
Z
′
itγi represents panel-specific means and panel-specific linear time trends. Also, there is
the option to omit the Z
′
itγi term.
Overview of tests
Kao (1999), Pedroni (2004), Westerlund (2005) extend the Engle-Granger method and
implement different types of tests, namely Dickey-Fuller (DF-t), augmented Dickey-Fuller
(ADF), Phillips Perron (PP) and variance ratio (VR) tests for whether eit is non-stationary.
Specifically, Kao (1999) uses the DF-t and ADF tests, Pedroni (2004) the PP, VR and
ADF tests, while Westerlund (2005) uses only the VR test. All variants of the test statis-
tics are constructed using ordinary least squares of the (4.77) model. After obtaining the
predicted residuals (eit) they fit the following regressions models:
For Kao’s tests the (DF-t) regression model is
êit = ρêi,t−1 + νit (4.78)
and the ADF
ê∗it = ρ
∗ê∗i,t−1 +
p∑
j=1
φj∆e
∗
i,t−j + ν
∗
it (4.79)
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where ρ, ρ∗ are assumed the same AR parameters for each regression model across all
panels, and νit, ν
∗
itv are stationary error terms.
For Peroni’s tests the (PP-t) regression model is
êit = ρiêi,t−1 + νit (4.80)
and the ADF
ê∗it = ρ
∗
i ê
∗
i,t−1 +
p∑
j=1
φj∆e
∗
i,t−j + ν
∗
it (4.81)
where in this case ρi, ρ
∗
i are panel-specific AR parameters and νit, ν
∗
itv are stationary error
terms.
For Westerlund’s tests the regression models are
either the same AR parameter
êit = ρêi,t−1 + νit (4.82)
or panel-specific AR parameter
ê∗it = ρ
∗
i ê
∗
i,t−1 + ν
∗
it (4.83)
The tests share a common null hypothesis that Yit and Xit are not cointegrated. Rejection
of the null hypothesis implies that eit is stationary and that the series Yit and Xit are
cointegrated. The alternative hypothesis of Kao and Pedroni tests is that the variables
are cointegrated in all panels. The alternative hypothesis of the Westerlund test has two
options. The first is that some panels are cointegrated, while the second is that all panels
are cointegrated. Below are described the three cointegration tests that will be employed
in the present study.
4.7.1 The Kao tests
Kao (1999) presented DF and ADF-type of tests for cointegration in panel data and
assumed the same cointegrating vector βi = β in (4.77) so that all panels share a common
slope coefficient. Then, consider the bivariate case without panel specific means and time
trend:
Yit = γi +X
′
itβ + eit (4.84)
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for
Yit = Yi,t−1 + uit (4.85)
Xit = Xi,t−1 + εit (4.86)
where i = 1, ...N , stands for the sections, t = 1, ...T for the time period, and γi denotes
panel-specific fixed effects requiring to be heterogeneous. β is homogeneous across cross-
sections, Yit and Xit are I(1) and non cointegrated, while eit is the error term. Kao then
runs either the pooled auxiliary DF regression (4.78) or the augmented version ADF of
the pooled specification (4.79), and the OLS estimate of ρ is given by:
ρ̂ =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2 êitêi,t−1∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2 ê
2
it
(4.87)
and its corresponding t-statistic is given by:
tρ =
(
ρ̂− 1
)√∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2 ê
2
it
1
NT
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=2
(
êit − ρ̂êi,t−1
)2 (4.88)
Under the null of no cointegration, Kao proposes five test statistics. The DF-t, the
modified DF-t, the unadjusted DF-t, the unadjusted modified DF-t and the ADF tests.
The test statistics based on DF regression are
DFt =
tρ +
√
6Nσ̂ν/2ω̂ν√
ω̂2ν/2σ̂
2
ν + 3σ̂
2
ν/10ω̂
2
ν
(4.89)
Modified DFt =
√
NT
(
ρ̂− 1
)
+ 3
√
Nσ̂2ν/ω̂
2
ν√
3 + 36σ̂4ν/5ω̂
4
ν
(4.90)
Unadjusted DFt =
√
1.25tp +
√
1.875N (4.91)
Unadjusted-modified DFt =
√
NT
(
ρ̂− 1
)
+ 3
√
N
√
10.2
(4.92)
The test statistic based on ADF regression is calculated by:
ADF t =
tADF +
√
6Nσ̂ν/2ω̂ν√
ω̂2ν/2σ̂
2
ν + 3σ̂
2
ν/10ω̂
2
ν
) (4.93)
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where
tADF =
ρ̂
ŜE(ρ̂)
(4.94)
The ρ̂ is the estimated value of ρ. σ̂2ν and ω̂
2
ν are scalar terms that are consistent estimates
of σ̂2ν = σ̂
2
u − Σ
′
uεΣεΣuε and ω̂
2
ν = ω̂
2
u − Ω
′
uεΩεΩuε.
5 tρ is the t statistic for testing the
null hypothesis H0 : ρ = 1. Also, the first two DFt tests are based on the cointegration
with endogenous relationship between the regressors and errors, while the unadjusted
assume strict exogeneity and absence of serial correlation. Following the standard normal
distribution, the asymptotic distribution of all five test statistics converges to N(0,1).
4.7.2 The Pedroni tests
Pedroni (2004) proposes test statistics based on a model in which the AR parameter either
is panel-specific, where all panels have individual slope coefficients, or is the same over
the panels. He also calls the panel-specific-AR test statistics “between dimension” and
the same-AR test statistics “within dimension”.
Now, consider again the following regression:
Yit = γi +X
′
itβi + eit (4.95)
where i− 1, ...N denotes the panel and t = 1, ...T the time. γi is the panel-specific fixed
effects requiring to be heterogeneous, and βi is the panel-specific cointegrating vector.
Also, Yit and Xit are I(1) and non cointegrated, while eit is the error term. The general
approach by Pedroni is to obtain residuals from the equation above and then to test
whether residuals are I(1) by running the auxiliary regressions, either DF (4.80) or the
augmented version (ADF) 4.81. He describes various methods of constructing statistics
for testing for null hypothesis of no cointegration (ρi = 1). There are also two alternative
hypotheses, such that of the homogenous (ρi = ρ) < 1 for all i and the heterogeneous
ρi < 1 for all i. Seven different cointegration statistics are proposed and can be classified
into two categories. The first category includes three tests and is the panel specific AR
test, while the second is based on the same AR across all panels. The panel-specific-AR
test statistics are given below:
Modified PP t = TN−1/2
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
ê2i,t−1
)−1 T∑
t=1
(
êi,t−1∆êi,t − λ̂i
)
(4.96)
5See details below for the long-run variance matrix.
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PP t = N−1/2
N∑
i=1
(
σ̂2i
T∑
t=1
ê2i,t−1
)−1/2 T∑
t=1
(
êi,t−1∆êi,t − λ̂i
)
(4.97)
ADF t = N−1/2
N∑
i=1
(
T∑
t=1
ŝ∗2i ê
2
i,t−1
)−1/2 T∑
t=1
(
êi,t−1∆êi,t
)
(4.98)
where eit are the residuals from the panel-data regression model in (4.77), and λi is
calculated as below:
λ̂i =
1
2
(
σ̂2i − ŝ2i
)
(4.99)
ŝ2i and σ̂
2
i are the individual contemporaneous and long-run variances of the residuals
from the DF regression. ŝ∗2i is the individual contemporaneous variance of the residuals
from the ADF regression, where the panel-specific ρi is instead of ρ.
The same-AR test statistics are
Modified V R =
T 2N3/2(∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 L̂
−2
11iε̂
2
i,t−1
) (4.100)
Modified PP t =
T
√
N
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 L̂
−2
11i
(
ε̂i,t−1∆ε̂i,t − λ̂i
)(∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 L̂
−2
11iε̂
2
i,t−1
) (4.101)
PP t =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 L̂
−2
11i
(
ε̂i,t−1∆ε̂i,t − λ̂i
)√
σ̃2N,T
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 L̂
−2
11iε̂
2
i,t−1
(4.102)
ADF t =
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 L̂
−2
11iε̂i,t−1∆ε̂i,t√
s̃∗2N,T
∑N
i=1
∑T
t=1 L̂
−2
11iε̂
2
i,t−1
(4.103)
where the residuals are as defined above and
σ̃2N,T =
1
N
L̂−211iσ̂
2
i (4.104)
L̂−211i = ω̂
2
u,i − Ω̂uε,iΩ̂ε,iΩ̂
′
uε,i (4.105)
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s̃∗2N,T =
1
N
N∑
i=1
s̃∗2i (4.106)
The asymptotic distribution of all test statistics, after appropriate standardization, con-
verges to N(0, 1). The adjustment is given by
χ− µ
√
N√
ν
(4.107)
where χ is any of the test statistics given above, and the parameters µ and ν are the mean
and variance of the test statistic obtained through simulation.
4.7.3 Westerlund tests
Westerlund (2005) assumes panel-specific cointegrating vectors as in (4.77), where all
panels have individual slope coefficients. The VR test statistics are obtained by testing
for a unit root in the predicted residuals using the DF regression in (4.80). He derives
test statistics based on a model in which the AR parameter either is panel-specific or
is the same over the panels. The panel-specific-AR test statistic is used to test the null
hypothesis of no cointegration against the alternative hypothesis that some panels are
cointegrated. The same-AR test statistic is used to test the null hypothesis of no cointe-
gration against the alternative hypothesis that all the panels are cointegrated.
The panel-specific-AR test statistic is given by
V R =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Ê2itR̂
−1
i (4.108)
The same-AR test statistic is given by
V R =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
Ê2it
(
N∑
i=1
R̂i
)−1
(4.109)
where Êit =
∑t
j=1 êij, R̂i =
∑t
T=1 ê
2
ij are the residuals from the panel-data regression
model in (4.77). The asymptotic distribution of all test statistics, after appropriate stan-
dardization, converges to N(0, 1).
Long run covariance matrix
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Considering the model (4.77) the data generating process for yit and xit is given by
yit = yi,t−1 + uit (4.110)
xit = xi,t−1 + εit (4.111)
The covariance of
ωit =
[
uit
εit
]
,
denotes a (k + 1) × 1 vector process with zero mean and long-run covariance matrix Ωi.
The long-run matrix can be decomposed as Ωi = Σi + Γ
′
i + Γi, where Σi and Γi denote
the contemporaneous and autocovariance matrices for a given panel i. The elements of
long-run contemporaneous matrices Ωi and Σi are given by
Ωi =
(
ω̂2u,i Ωuεi
Ω
′
uεi Ωεi
)
(4.112)
Σi =
(
σ̂2u,i Σuεi
Σ
′
uεi Σεi
)
(4.113)
Consistent estimators Ω̂i and Σ̂i are obtained using Newey and West (1987), which is
given by
Ω̂i =
T
1
T∑
t=1
ω̂itω̂
′
it +
1
T
m∑
j=1
K(j,m)
T∑
t=j+1
(ω̂itω̂
′
it + ω̂i,t−jω̂
′
i,t−j)
where m is the maximum number of lags and K(j,m) is the kernel weight function.
4.8 Dynamic heterogeneous panels
4.8.1 Introduction
The dynamic models are very important, especially in economics, because many economic
relationships are dynamic in nature and are used to express and model the behaviour of
the system over time (Asteriou and Price, 2001). Consider the following simple dynamic
model:
Yit = αi + λYi,t−1 + β
′
iXit + εit (4.114)
where i=1,...N, and t=1,...T, λi is a scalar, and βi andX are each k×1. Also, as a dynamic
model, includes a lagged dependent variable (Yi,t−1) among the explanatory variables. In
this model, the only heterogeneity comes from the intercepts αi, which are allowed to
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vary across different sections. The time dimension of panel data is used to capture the
dynamics of adjustment. The dynamic panel data regression described in (4.115) is
characterised by two sources of persistence over time: autocorrelation due to the presence
of a dependent variable among the regressors, and individual effects characterizing the
heterogeneity among the individuals (Baltagi, 1997). Thus, the problem with dynamic
panels is that the traditional OLS estimators are biased and therefore different methods
of estimation need to be introduced (Asteriou and Price, 2001).
The bias and inconsistency in fixed and random effect
Since Yit is a function of αi, it immediately follows that Yi,t−1 is also a function of αi.
Therefore Yi,t−1 which is a right hand regressor in (4.74), is correlated with the error
term.6 This renders the OLS estimator biased and inconsistent even if the εit are not
serially correlated. For the Fixed effects estimator, the within transformation eliminates
the αi, but Yi,t−1 − Ȳi,−1, where Ȳi =
∑T
t=2 Yi,t−1/
(
T − 1
)
, will still be correlated with(
εit − ε̄i
)
even the εit are not serially correlated. This is because Yi,t−1 is correlated with
ε̄i. As for the random effect estimator, the problem is similar to the that of the estimation
of the fixed effects model.
For panel data studies when the regression coefficients vary across individuals, they are
heterogeneous but assumed homogeneous in estimation. Asteriou and Price (2001) argued
that all panel data models make the basic assumption that at least some parameters are
the same across the panel; this is referred to as the pooling assumption. When pooling
assumption does not hold, a panel is referred to as a heterogeneous panel, and severe
biases can occur in dynamic estimation. Pesaran and Smith (1995) considered the prob-
lem of estimating the dynamic panel data model when the coefficients are individually
heterogeneous. Their model is given by
Yit = λiYi,t−1 + β
′
iX it + uit (4.115)
where i=1,...,N, and t=1,...T. The objective is to obtain consistent estimates of the mean
values of λi and βi. The difficulty is in obtaining consistent estimates for λ and β.
Assuming that the coefficients vary across groups Pesaran and Smith (1995) presented
the following random coefficient model:
λi = λ+ η1i and βi = β + η2i (4.116)
where η1i and η2i are assumed to have zero means and constant covariances. This is the
standard formulation of the random coefficients model (RCM), and introduces parameter
6The composite error term is uit = αi + εit
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heterogeneity through the short-run coefficients, βi and λi (Fabozzi and Francis, 1978).
Substituting these two equations of (4.117) to (4.116) it is obtained:
Yit = αi + λYi,t−1 + η1iYi,t−1 + β
′Xit + η
′
2iXit + εit (4.117)
and
νit = εit + η1iYi,t−1 + η
′
2iXit (4.118)
It is now easily seen that Yi,t−1 and Xit are correlated with νit, thus rendering the OLS
estimator inconsistent.
Solutions to the bias problem
Two different solutions to heterogeneity bias come from Pesaran et al. (1995, 1999),
who suggested two different estimators resolve the bias caused by heterogeneous slopes in
dynamic panels. They showed that when both T and N are large, the regression procedure
will yield consistent estimates of the mean values of λ and β. These two solutions are
the mean group (MG) estimator and the pooled mean group (PMG) estimator. In MG
method, when T is large, the individual parameters λi and βi can be consistently estimated
by using T observations of each individual i, giving λ̂i and β̂i. Then averaging these
individual estimators will lead to consistent estimators of the mean values of λ and β. In
PMG method, if the data allows, they proposed estimation by pooling only the long-run
parameters, while the short-run coefficients are allowed to vary. Below, is introduced the
cross-section estimator aggregating over time, to get consistent estimators:
Ȳi = β
′
iX̄ i + λiȲi,−1 + ε̄i (4.119)
where,
Ȳi = T
−1∑T
t=1 Yit, Ȳi,t−1 = T
−1∑T
t=1 Yi,t−1, X̄i = T
−1∑T
t=1 Xit, εi = T
−1∑T
t=1 εi,t.
Hence, the equation above becomes as below:
Ȳi = β
′
X̄i + λȲi,−1 + ν̄i (4.120)
where
ν̄i = η1iȲi,−1 + η
′
2iX̄i + ε̄i (4.121)
The regression defined by (4.120) will produce inconsistent estimates of β and λ as N, T →
∞. This is due to the fact that ν̄i is correlated with Ȳi,−1 even for large T. A more
120
promising route is to rewrite (4.120) using back substitution which yields
Ȳi = β
′
iX̄ i + λi
(
Ȳi −∆TYi
)
+ ε̄i (4.122)
where the growth term ∆TYi = (YiT − Yi0/T ) captures the end effects. Then Ȳi becomes
Ȳi =
β
′
i
1− λi
X̄ i −
λi
1− λi
∆TYi +
1
1− λi
ε̄i = θ
′
iX̄ i − ψi∆TYi +
1
1− λi
ε̄i (4.123)
which can be rewritten
Ȳi = θ
′
iX̄i − ψi∆TYi +
1
1− λi
ε̄i (4.124)
Thus the coefficients in this cross-section regression are in fact the appropriate long-run
averages. With the coefficients varying across groups according to the random coefficient
model, ψi = ψ + ξ1i and θi = θ + ξ2i, the cross-section regression is
Ȳi = θ
′
X̄ i − ψ∆TYi + ūi (4.125)
where
ūi =
1
1− λi
ε̄i + ξ
′
2iX̄ i − ξ1i∆TYi (4.126)
and the cross-section estimates of the average long-run coefficients are given by
θ̂ =
( N∑
i=1
X̄iX̄
′
i
)−1( N∑
i=1
X̄iȲi
)
(4.127)
However, the growth terms now such as ∆TYi are uncorrelated with the level terms. This
suggests that cross-section estimates of the average long-run effect, θ will be robust and
consistent. In order to identify the long-run and short-run effects, as well as to investigate
the heterogenous dynamic issues across cross-sections, the appropriate technique to be
used to the analysis of dynamic panels is based on the autoregressive distributed lag
ARDL (p,q) model in the error correction form. The ARDL model, especially Mean
Group (MG) and Pooled Mean Group (PMG), provide consistent coefficients despite the
possible presence of endogeneity because it includes lags of dependent variables (Pesaran
et al., 1999). The two different estimators (MG and PMG), are presented below.
4.8.2 The mean group (MG) estimator
The mean group (MG) estimates method was introduced by Pesaran and Smith (1995),
where a separate regression for each cross-section and calculating the coefficients as un-
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weighted means of the estimated coefficients for the individual cross-sections. This does
not impose any restrictions and allows for all coefficients to vary and be heterogeneous
in the long-run and short-run. The method estimates short-run parameters by taking an
average of individual parameters of each cross-section. The long-run coefficients can be
obtained through different ways; from the mean of the long-run cross-section coefficients;
from the average of cross-section short-run coefficients; from the mean coefficients in the
cross-section cointegrating regressions. In order to illustrate how this method works and
based on Pesaran and Smith (1995) study, it is estimated the equation for each cross-
section with the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) form as below:
Yit = αi + λ1iYi,t−1 + λ2iYi,t−2 + β0iXit + β1iXi,t−1 + β2iXi,t−2 + εit (4.128)
where λ1i, λ2i, β1i and β2i are the coefficients of the first and second lags of Yit and Xit
accordingly. For cross-section i=1,2,...,N, then the long-run parameter with respect to X
is as:
φi = β0i + β1i + β2i/(1− λ1i − λ2i) (4.129)
and if
βi = β0i + β1i + β2i (4.130)
then
θi = 1− λ1i − λ2i (4.131)
then the long-run parameter becomes,
φi = βi/θi (4.132)
Now, according to the first way, the mean of the long-run cross-section coefficients for the
whole panel will be given by:
φ̂ =
N∑
i=1
φ̂i/N. (4.133)
and
α̂ =
N∑
i=1
α̂i/N. (4.134)
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According to the second way, the long run estimates is calculated from the means of the
short-run coefficients use for λs
λ̄1 =
N∑
i=1
λ̂1i/N λ̄2 =
N∑
i=1
λ̂1i/N (4.135)
and for βs
β̄0 =
N∑
i=1
β̂0i/N, β̄1 =
N∑
i=1
β̂1i/N β̄2 =
N∑
i=1
β̂2i/N (4.136)
to give estimates for the long-run as follows:
φ̄ =
(
β̄0 + β̄1 + β̄2
)
(1− λ1i − λ2i)
(4.137)
The cointegrating regressions have the form
Yit = αi + φiXit + uit (4.138)
and the average long-run effects are computes as φ̄ =
∑N
i=1 φ̂i/N . The MG is consistent
and has sufficiently large asymptotic distributions for N and T. The necessary condition
for the consistency and validity of this approach is to have a sufficiently sizeable time-
series dimension of data (to include about 20 to 30 cross-sections). When T is small, the
MG estimator is biased and can cause misleading results. Additionally, for small N, the
average estimators (MG) are quite sensitive to the outliers (Favara, 2003).
4.8.3 The pooled mean group (PMG) estimator
The PMG method of estimation only the short-run coefficients are allowed to differ across
cross-sections, while long-run slope coefficients are restricted to be homogeneous across
cross-sections. Also, the model includes the intercepts, the speed of adjustment to the
long-run equilibrium values. Based on Pesaran et al. (1999), the dynamic heterogeneous
panel regression can be incorporated into the error correction model using the autore-
gressive distributed lag ARDL (p,q) technique. Consider the following simple dynamic
ARDL model for only one lagged term of X and Y :
Yit = λiYi,t−1 + β1iXit + β2iXi,t−1 + µi + εit (4.139)
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where all coefficients are allowed to vary across cross-sectional units. If the ARDL model
above is re-parameterized as below:
∆Yit︷ ︸︸ ︷
Yit − Yi,t−1 =
−
(
1−λi
)
Yi,t−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
λiYi,t−1 − Yi,t−1 +
β1i∆Xi,t−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1iXit − β1iXi,t−1 +
(
β1i+β2i
)
Xi,t−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
β1iXi,t−1 + β2iXi,t−1 +µi + εit
(4.140)
then
∆Yit = β1i∆Xit −
(
1− λi
)(
Yi,t−1 −
β1i + β2i
1− λi
Xi,t−1
)
+ µi + εit (4.141)
and substituting 1− λi = φi, β1i + β2i = βi the equation becomes:
∆Yit = β1i∆Xit − φi
ECM︷ ︸︸ ︷(
Yi,t−1 − β
′
iXi,t−1
)
+µi + εi (4.142)
where ECM= Error correction model, and if the heterogenous model is generalised incor-
porating a range of lags of first differences in Xs and Ys as well as the error correction
model the equation is as follows:
∆Yit =
p−1∑
j=1
γi∆Yi,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
δi∆Xi,t−j − φi
(
Yi,t−1 − θ
′
iXi,t−1
)
+ µi + εi (4.143)
where Y is the dependent variable, X is a set of independent variables, γ and δ rep-
resent the short-run coefficients related growth to its past values of lagged dependent
and independent variables respectively, θ1i = −βi/φi are the long-run coefficients, φi is
the coefficient of speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium. The subscripts i and
t represent units and time respectively. The pooled mean group restriction is that the
elements of β are common across cross-sections:
∆yit =
p−1∑
j=1
γi∆yi,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
δi∆xi,t−j − φi
(
yi,t−1 − β
′
xi,t−1
)
+ µi + εi (4.144)
Therefore, the long-run relationship is expected to be identical in the cross-sections.
The homogeneity of long-run slope coefficients can be easily carried out using maximum
likelihood (ML) estimation of the long-run coefficients, θ, and the group-specific error-
correction coefficients, φi. The ML estimators will be referred to as the ”pooled mean
group” estimators in order to highlight the pooling effect of the homogeneity restrictions
on the estimates of the long-run coefficients. Also, Pesaran et al. (1999) proved that under
some assumptions, the parameter estimates of this model are consistent and asymptoti-
cally normal for both stationary and non-stationary I(1) regressors. Both methods, MG
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and PMG, require the appropriate lag lengths using the Schwartz Bayesian criterion. Also,
Pesaran proposed a Hausman test based on the result that an estimate of the long-run
parameters can be derived from the average mean group of the cross-section regressions.
This is consistent even under heterogeneity. The test statistic is constructed as below:
H = q̂
′[
var(q̂)
]−1
q̂ ∼ χ2k (4.145)
where q̂ is a (k× 1) vector of the difference between the mean group and PMG estimates
and var(q̂) is the corresponding covariance matrix. The null hypothesis is that the two
estimators are consistent but only one is efficient, var(q̂) is easily calculated as the dif-
ference between the covariance matrices for the two parameter vectors. If the poolability
assumption is invalid, then the PMG estimates are no longer consistent and the test fails.
4.9 Multivariate analysis-Factor models
4.9.1 Introduction
The field of multivariate analysis consists of those statistical methods that consider two
or more related random variables as a single entity and attempts to produce an overall re-
sult taking into account the relationship among the variables. These statistical methods,
namely factor models, can measure things which cannot be measured directly (so-called
unobservable or latent variables). For example, the present study might be interested in
measuring financial development as one, two, or more indices, which cannot be measured
directly, and has many facets. However, different aspects of financial development can
be measured such that of financial development of bank sector, financial development of
the stock market sector, and so on. Having done this, it would be helpful whether these
aspects reflect a single variable.
Also, factor models try to measure different variables driven by the same underlying
factor. In particular, the models are employed primarily as dimensionality reduction
techniques in situations where a large number of closely related variables have the most
important influence at the same time. The models decompose the structure of a set of
series into factors that are common to all series and a proportion that is specific to each
series. There are broadly two types of such factor models to analyze. The first is the
principal component analysis, and the second is the factor analysis. The key distinction
between the two is that the factors are observable for the former but are latent for the
latter. The primary use of these statistical methods is to reduce a data set to more mean-
ingful size while retaining as much of the original information. Also, both techniques
are used to identify clusters of variables, which are called factors in factor analysis and
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components in the principal component analysis.
Pricipal component analysis (PCA) transforms the data into a set of linear components;
it does not estimate unmeasured variables; it just transforms measured ones. Also, it
tries to explain the maximum amount of total variance (not just common variance) in a
correlation matrix by transforming the original variables into liner components.
Factor analysis, in contrast, attempts to achieve parsimony by explaining the maximum
amount of common variance in a correlation matrix using the smallest number of explana-
tory constructs. These explanatory constructs are known as factors or latent variables
in factor analysis, and they represent clusters variables that correlate highly with each
other. Also, the factors are estimated from the data and reflect constructs that cannot
be measured directly.
4.9.2 Principal component analysis (PCA)
The most common mathematical factor model is PCA. The method of principal compo-
nents is a statistical technique used for data reduction and was developed by Pearson
(1901) and Hotelling (1933). It helps to reduce the number of variables through a linear
transformation of a group of correlated variables, and the obtained transformed variables
are uncorrelated (orthogonal), containing most of their variance. However, PCA is a tech-
nique that is useful when the independent variables are highly correlated-for example, in
the context of near multicollinearity. Generally, PCA is employed with two perspectives
in mind. One is the lowered dimension, and the other is the orthogonality of new dimen-
sions (PCs). Consider the matrices of k observable random variables X1, ..., Xk, with N
observations each of them
X1 =

x11
x21
.
.
.
xN1

N×1
,X2 =

x12
x22
.
.
.
xN2

N×1
, . . . Xk =

x1k
x2k
.
.
.
xNk

N×1
,
When the regression model includes k explanatory variables, PCA will transform them
into k uncorrelated new variables. The new transformed uncorrelated variables are the
principal components and are denoted by Z1, ..., Zk. These principal components Zi are
independent linear combinations of the original data and standardized (mean 0, variance
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1). The representing model in PCA can be written in two ways. The first is the vector of
equations, where this particular model ignores the vector of observations and estimates
the equations on the row. Specifically, the vector of equations is as below:
Z1 = α11X1 + α12X2 + ...+ α1jXj + ...+ α1kXk
Z2 = α21X1 + α22X2 + ...+ α2jXj + ...+ α2kXk
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Zi = αi1X1 + αi2X2 + ...+ αijXj + ...+ αikXk
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
Zk = αk1X1 + αk2X2 + ...+ αkjXj + ...+ αkkXk
(4.146)
where i = 1, 2, ..., k is the number of principal components, j = 1, ..., k is the number
of variables, αij are coefficients to be calculated, representing the coefficient on the jth
explanatory variable in the ith principal component. The coefficients are also known as
loading factors or component loadings in PCA, and are the correlation coefficients be-
tween the variables (rows) and factors (columns). Also, there will be n observations on
each principal component if there are n observations on each explanatory variable. The
values of the principal components represent the component scores in PCA, and these
scores are the scores of each case (row) on each factor (column).
Z1 =

z11
z21
.
.
.
zN1

N×1
, Z2 =

z12
z22
.
.
.
zN2

N×1
, . . . Zi =

z1i
z2i
.
.
.
zNi

N×1
,
If those observations are stacked, the Zi vectors of equations are
Z1
Z2
.
.
Zk

k×1
=

α11 α12 . α1k
α21 α22 . .
. . . .
. . . .
αk1 . . αkk

k×k

X1
X2
.
.
Xk

k×1
which can be written in matrix notation
Z = ATX
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and the matrix representation is
z11 z12 . . . z1k
z21 z22 . . . z2k
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
zi1 . . . . zik
. . . . . .
zN1 . . . . zNk

N×k
=

x11 x12 . . . x1k
x21 x22 . . . x2k
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
. . . . . .
xi1 . . . . xik
. . . . . .
xN1 . . . . xNk

N×k

α11 α12 . α1k
α21 α22 . α2k
. . . .
. . . .
. . . .
αk1 αk2 . αkk

k×k
It is also required that the sum the squares of the coefficients for each component is one.7
α211 + α
2
12 + ...+ α
2
1k = 1
α221 + α
2
22 + ...+ α
2
2k = 1
· · · · · · · · ·
· · · · · · · · ·
α2k1 + α
2
k2 + ...+ α
2
kk = 1
(4.147)
This requirement can be written using the following notation
k∑
j=1
α2ij = 1 ∀ i = 1, ..., k
The principal components are derived in such a way that they are in descending order of
importance. Although there are k principal components, which is the same as the number
of explanatory variables; if there is collinearity between these original variables, some of
the principal components will likely account for so little of the variation that they can be
discarded. However, if all of the original explanatory variables were already essentially
uncorrelated, all of the components would be required, but in such a case there is little
motivation for using PCA. The principal components can also be understood as the eigen
decomposition of the squared matrix of (XX
′
), where X is the matrix of observations
on the original variables. Thus the number of eigenvalues and corresponding eigenvectors
will be equal to the number of variables, k. If the ordered eigenvalues8 as denoted λi
where i = 1, ..., k, the ratio
φi =
λi∑k
i=1 λi
(4.148)
7See further details in Appendix 4A.
8Eigenvalues are also called characteristic roots. See Appendix 4A.
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gives the proportion of the total variation in the original data explained by the principal
component i. Suppose that only the first j principal components, where (0 < j < k), are
deemed sufficiently useful in explaining the variation of (XX
′
), and that they are to be
retained, with the remaining k-j components being discarded. Taking into account that
the matrix of eigenvalues is diagonal and ordered from the largest to the smallest, the
first factor scores extract as much of the variance of the original data as possible.
Hence, the first principal component has maximal overall variance. The second prin-
cipal component has maximal variance among all unit length linear combinations that
are uncorrelated to the first principal component, etc. The last principal component
has the smallest variance among all unit length linear combinations of the variables. In
particular, the leading eigenvectors from the eigendecomposition of the correlation or co-
variance matrix of the variables describe a series of uncorrelated linear combinations of
the variables that contain most of the variance.
All principal components combined contain the same information as the original vari-
ables, but the important information is partitioned over the components in a particular
way. The components are orthogonal, and earlier components contain more information
than later components. The regression finally estimated, after the principal components
have been formed, would be one of the y on the j principal components
yij = γ̂0 + γ̂1zi1 + γ̂2zi2 + ...+ γ̂jzij + uij (4.149)
where yij are the elements of matrix Y , i stands for the observations and j is the number of
factors. γ̂j are the coefficient estimates for the principal component, and uij the residuals.
In this way, the principal components keep most of the important information contained
in the original explanatory variables, but are orthogonal. This may be particular useful for
independent variables that are very closely related. If the OLS estimator for the original
regression of y on x is denoted β̂, then
y = Xβ + u
then it can be re-arranged as
y = XAATβ + u
where AAT , are the eigenvectors in orthonormal form, that is orthogonal (uncorrelated)
and normalised (with unit length, AAT = I). Considering that Z = XA are the trans-
formed principal components, and ATβ = γ is the new coefficient vector it is obvious to
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find that
y = Z
′
γ
where γ are the coefficient estimates for the principal components, and Z
′
is the matrix
of the first j principal components. The principal components estimates are simply linear
combinations of the original OLS estimates.
4.9.3 Postestimation statistics
After the estimation of principal components and the associated eigenvalues, there are
more issues to resolve.
• The first is about the components needed to retain.
• The second is how well is the correlation or covariance matrix approximated by the
retained components.
• The third is the interpretation of principal components and if it is possible to improve
the interpretability by rotating the retained principal components.
Squared multiple correlations (SMC)
Squared multiple correlations is a standard method for studying correlation matrix to
assess whether the variables have strong linear relations with each other. In a sense, these
methods could be seen as pre-estimation rather than as a post estimation method. The
SMC method is the inspection of the squared multiple correlations (the regression R2) of
each variable on all other variables. SMC measures help identify variables that cannot
be explained well from the other variables. For such variables, it should be reevaluated
whether they should be included in the analysis.
Also, Kaiser (1974) developed a method to measure the sampling adequacy and com-
pares the correlations and the partial correlations between variables.
0.00 to 0.49 unacceptable
0.50 to 0.59 miserable
0.60 to 0.69 mediocre
0.70 to 0.79 middling
0.80 to 0.89 meritorious
0.90 to 1.00 marvelous
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and the formula is
KMO =
∑
pr2ij∑
p(α2ij + r
2
ij)
where p = (j; i 6= j). If the partial correlations are relatively high compared to the
correlations, the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure is small, and a low-dimensional
representation of the data is not possible. Using the characterization of KMO values,
Plots of eigenvalues
After estimating the principal components, it has to be determined how many components
to keep. The process of how many PCAs to keep is called extraction. A useful tool
for visualizing the eigenvalues relative to one another, so that to decide the number of
components to retain, is the scree plot, which was proposed by Cattell (1966). The author
suggested plotting each eigenvalue (Y-axis), against factor with which it is associated (X-
axis), and the large eigenvalues should be retained. The retaining components are all
with eigenvalues greater than 1 (Kaiser, 1960). Also, another graph developed by Gabriel
(1971) is the biplot, which is employed as an enhanced scatterplot that uses both points
and vectors to represent structure. In Principal Component Analysis, the axes of a biplot
are a pair of principal components.
Rotating the components
Rotating components eliminates some of the properties of principal components. In par-
ticular, the first rotated component no longer has maximal variance, the second rotated
component no longer has maximal variance among those linear combinations uncorrelated
to the first component, etc. If preserving the maximal variance property is very impor-
tant for the interpretation, and is better not rotating them. In orthogonal rotation, the
rotated components are still uncorrelated. The only thing that has changed is that the
explanation is distributed differently among the rotated components. If the rotated com-
ponents have a clearer interpretation, it might be better to use them in subsequent work.
The Varimax rotation method maximizes the sum over the columns of the within-column
variances. The oblique rotation method does not change the variance that is unexplained
by the components, and the rotated components are no longer uncorrelated. This makes
measuring the importance of the rotated components more ambiguous.
Component scores
After extracting the number of components and, possibly, the rotation of the components,
the component scores are estimated for all respondents. The PCs are obtained as weighted
131
sum of standardized variables. Finally, for a better understanding, the method of prin-
cipal components will be illustrated by a hypothetical two-variable example, allowing to
introduce the mechanics of PCA in Appendix 4A. In particular, it is described how the
number of variables is reduced and how principal components and principal components
scores are orthogonal as well as several useful properties, some of which are geometric.
4.9.4 Mathematical approach of principal components
Consider the following dataset X
X =

x11 x12
x21 x22
.
.
.
xN1 xn2

NX2
where x1 and x2 are the two variables of dataset with n observations. One of the first
things to be considered, is to provide a quick indication of the relationship between the
two variables, and this is a simple two-dimensional data plot between x1 and x2, which is
displayed below.
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Figure 4.1: The data plot
The figure 4.1 is a graphical representation that shows the relationship between x1 and
x2. Such a graphical representation is called a scatterplot. Each individual in the data
appears as a point of the graph. The values of the one variable (x1) appear on the hor-
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izontal axis, and the values of the other variable, (x2) appear on the vertical axis. The
variables have a positive association, and the graph illustrates a linear relationship as the
points of the scatterplot closely resemble a straight line. Also, the crucial information
from the graph is the strength of the relationship between x1 and x2, which is strong.
This means that the variables are highly correlated.
To perform a linear transformation, an orthogonal rotation of the axes is operated, where
the PCs are extracted and the new axes are maintained at 90 degrees. This geometrical
procedure is described in figure 4.2 below.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
x1	
x2	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	 .	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
.	
M(x1,	x2)	
	
	
M1	(X1,	0)	
	
	
		M2	(0,	X2)	
	
	
θ	
	
θ	
	
z1	
	
	
z2	
	
	
	
	
Variability	of	x1	
	
Va
ri
ab
ili
ty
	o
f	x
2	
	
Figure 4.2: The geometry of principal components
Figure 4.2 is a visual of what happens during rotation when there are only two dimen-
sions (x-and y-axis). The points M1(X1, 0) and M2(0, X2) are the projections of the point
M(x1, x2) on the axes x1 and x2 respectively. The orthogonal rotation of axes x1 and x2
by angle θ is nothing more than a principal axis rotation of the original coordinates axes
x1 and x2. The new axes are the principal components z1 for x1 and z2 for x2. The new
axes coincide with the directions of maximum variation of the original observations, and
according to the graph, the variability of x1 is greater than the variability of x2. The
scatterplot below shows clearly the variability of z1 and z2 after the orthogonal rotation.
Figure 4.3 displays the orthogonal rotation of the whole graph, and the two lines are
the new axes z1 and z2. This rotation makes the left/right and up/down variation easier
to see. The data varies a lot left and right and a little up and down. These rotated
axes that describe the variation in the data are the principal components (PCs). z1 (the
first principal component) is the axis that spans the most variation of transformed data,
while z2 (the second principal component)is the axis that has much less variation and can
be ignored because the statistical information needed is the variance. Thus, z1 alone is
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sufficient to give the information from the original data set and the dimension is reduced.
However, it is convenient to use this geometrical representation, and the figure below
shows the mathematical procedure that transforms the original data set into a reduced
dimension of data set as well as preserve the orthogonality.
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Figure 4.3: The orthogonal rotation axis
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Figure 4.4: Projection of original data
Figure 4.4 illustrates the projection of a representative original data point M1 onto z1
and M2 onto z2 axes (Projection of point M onto x1 and x2 axes is described in figure 3.1
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above). The points M1z1,M2z1 are the projections of M1 and M2 onto the axis defined
by the direction of z1. This axis has the property that the variance of the projected
points x1n, is greater than the variance of points M1z2, M2z2, when projected on the
axis defined by the direction of z2. The maximum variation of the projected points define
the principal axes. It is the line or direction with a maximum variation of the projected
values of the original data points. The projected values of maximum variation are the
principal component scores. The first principal axis is often called the line of best fit since
the sum of squares of the vertical deviations of the original data points from the line is
a minimum. Successive principal axes are determined with the property that they are
orthogonal to the previous principal axes.
The two principal components z1 and z2 are the direction cosines of the new axes re-
lated to the old, and the following equations give their linear transformation
z1 = x1 cos θ + x2 sin θ
z2 = −x1 sin θ + x2 cos θ
and the matrix notation is[
z1
z2
]
2x1
=
[
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ cos θ
]
2x2
[
x1
x2
]
2x1
This can be re-written as
Z = ATX
and the vectors obtained from the matrix are
α1 =
[
cos θ
sin θ
]
2x2
=
[
α11
α12
]
2x2
, and α2 =
[
− sin θ
cos θ
]
2x1
=
[
α21
α22
]
2x2
,
where
Z =
[
z1
z2
]
2x1
AT =
[
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ cos θ
]
2x2
A =
[
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
]
2x2
,
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However, the vectors α1 and α2 are orthogonal, that is,
αT1 α1 = 1
αT2 α2 = 1
αT1 α2 = 0
where this is verified below
α1 =
[
cos θ
sin θ
]
2x2
,
αT1 α1 =
[
cos θ
sin θ
]
1x2
[
cos θ sin θ
]
2x1
= cos2 θ + sin2 θ = 1
Similarly, αT2 α2 = 1, and
ATA =
[
cos θ sin θ
− sin θ cos θ
]
2x2
[
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
]
2x2
=
[
1 0
0 1
]
2x2
= AAT = A−1A = I
The identity matrix denotes orthogonal transformation.
Thus, if the original variables are x1, ..., xp the following matrix is given
z1
z2
.
zj
.
zp

px1
=

α11 α12 . . α1p
α21 α22 . . α2p
. . . . .
αj1 αj2 . . αjp
. . . . .
αp1 αp2 . . αpp

pxp

x1
x2
.
.
xp

px1
136
and the conceptual model with p variables is
z1 = α
T
1 x = α11x1 + α12x2 + ...+ α1pxp
z2 = α
T
2 x = α21x1 + α22x2 + ...+ α2pxp
...
...
zj = α
T
j x = αj1x1 + αj2x2 + ...+ αjpxp
...
...
zp = α
T
p x = αp1x1 + αp2x2 + ...+ αppxp
where the first principal component z1, has the maximum of variation. Each jth PC (α
T
j x)
is a linear combination of X that maximizes V ar(αTj x), and subjected to a α
T
j αj = 1 and
Cov(αTj x, α
T
j ) = 0.
Given that the variability of PCs is,
V ar(αTj x) = α
T
j V ar(x)αj
then, under the orthogonality condition the covariances are equal to zero, and the variance
of the sample is
V ar(x) = Cov(x) = S =

s21 s12 . . s1p
s12 s
2
2 . . s2p
. . . . .
. . . . .
s1p . . . s
2
p

pxp
,
where S is the sample of covariance matrix for p-variable problem, s2i is the variance of the
ith variable xi, and sij is the covariance between the ith and the jth variables (i, j = 1, ..., p).
If the covariances are not equal to zero, it indicates that a linear relationship exists
between these two variables, the strength of their relationship is being represented by the
correlation coefficient, rij = sij/(sisj). The maximization of variability is obtained by the
Lagrange multiplier method
L = αTj Sαj − λ(αTj αj − 1)
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subject to
αTj αj = 1
ϑL
ϑαj
= 0
and gives the following characteristic or determinantal equation of the matrix S:
(S − λI)αj =| S − λI |= 0
where S is the covariance matrix, λ is a scalar and I is the identity matrix. The equation
produces pth path degree of polynomial in λ, since the formula for the determinant is a
sum containing p terms, each of which is a product of p elements, one element from each
column of S. From the solution of the equation, the characteristics roots with the values
λ1, λ2, ..., λp, are obtained
| S |=| Λ |= λ1, λ2, ..., λp
or
det(S) = λ1, λ2, ..., λp
that is, the determinant of the original covariance matrix is equal to the product of the
characteristics roots, which are the component loadings (correlation coefficients between
the variables (rows) and factors (columns)) in PCA nd help to interpret the principal
components.
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Chapter Five
Estimation results
5.1 Introduction
This chapter reports the estimation results, which are displayed in Tables. All findings
from the Tables are described, noting any interesting features, whether expected or un-
expected. Also, inferences related to the original aims and objectives of the research are
analyzed and discussed. Before proceeding to the estimation results, a preliminary anal-
ysis of data is reported (section 2), summarizing the entire sample of data and applying
panel data tests, namely panel unit root tests, testing for stationarity; Hausman tests to
decide between fixed or random effects as well as cross-sectional dependence tests to exam-
ine for contemporaneous correlation across countries. Hausman tests and cross-sectional
dependence tests are executed across all estimated models.
After the preliminary analysis of data, the estimation results are reported in three studies
as follows: In the first study (section 3), it is examined the impact of the financial develop-
ment on economic growth during the recent financial crisis, using standard panel models.
In the second study (section 4), it is investigated whether the bank or stock market sector
prevails in any positive or negative effect on economic growth before and after the crisis.
Additionally, it is examined the response of financial development measures to the quality
of the fiscal policy, which plays an essential role in economic growth.
As the first two studies employ static panel models, the third study (section 5), examines
the existence of the long-run equilibrium of the finance-growth relationship employing the
panel cointegration tests. Next, the short and long-run effects of financial development
on economic growth is investigated through heterogeneous panel models of Pesaran and
Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999). Furthermore, through all studies, a discussion
and explanation of results are provided as well as potential policy-implications, which are
the critical points of the thesis.
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5.2 Preliminary analysis of data
5.2.1 Introduction
This section deals with the preliminary data analysis. The main objective is to summarize
the dataset as well as to edit and prepare them for further analysis. The following section
presents the summary statistics, while section 3 reports the correlation analysis. Section
4 displays the panel unit root tests, while sections 5 and 6 report the results for Hausman
and cross-sectional dependence tests, respectively.
5.2.2 Summary statistics
Summary statistics describe the essential features of the data. They are broken down
into measures of central tendency and measures of variability or spread. Measures of cen-
tral tendency included in the study are mean and median, while measures of variability
or spread included are maximum, minimum, standard deviation, kurtosis, skewness, and
coefficient of variation (cv). Apart from the full sample of EU countries, the summary
statistics describes the three regional panels (See chapter three and section 3.2.1 for fur-
ther details).
Table 5.1 presents the summary statistics for all variables used for the estimation of
results. There are disparities in many variables across regions. In particular, the North-
West panel presents the highest growth average, which is around 2.11%, followed by the
Central-Eastern and Baltic panel (1.81%) and the South countries panel (1.60%). Also,
it appears that the average growth rate in the full sample is approximately the same as
that of the transition economies (Panel B).
Following with the financial development measures of bank sector, the average of liq-
uid liabilities as a percentage of GDP over the period 1990-2016 varies from a low of 46%
in the Central-Eastern and Baltic panel to around 84% in North-West panel and 100.6%
in the South panel, which is approximately more than two times as much in the panel
of transition economies. Similarly to the liquid liabilities, private credit averages around
41% in transition economies, while in the North-West and the South panels is 94.5% and
105% respectively, which are also approximately two and a half times as much in the
panel of transition economies. Commercial-bank assets do not present disparities, which
varies from a low of 94% in South countries to around 99% in North-West panel.
Regarding the financial development measures of the stock market, it is noted that mar-
ket capitalization in North-West presents the highest average across all panels, which is
around 66%, while in South and Central-Eastern panels is approximately 45% and 21%
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respectively. Likewise, turnover ratio is approximately 69% in North-West panel, 65% in
South panel, and 30% in the panel of transition economies. Also, total value traded varies
from a low of 4.5% in the Central and Eastern panel to around 33% in South panel and
47% in the North-West countries.
Table 5.1: Summary statistics
Statistics GGDP LLY PRIVY BTOT MCAP TOR TVT INFL FDI OPEN
Full-sample of countries
Mean 1.889 71.42 74.99 96.07 45.02 53.74 28.18 13.10 9.483 92.12
Median 2.392 63.15 68.30 99.19 33.61 42.39 11.28 2.523 2.593 84.43
Maximum 11.88 258.0 261.4 107.1 238.8 341.2 242.9 1494.6 734.0 221.1
Minimum -34.90 7.867 7.089 40.76 0.025 0.027 0.000 -4.479 -43.46 33.00
St.D. 4.340 37.42 45.15 8.513 38.31 46.20 37.77 78.97 42.26 37.80
Skewness -2.108 1.621 1.002 -4.137 1.385 1.445 1.933 14.11 11.14 0.648
Kurtosis 13.84 7.405 4.226 23.00 5.219 6.798 7.016 233.6 159.0 2.682
CV 1.693 0.522 0.599 0.091 0.852 0.859 1.336 5.926 4.457 0.410
Obs 696 688 681 681 623 614 606 678 637 702
Panel A: North and West countries of EU
Mean 2.118 83.45 94.45 98.95 66.43 69.32 47.03 1.993 17.53 90.93
Median 2.056 78.99 91.01 99.57 59.90 64.92 33.86 1.940 2.529 82.16
Max 10.86 170.3 201.2 107.1 238.8 247.7 182.8 10.46 734.0 221.1
Min -8.269 37.82 29.53 81.04 8.116 4.485 1.480 -4.479 -5.670 39.57
St.D. 2.612 30.05 36.19 2.393 37.82 41.01 41.42 1.471 65.36 38.90
Skewness -0.011 0.655 0.667 -4.002 0.923 0.666 1.018 1.352 7.299 0.964
Kurtosis 5.801 2.692 3.506 24.93 4.200 3.396 3.279 10.45 67.77 3.342
CV 1.233 0.360 0.383 0.024 0.569 0.591 0.880 0.738 3.728 0.427
Obs 270 270 270 270 264 258 255 268 248 270
Panel B: Central-Eastern countries and Baltic of EU
Mean 1.811 46.02 41.12 94.31 20.62 30.01 4.476 28.67 4.502 104.3
Median 3.282 46.24 40.37 99.17 14.58 16.70 1.865 4.401 3.514 98.51
Maximum 11.88 85.90 102.5 100.0 210.3 198.2 30.14 1494.6 50.74 185.7
Minimum -34.9 7.867 7.089 40.76 0.025 0.027 0.0003 -1.500 -16.07 33.00
St.D. 5.885 16.96 20.87 11.83 24.55 32.56 5.933 122.4 5.781 34.60
Skewness -1.947 0.000 0.338 -3.132 3.977 1.834 2.042 8.987 4.167 0.290
Kurtosis 9.378 2.142 2.319 12.78 24.49 7.248 7.181 95.47 31.61 2.309
CV 3.249 0.368 0.507 0.125 1.190 1.084 1.325 4.269 1.284 0.331
Obs 291 283 276 276 232 231 226 275 259 297
Panel C: South countries of EU
Mean 1.601 100.6 105.3 93.92 45.09 65.46 32.60 3.434 4.047 67.58
Median 1.772 86.84 94.70 95.38 37.90 48.03 16.72 2.846 1.536 57.52
Maximum 9.400 258.0 261.4 101.2 198.6 341.2 242.9 20.40 198.3 140.8
Minimum -9.132 50.86 26.64 67.96 8.663 1.831 0.211 -2.096 -43.46 33.98
St.D. 2.972 47.41 52.61 6.410 33.17 58.36 40.10 3.489 18.83 29.17
Skewness -0.726 1.784 0.832 -2.045 1.860 1.840 2.402 2.327 8.575 1.213
Kurtosis 4.288 5.709 3.428 7.353 8.031 7.891 10.64 10.80 89.17 3.208
CV 1.856 0.471 0.499 0.068 0.735 0.822 1.230 1.016 4.652 0.431
Obs 135 135 135 135 127 125 125 135 130 135
Note: CV denotes coefficient of variation and is estimated by dividing the standard deviation by the mean. The
higher the coefficient of variation, the greater the level of dispersion around the mean.
In general, it is worth to notice that North-West panel of countries illustrate more sig-
nificant development in the market sector than the other panels, while the South region
have more significant development in the bank sector. Besides, North-West countries have
the lowest inflation rate, which is approximately 2%, while in South countries the rate
is 3.5% and in transition economies 28%. Indeed, these countries experienced very high
rates of inflation at the beginning of their reform programs. As for the net foreign direct
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investments, North-West countries have the highest level (17%), while in the transition
economies and South countries is approximately 4% to 4.5%. Another remarkable con-
clusion is that the coefficient of variation of GDP growth rate is the most volatile for the
Central and Eastern panel of countries followed by countries in the South region, while
the North-West group of countries presents the lowest volatility. Finally, the kurtosis and
skewness statistics suggest that most of the data series are non-normal distributed.
5.2.3 Correlation analysis
An implicit assumption when using OLS estimation method is that the explanatory vari-
ables are not correlated with one another. A correlation matrix shows the correlation
coefficients between sets of variables, and the probability values (p-values) to measure the
significance of their relationship. The line of 1.00s going from the top left to the bottom
right is the main diagonal, which shows that each variable always perfectly correlates with
itself.
Table 5.2: Correlation-Probability matrix
Statistics LLY PRIVY BTOT MCAP TOR TVT INFL FDI OPEN
LLY 1.000
PRIVY 0.792 1.000
(0.000)
BTOT 0.163 0.307 1.000
(0.000) (0.000)
MCAP 0.452 0.551 0.323 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
TOR 0.223 0.318 -0.025 0.418 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.532) (0.000)
TVT 0.449 0.543 0.196 0.801 0.811 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
INFL -0.420 -0.425 -0.295 -0.401 -0.222 -0.423 1.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
FDI 0.0367 0.0038 0.211 0.184 -0.066 0.068 0.025 1.000
(0.356) (0.924) (0.000) (0.000) (0.108) (0.097) (0.518)
OPEN 0.049 -0.045 0.255 -0.065 -0.316 -0.222 -0.105 0.426 1.000
(0.191) (0.236) (0.000) (0.102) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
Note: Boldface values indicate the high pair-wise correlation. For the macroeconomic variables, high
pair-wise correlation is not detected.
The matrix is symmetrical, with the same correlation above the main diagonal (not dis-
played) being a mirror image of those below the main diagonal. P-values are reported in
parentheses. A low p-value such that of 0.01 to 0.05, indicates that there is a 1 or 5 in a
100 chances of no relationship, which is the same as a 99% or a 95% chance that there
is a relationship. The coefficients that are closer to +1 show a positive linear correlation,
which indicates that one variable tends to increase when the other variable increases. In
contrast, if the coefficients are closer to minus 1, show a negative linear correlation, which
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indicates that one variable tends to decrease when the other variable increases.
Table 5.2 presents the results and suggest that there is high pair-wise correlation be-
tween TVT and TOR, which is approximately 81%, followed by LLY and PRIVY (80%)
as well as, MCAP and TVT (79%), all significant at the 1% level of significance. Ac-
cording to the results for the macroeconomic variables high pair-wise correlation is not
detected.
5.2.4 Panel unit root tests
Before proceeding to estimate the results of the panel regression models, it will be nec-
essary to verify that all variables are stationary. For this reason, a variety of panel unit
root tests or stationarity tests in the panel dataset is implemented. Table 5.3 presents
the results obtained from the panel unit root tests. The Levin et al. (2002), Breitung and
Das (2005), Im et al. (2003) and Fisher type tests (Augmented Dickey Fuller-ADF and
Phillips-Perron-PP tests) have a null hypothesis that all panels contain unit-root, thus are
non-stationary. The Hadri (2000) test has a null hypothesis that all panels are stationary.
In the first column, the variables are displayed, while in column two, three specifica-
tion models (intercept, intercept and trend, none) are examined, and when the level of
significance is either 5% or 1%, the null hypothesis is rejected. The decision is of great
importance, and the most robust option is to do all three tests. Also, looking into the
graphs of the dataset (Chapter 3), which show whether the variables of interest over time
are going in a clear direction, is an additional way to check their trend. Finally, the last
column summarises the order of integration of each variable.
Turning now to the results, it is apparent that GGDP is stationary at level (I(0)), while
very few variables of financial development are stationary and most series are best char-
acterized by unit root processes in levels but become stationary in first differences. In
particular, (LLY, PRIVY, BTOT, MCAP and TVT) are integrated of first order (I(1)),
while (TOR) is stationary at level (I(0)). Regarding the macroeconomic variables, INFL
and FDI are founded stationary (I(0)) at level, while OPEN is founded to be integrated
of the first order (I(1)).
Thus, to proceed to the estimation of results, the non-stationary variables will be dif-
ferenced in order to be converted and become stationary, so that only stationary series
are used in the estimated models. The results of the panel unit root tests in first difference
confirm that the non-stationary variables are transformed to stationary. More precisely,
∆LLY, ∆PRIVY, ∆BTOT, ∆MCAP and ∆OPEN have been converted in first difference
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and transformed to stationary. The Greek letter ∆ denotes the first difference of the
variables that have been found to be non-stationary at level.
Table 5.3: Estimation results of panel unit root tests at levels and first difference
Variables
Model
LLC Breitung IPS ADF PP Hadri I(·) I(·)
specification
GGDP Intercept -7.84*** -9.03*** 180.6 *** 226.2*** 2.67*** I(0)
I(0)GGDP Intercept-trend -6.84*** -4.37*** -7.36*** 146.1*** 203.5*** 5.85*** I(0)
GGDP none -9.85*** 177.7*** 220.5*** I(0)
LLY Intercept -1.37 2.54 24.74 29.83 16.29*** I(1)
I(1)LLY Intercept-trend -4.83*** -0.31 -4.47*** 113.4*** 74.7** 8.56*** I(0)
LLY none 3.92 10.22 8.718 I(1)
∆LLY Intercept -11.81*** -12.51*** 251.46*** 2572.55*** 0.561 I(0)
I(0)∆LLY Intercept-trend -8.83*** -2.88*** -9.552*** 189.78*** 453.78*** 5.36*** I(0)
∆LLY none -15.73*** 305.93*** 342.93*** I(0)
PRIVY Intercept -3.15 -0.73 56.75 36.72 15.19*** I(1)
I(1)PRIVY Intercept-trend -0.92 1.89 -2.81*** 86.13*** 31.51 6.82*** I(1)
PRIVY none -0.98 26.26 25.65 I(1)
∆PRIVY Intercept -11.01*** -10.54*** 207.43*** 209.66*** 1.89** I(0)
I(0)∆PRIVY Intercept-trend -7.31*** -4.50*** -6.58*** 156.8*** 152.69*** 8.39*** I(0)
∆PRIVY none -16.26*** 328.88*** 330.30*** I(0)
BTOT Intercept -3.01 -2.4*** 99.65*** 461.5*** 14.45*** I(0)
I(1)BTOT Intercept-trend 17.71 -1.60 -0.14 83.99*** 495.9*** 8.17*** I(1)
BTOT none 3.06 20.70 12.20 I(1)
MCAP Intercept -4.53*** -3.87*** 90.03*** 47.68 3.07*** I(0)
I(1)MCAP Intercept-trend -1.79** -3.51*** -1.51 61.64 26.99 8.66*** I(1)
MCAP none -0.27 29.80 28.90 I(1)
∆MCAP Intercept -12.60*** -10.49*** 207.23*** 198.18*** -0.658 I(0)
I(0)∆MCAP Intercept-trend -11.07*** -12.83*** -8.82*** 167.50*** 151.92*** 2.41*** I(0)
∆MCAP none -17.24*** 349.14*** 318.62*** I(0)
TOR Intercept -14.22*** -11.38*** 210.9*** 159.2*** 10.01*** I(0)
I(0)TOR Intercept-trend -11.03*** -4.59*** -9.72*** 179.2*** 141.1*** 7.15*** I(0)
TOR none -5.94*** 136.6*** 121.2*** I(0)
TVT Intercept -11.03*** -6.52*** 125.8*** 49.78 8.46*** I(0)
I(1)TVT Intercept-trend -1.01 -4.93*** -3.83*** 90.75*** 30.89 7.63*** I(1)
TVT none -2.33*** 52.59 61.76 I(1)
∆TVT Intercept -13.89*** -11.64*** 230.69*** 142.32*** -1.56 I(0)
I(0)∆TVT Intercept-trend -16.67*** -9.82*** -11.85*** 195.87*** 83.57*** -0.526 I(0)
∆TVT none -18.57*** 371.65*** 268.78*** I(0)
INFL Intercept -390.3*** -171.23*** 1057*** 1233*** I(0)
I(0)INFL Intercept-trend -440*** -2.14** -171.01*** 1253*** 1485*** I(0)
INFL none -164.2*** 559.1*** 551.5*** I(0)
FDI Intercept -7.73*** -8.37*** 174.09*** 183.7*** 9.76*** I(0)
I(0)FDI Intercept-trend -4.84*** -2.4*** -4.35*** -103.6*** 176.9*** 2.72*** I(0)
FDI none -5.91*** 98.74*** 158.3*** I(0)
OPEN Intercept -0.83 2.68 23.61 23.27 I(1)
I(1)OPEN Intercept-trend -3.38*** -4.44*** -3.85*** 86.02*** 88.24*** I(0)
OPEN none 6.23 4.31 2.73 I(1)
∆OPEN Intercept -21.68*** -20.14*** 408.51*** 478.24*** 0.939 I(0)
I(0)∆OPEN Intercept-trend -18.74*** -13.19*** -17.61*** 326.85*** 479.99*** 6.89*** I(0)
∆OPEN none -24.16*** 550.81*** 561.77*** I(0)
Note:(***),(**) reflect the 1%, 5% of significance level respectively. Automatic selection of maxi-
mum lags based on Akaike Info Criterion (AIC). (***),(**) reflect the 1%, 5% of significance level
respectively. Automatic selection of maximum lags based on Akaike Info Criterion (AIC).
5.2.5 Fixed or Random effects-Hausman tests
The first decision before proceeding to the panel estimation models is whether the ex-
planatory variables have fixed or random effects. A central assumption is that the random
effects estimation is uncorrelated with the explanatory variables and the Hausman (1978)
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test is employed to compare the fixed and random effects across all estimated models.
The null hypothesis is that the preferred model is random effects vs. the alternative the
fixed effects. Table 5.4 reports the results and it is found that the null hypothesis is
rejected across all models. In particular, the χ2k statistics and the p-values indicate that
all diagnostic tests reject the null hypothesis. Rejecting the null hypothesis implies that
the random effects (RE) estimator is not consistent. Hence, the fixed effects model is
appropriate.
Table 5.4: Hausman test
Test Summary Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X
χ2k 21.29 17.77 33.78 58.62 68.46 41.65 20.41 44.18 63.59 72.32
P -value 0.001 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.008 0.000 0.000 0.000
5.2.6 Cross-sectional dependence tests
It is commonly assumed that disturbances in panel data models are cross sectionally in-
dependent. There is, however, considerable evidence that cross-sectional dependence is
often present in panel regression settings. Due to globalisation and an increasing amount
of integration among European Union countries, a shock that occurs in the financial sector
in one member country is likely to affect other countries.
The recent European bond crisis influenced all member countries and was felt around
the world. The results, as shown in Table 5.5, indicate that the null hypothesis of no
cross-sectional dependence is rejected at 1% level of significance for all specification mod-
els. The findings imply that a shock that occurs in the financial sector in one member
country is transmitted to other countries.
Table 5.5: Cross-sectional dependence test
Test Summary Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X
Pesaran 35.517 32.548 19.66 19.664 13.724 7.655 19.638 17.957 17.040 16.542
P -value 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
Frees 2.407 5.229 2.034 2.034 2.546 2.226 2.120 1.939 2.180 2.313
P -value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Friedman 120.8 163.02 79.829 79.83 77.927 44.482 87.486 81.842 93.036 92.573
P -value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000
After getting the estimation results of Hausman and cross-sectional dependence tests,
panel fixed effects models are employed using Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors
estimates that are robust to disturbances being heteroscedastic, autocorrelated and cross-
sectional dependent. Hence, the spatial correlation consistent standard errors (SCC)
estimator is used, and the program xtscc is the selection for Stata commands that produce
robust standard error estimates for linear panel models.
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5.3 Study 1: Financial development and economic
growth during the recent crisis
5.3.1 Introduction
According to the empirical literature (Chapter 2), many cross-sectional studies concluded
that financial development positively affects economic growth (King and Levine, 1993c;
Levine and Zervos, 1996; Gregorio and Guidotti, 1995; Levine, 1997; Azman-Saini et al.,
2010), while more recent studies that used time-series or panel data models arrived at
a less uniform conclusion (Arestis et al., 2001; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Levine,
1999; Caporale et al., 2015; Samargandi et al., 2015; Bumann et al., 2013). However,
although the literature is extensively vast so far, to the best of my knowledge, no study
has attempted to compare the financial development conventional measures that led to
economic growth across the European Union (EU) countries, before, during and after
the recent financial crisis in 2008. The contribution of this study is described in the
introduction chapter (See Chapter 1, contribution of the research). The following section
includes a description of data and section 3 presents the model specification. Section 4
provides the empirical results and discussion, while section 5 concludes.
5.3.2 Data
The empirical analysis uses annual data for 26 European Union countries (N=26) over
the period 1990 to 2016 (T=27). The list of countries is provided in chapter 3.5. Also,
descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are reported in the preliminary analysis of
data above (Tables 5.1 and 5.2). The financial development measures used in this thesis
are described in detail in Chapter 3.3 (Description of data). However, a brief description
of the variables used in the current study is provided in Table 5.6 below.
Table 5.6: List of variables
variables Description of variables
GGDP Annual percentage growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
LLY Liquid liabilities as percentage to GDP(%).
PRIVY Credit to private sector as percentage to GDP(%).
BTOT Total bank assets (%).
MCAP Stock market capitalization as percentage to GDP (%).
TVT Stock market total value traded as a percentage of GDP(%).
TOR Stock market turnover ratio (%).
INFL Inflation rate (%).
FDI Net inflows of foreign direct investments to GDP(%).
OPEN Trade openness to GDP(%).
Cr0809 The dummy variable for years 2008 and 2009.
Cr0816 The dummy variable for the years 2008 to 2016.
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5.3.3 Model specification
To analyse the finance-growth relationship before and after the crisis various panel re-
gressions are employed. The basic econometric model, is as below:
GGDPit = α0 + β
′
FDit + γ
′
Xit + uit (5.1)
where the dependent variable is GDP growth, i and t subscripts are defined as i=1,2,...,26
EU countries and t=1990,...,2016. Then, α0 denotes the intercept; β and γ are the vectors
of coefficients; FDit is a matrix of financial development measures (LLY, PRIVY, BTOT,
MCAP, TVT, TOR); Xit is a matrix of control variables (INFL, FDI, OPEN) and uit
captures an error term. Given that the primary purpose is to investigate the impact of
financial development on economic growth through a comparative approach before/after
crisis, in the above model two dummy variables are used; one for the sub-prime crisis
period (years 2008 and 2009); and one for the ongoing crisis period (years 2008 to 2016).
5.3.4 Estimation results
5.3.4.1 All countries results
The results from the full panel of countries are reported in Table 5.7. Models (I) and
(II) present the results for the whole sample period. Models (III) to (VI) estimate the
results for the ongoing crisis and models (VII) to (X) for the subprime crisis. Model
(I) includes the financial development measures, while model (II) includes the financial
development measures and the macroeconomic control variables. Model (III) includes the
financial development measures and their interaction with the crisis dummy Cr0816, thus
capturing slope effects, while model (IV) includes the intercept dummy variable as well.
Model (V) includes the financial development measures and the control variables along
with their interaction with the crisis dummy Cr0816, while model (VI) also includes the
intercept dummy Cr0816 variable as well. Models (VII) to (X) are defined similarly to
models (III) to (VI) using the Cr0809 dummy variable instead.
In the first column (model I), where the whole sample period is examined, BTOT
and MCAP have a positive and statistically significant impact on economic growth, while
LLY is significantly negative.
In column two, model (II) includes the macroeconomic variables, and the results
confirm the negative and significant effect of BTOT and MCAP on growth, while LLY
is insignificant. Additionally, the macroeconomic variables have no impact on economic
growth. The next four models (III to VI) include the Cr0816 dummy variable and estimate
the pre-ongoing and ongoing crisis periods.
In the third column, the results of the model (III) that includes interaction terms
(slope dummies) on the financial development variables, show that during the pre-crisis
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period, BTOT, MCAP and TOR have a positive and statistically significant impact on
economic growth, while the effect of LLY is significantly negative. Through the statistical
significance and estimated coefficients of the slope dummies, the findings suggest that for
the ongoing crisis period, PRIVY and TOR have a negative and statistically significant
effect on economic growth, while the effect of TVT is significantly positive. In contrast,
the regression parameters of LLY and BTOT are statistically insignificant.
In column four, model (IV) is specified similarly to (III) but also includes the
intercept dummy Cr0816 that captures the effect of the ongoing crisis period along with
the slope dummies. The results show that during the pre-crisis period, BTOT has a
positive and significant effect on economic growth, while the effect of LLY is significantly
negative. Also, PRIVY is positive and significant before the crisis, which is fully reversed
after the crisis.
In column five, model (V) includes the macroeconomic variables, and the results
show that without accounting for the ongoing crisis period BTOT, MCAP and TOR have
a positive and significant effect on growth, while during the ongoing crisis period, TVT
has a positive and significant effect, but MCAP and TOR are significantly negative.
In column six is reported the fullest specification, which is that of the model (VI).
As evidenced by the results, during the pre-crisis period, BTOT is positive and significant,
while LLY is significantly negative. As for the ongoing crisis period, TOR is positive
and significant, whereas PRIVY is significantly negative. Regarding the macroeconomic
variables, during the pre-crisis period INFL is found to be negative and significant only
in the fullest specification model (VI), while in the ongoing crisis period this is the case
only in the model (V). Interestingly, during the crisis period, there is substantial evidence
of positive effects from trade, given that OPEN is found to be positive and significant in
models (V) and (VI).
In last four columns, in models (VII) to (X ) and when the dummy variable is not
used as an interaction term, the results show that PRIVY, BTOT, MCAP and TOR are
statistically significant and positive. However, during the subprime crisis period (2008-
2009), across all models, LLY, MCAP are negative and significant, while BTOT is sig-
nificantly positive with significant economic value (approximately 7% to 9%). As for
the macroeconomic variables, the results show that at regular periods there is no impact
on economic growth, while at stress time FDI is statistically positive and again trade
openness (OPEN) is a positive and significant driving force of economic growth.
The overall results from the full sample suggest that during the whole sample
period, and without accounting for the crisis period, financial development positively
affected the economy, as PRIVY, BTOT, MCAP and TOR contributed to economic
growth. In contrast, during the same period, the impact of LLY on growth is significantly
negative and insignificant at regular periods (models VII to X).
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Table 5.7: Full panel
period whole sample ongoing crisis Cr=Cr0816 subprime crisis Cr=Cr0809
model model model model model model model model model model
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Intercept 1.931*** 2.017*** 1.778*** 3.049*** 2.068*** 3.485*** 1.928*** 2.177*** 2.236*** 2.327***
[3.94] [3.54] [3.40] [6.21] [3.30] [7.49] [3.76] [4.32] [4.11] [4.23]
∆LLY -0.087* -0.126 -0.038* -0.042*** -0.037 -0.060** -0.026 -0.027 0.003 0.003
[-1.81] [-1.44] [-2.01] [-2.91] [-1.13] [-2.39] [-0.94] [-1.01] [0.08] [0.08]
∆PRIVY 0.029 0.044 0.053 0.038* 0.063 0.041* 0.041** 0.040** 0.045** 0.044**
[1.48] [1.69] [1.50] [1.92] [1.47] [1.82] [2.07] [2.24] [2.34] [2.40]
∆BTOT 0.351*** 0.296*** 0.260*** 0.208*** 0.203*** 0.153*** 0.277*** 0.255*** 0.236*** 0.235***
[3.76] [2.42] [5.04] [3.99] [4.30] [2.89] [4.84] [4.98] [4.03] [3.98]
∆MCAP 0.030** 0.023** 0.027** 0.012 0.024** 0.008 0.019** 0.017* 0.021* 0.020*
[2.465] [2.42] [2.48] [1.36] [2.31] [0.88] [2.10] [1.84] [2.02] [1.92]
∆TVT 0.025 0.023 -0.004 0.013 -0.004 0.013 0.002 0.006 0.004 0.005
[1.35] [1.49] [-0.42] [1.32] [-0.44] [1.52] [0.29] [0.59] [0.47] [0.58]
TOR 0.006 0.005 0.017*** 0.003 0.016*** 0.003 0.011** 0.008** 0.010** 0.009**
[1.40] [1.52] [3.28] [0.57] [3.40] [0.51] [2.58] [2.05] [2.61] [2.36]
INFL -0.022 -0.032 -0.06*** -0.031 -0.033
[-1.00] [-1.51] [-5.69] [-1.53] [-1.64]
FDI -0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 -0.002 -0.002
[-0.20] [0.38] [0.73] [-0.90] [-0.79]
∆OPEN 0.055 0.017 0.024 -0.0122 -0.013
[1.15] [0.83] [1.57] [-0.64] [-0.67]
Crisis -3.87*** -5.691*** -6.563*** -5.078***
[-5.88] [-5.74] [-4.40] [-3.26]
Cr*∆LLY -0.131 -0.084 -0.100 -0.008 -0.548*** -0.305*** -0.497*** -0.321***
[-0.84] [-0.67] [-0.69] [-0.10] [-8.28] [-4.98] [-12.10] [-5.70]
Cr*∆PRIVY -0.120** -0.126*** -0.080 -0.110** -0.092 0.082* -0.020 0.018
[-2.32] [-2.87] [-1.31] [-2.75] [-1.27] [1.74] [-0.34] [0.47]
Cr*∆BTOT 0.041 -0.150 0.082 -0.093 9.20*** 7.685*** 8.574*** 7.257***
[0.13] [-0.72] [0.27] [-0.53] [4.06] [5.90] [5.29] [6.89]
Cr*∆MCAP -0.025 -0.019 -0.042** -0.022 -0.039*** -0.092*** -0.049*** -0.076***
[-1.19] [-0.91] [-2.72] [-1.37] [-3.55] [-4.27] [-3.65] [-4.02]
Cr*∆TVT 0.047** 0.019 0.043*** -0.001 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.010 0.009
[2.68] [0.98] [3.52] [0.39] [3.29] [5.49] [0.73] [0.91]
Cr*TOR -0.023*** 0.015* -0.019*** 0.023** 0.002 0.03*** 0.004 0.020***
[-3.59] [1.78] [-3.05] [2.64] [0.97] [4.50] [1.50] [3.17]
Cr*INFL -0.404** 0.166 -0.346*** 0.044
[-2.70] [1.33] [-4.34] [0.35]
Cr*FDI -0.003 0.001 0.016*** 0.017***
[-1.57] [0.39] [4.70] [5.32]
Cr*∆OPEN 0.131* 0.167*** 0.305*** 0.207***
[2.01] [4.84] [10.58] [6.05]
R2 0.111 0.143 0.225 0.346 0.299 0.463 0.281 0.35 0.380 0.395
Obs 575 552 575 575 552 552 575 575 552 552
Note: Dependent variable is the GGDP. (***), (**), (*) reflect the 1%, 5%, 10% level of significance respectively. ∆ denotes the first
difference operator that were transformed to become stationary. Cr denotes the dummy variables for the 08-09 and the 08-16 time periods.
During the subprime crisis period (2008-2009), there is substantial evidence that LLY
and MCAP, which are the main proxies for the size of the bank and stock market sec-
tors respectively, negatively affected economic activity, while eight years after the crisis
(2008-2016, ongoing crisis period) this is the case for PRIVY, which is another proxy of
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the size of the bank sector. On the other hand, the most remarkable result is the positive
and significant effect of (BTOT) in the years 2008 and 2009, with a meaningful economic
size.
Furthermore, during the crisis periods, the results show that TOR, is positive and signif-
icant when the intercept dummy is included in the models (IV, VI, VIII, X) and signifi-
cantly negative or insignificant otherwise. However, the higher liquidity (TOR) observed
in the stock market during the ongoing crisis period is not accompanied by higher activity
(TVT), and this is counter-intuitive. It is also surprising that during the subprime crisis
period, the higher activity (TVT) and liquidity (TOR) are accompanied by the negative
results, of stock market capitalization (MCAP), which is also unexpected. Since there is
a co-movement between MCAP and TVT (as found in the correlation matrix), one could
expect that TVT rises faster than MCAP. However, a possible explanation might be that
more selling activity occurred during the crisis period, thus leading to higher supply, and
prices fell. Since prices fall, MCAP drops, thus leading the denominator of TOR to decline
and-as a result-TOR to rise. Even though volume may have declined, MCAP has declined
even faster. This is an indication of how dynamics of stock markets work. The forces
that influence prices and behaviour of investors are signals from fluctuations of supply
and demand.
Nevertheless, during the crisis periods, the results are mixed, and there is no clear evi-
dence if financial development promoted economic growth or hindered economic activity.
Hence, it follows further investigation for the regional panels, which may contribute to
this and lead to more accurate inferences.
5.3.4.2 Regional results
Table 5.8 presents the results for the North-West panel of countries. The results show
that during the full sample period and when the crisis period is not included in the
models, MCAP has a significant positive impact on economic growth across all models,
while for TOR, there is substantial evidence that is significantly positive at normal periods
(models VII to X). In contrast, at regular periods, the findings suggest that LLY hindered
economic activity.
In the years 2008 and 2009, the negative effect of LLY and MCAP, as well as
the positive effect of BTOT and TVT, become insignificant eight years after the crisis
(2008-2016, ongoing crisis). However, the results for the subprime crisis period are still
mixed, while for the ongoing crisis period it seems that financial development hindered
economic activity as TOR is significantly negative, but the evidence is only weak as it is
not reported significant impact in models IV and VI.
Finally, regarding the macroeconomic variables, the negative and significant effect
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of INFL on growth, during the pre-ongoing crisis period, becomes positive and signif-
icant eight years after the crisis. FDI, is insignificant at regular periods and becomes
significantly positive only in the subprime crisis period. OPEN is the only positive and
significant driving force of growth during the ongoing crisis period.
Table 5.9 presents the estimation results for Central-Eastern and Baltic EU countries.
The findings suggest that during the whole sample period and when the models include
the crisis period, PRIVY, BTOT, and TVT have a significant positive effect, indicating
that financial development promoted economic growth.
On the other hand, during the crisis periods LLY and PRIVY harm growth, while
TVT and TOR have a positive effect. Also, in the years 2008 and 2009, the positive and
significant impact of BTOT on economic growth is presented across all models with a
value of around 13% to 14%. Furthermore, it is worth to notice that the higher liquidity
(proxied by TOR), is accompanied with higher activity, (proxied by TVT), but not with
an increased size of stock market capitalization (MCAP), since stock prices fell and TOR
rises.
Regarding the macroeconomic variables, in the pre-ongoing crisis period, there is a
negative effect of INFL on growth, which becomes positive and significant in the ongoing
crisis period. FDI is presented positive and significant in the ongoing crisis period, while
OPEN is positive and significant during both crisis periods. However, the results for the
crisis periods do not provide clear evidence if financial development promoted or hindered
economic activity.
Table 5.10 presents the estimation results for South EU countries. The findings suggest
that during the full sample period and without accounting for the crisis period, financial
development promoted economic growth as BTOT is significantly positive. The positive
and significant effect of TOR seems to be negligible as the coefficient has not significant
economic size and the level of significance in only 10%.
During the sub-prime crisis period, the findings suggest that LLY has an adverse
impact on growth, while for PRIVY, there is evidence that enhanced economic activity.
Moreover, the positive effect of BTOT is observed only in the full specification model
(X). During the ongoing crisis period, there is substantial evidence that LLY and BTOT
are positive and significant, while the effect of PRIVY is insignificant. Also, the results
for the stock market indicators show that any higher stock market activity (TVT) is
accompanied by negative liquidity (TOR), which is again counter-intuitive. However, the
results show that financial development enhanced the economic activity in the ongoing
crisis period, while for the subprime crisis period, this is not the case.
From the macroeconomic variables, the impact of FDI on growth seems to be weak
at regular times, while in the years 2008 and 2009 is positive and significant. During the
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ongoing crisis period, appears to be significantly negative, but is not confirmed in the
fullest specification model (VI). Finally, OPEN is found positive and significant in the
fullest specification models both crisis periods being considered.
The overall results from the regional panels suggest that at regular periods a pos-
itive and significant effect is found for MCAP in North-West region; for PRIVY, BTOT
and TVT in Central-Eastern and Baltic panel; and BTOT in the South group of countries.
In contrast, LLY negatively affected economic growth only in the North-West panel.
During the sub-prime crisis period, the positive effect on growth is found for BTOT
and TVT across all panels, while for the South region PRIVY is significantly positive
as well. In contrast, LLY has negative effect on growth across all regions, while MCAP
and PRIVY are found to be significantly negative in North-West and transition panels
as well. During the ongoing crisis period, only in the North-West panel there is clear
evidence that financial development hindered economic activity as TOR is significantly
negative. In transition economies the results are mixed as LLY and PRIVY are positive,
whereas TVT and TOR are negative. In South region, LLY, BTOT and TVT are posi-
tive and significant, while TOR is significantly negative.
However, one of the main conclusions is that finance led growth at regular periods, while
during the crisis periods, there is no clear evidence that financial development promoted
or hindered economic activity as the results are mixed. Also, the results reveal that the
impact of financial development on economic growth is heterogeneous and varies across
countries over time. Nevertheless, two main questions remain unanswered at present. The
first is related to the impact of financial development on growth during the crisis periods;
and the second is that there is no clear picture of which sector prevails in the positive or
negative effect on economic growth. It is required further work and issues such that of
the intercept dummy and the imperfect (near) multicollinearity will be addressed to get
more conclusive results.
152
Table 5.8: North-West panel
period whole sample ongoing crisis Cr=Cr0816 subprime crisis Cr=Cr0809
model model model model model model model model model model
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Intercept 1.499** 1.386* 0.868 1.443* 0.808 2.695*** 0.916 0.999 1.292* 1.443*
[2.30] [2.22] [1.43] [1.84] [1.09] [4.41] [1.32] [1.42] [1.90] [2.13]
∆LLY -0.64** -0.113** -0.038*** -0.037*** -0.039 -0.057** -0.030** -0.029** -0.020 -0.019
[-2.53] [-2.37] [-5.64] [-4.52] [-1.78] [-2.79] [-2.75] [-2.71] [-0.86] [-0.83]
∆PRIVY 0.018 0.028 0.016 0.013 0.019 0.014 0.022 0.021 0.023 0.022
[1.58] [1.36] [1.24] [1.31] [1.20] [1.35] [1.68] [1.63] [1.83] [1.76]
∆BTOT 0.080 0.060 0.098 0.112 0.050 0.017 0.030 0.036 -0.012 -0.005
[0.62] [0.43] [0.97] [1.11] [0.67] [0.20] [0.25] [0.30] [-0.10] [-0.05]
∆MCAP 0.036** 0.033** 0.042*** 0.036*** 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.029** 0.028** 0.030** 0.0299**
[2.43] [2.33] [3.78] [3.78] [3.48] [3.36] [2.53] [02.47] [2.91] [2.84]
∆TVT 0.020 0.016 -0.015 -0.006 -0.016 -0.006 -0.01 -0.009 -0.012 -0.011
[1.01] [1.07] [-0.95] [-0.40] [-0.91] [-0.35] [-0.94] [-0.84] [-1.04] [-0.97]
TOR 0.006 0.006 0.024** 0.018 0.025** 0.012 0.020** 0.019* 0.020** 0.019**
[0.65] [0.69] [3.04] [1.17] [2.86] [1.22] [2.33] [2.23] [2.48] [2.41]
INFL 0.068 0.004 -0.369** -0.175 -0.208
[0.28] [0.01] [-2.53] [-1.10] [-1.38]
FDI -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.002
[-0.79] [-1.22] [-0.67] [-1.43] [-1.40]
∆OPEN 0.059 0.010 0.017 -0.002 -0.003
[1.74] [0.57] [1.09] [-0.13] [-0.17]
Crisis -2.803*** -5.066*** -5.048*** -5.024***
[-3.85] [-5.04] [-7.35] [-5.94]
Cr*∆LLY -0.155 -0.134 -0.161 -0.097 -0.434*** -0.263*** -0.482*** -0.303***
[-1.24] [-1.18] [-1.43] [-1.03] [-8.47] [-5.23] [-7.54] [-5.42]
Cr*∆PRIVY -0.008 -0.033 0.029 -0.003 0.038 0.013 0.082 0.055
[-0.15] [-0.65] [0.48] [-0.08] [0.61] [0.56] [0.60] [0.72]
Cr*∆BTOT -0.216 -0.397 -0.144 -0.288 6.754*** 1.331 4.875*** -0.556
[-0.81] [-1.80] [-0.57] [-1.51] [7.06] [0.56] [5.49] [-0.21]
Cr*∆MCAP -0.020 -0.003 -0.026 0.008 -0.070*** -0.126*** 0.017 -0.060***
[-0.56] [-0.10] [-0.91] [0.42] [-5.02] [-8.02] [0.96] [-3.56]
Cr*∆TVT 0.040 0.022 0.030 0.003 0.090*** 0.084*** 0.046* 0.068***
[1.53] [0.83] [1.38] [0.15] [8.49] [9.02] [2.20] [6.26]
Cr*TOR -0.020*** 0.007 -0.021** 0.0155 -0.008 0.009 -0.010 0.004
[-3.99] [0.87] [-2.78] [1.83] [-1.56] [1.36] [-1.57] [0.78]
Cr*INFL -0.028 0.714** 0.668** 0.650***
[-0.08] [2.71] [2.55] [3.86]
Cr*FDI -0.003 -0.002 0.021*** 0.019***
[1.34] [-0.87] [6.92] [8.13]
Cr*∆OPEN 0.133*** 0.125*** 0.080** 0.002
[3.62] [4.09] [2.27] [0.06]
R2 0.184 0.236 0.355 0.406 0.410 0.517 0.439 0.46 0.491 0.508
Obs 246 226 246 246 226 226 246 246 226 226
Note: See notes Table 5.7.
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Table 5.9: Central-Eastern and Baltic panel
period whole sample ongoing crisis Cr=Cr0816 subprime crisis Cr=Cr0809
model model model model model model model model model model
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Intercept 3.370*** 2.514** 3.374*** 4.512*** 3.211*** 4.862*** 3.688*** 3.676*** 3.714*** 3.644***
[7.33] [3.10] [5.75] [8.02] [3.69] [6.46] [7.37] [7.04] [4.95] [4.95]
∆LLY -0.411 -0.404 0.050 -0.038 -0.007 -0.086 -0.057 -0.056 -0.101* -0.097*
[-1.39] [-1.68] [0.65] [-0.73] [-0.11] [-1.73] [-1.07] [-1.07] [-1.93] [-1.93]
∆PRIVY 0.135** 0.141** 0.229** 0.183*** 0.202** 0.164** 0.182*** 0.182*** 0.168*** 0.168***
[2.46] [2.90] [3.12] [3.21] [2.69] [3.09] [3.78] [3.79] [3.71] [3.67]
∆BTOT 0.417*** 0.389*** 0.234*** 0.252*** 0.196** 0.198** 0.285*** 0.285*** 0.273*** 0.270***
[3.96] [3.91] [4.50] [3.61] [3.11] [2.31] [5.90] [5.89] [5.70] [5.92]
∆MCAP 0.025 0.018 -0.005 -0.019 -0.007 -0.021* -0.010 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005
[1.59] [1.20] [-0.25] [-1.68] [-0.40] [-1.87] [-0.63] [-0.62] [-0.51] [-0.41]
∆TVT 0.373** 0.189** 0.112 0.188** -0.018 0.102* 0.197*** 0.196*** 0.167** 0.164**
[2.91] [2.34] [1.44] [2.46] [-0.22] [2.16] [3.66] [3.67] [3.11] [3.03]
TOR -0.0005 0.013* 0.0007 -0.012 0.010 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.003 0.005
[-0.10] [2.08] [0.12] [-1.62] [1.53] [-0.32] [-0.37] [-0.34] [0.51] [0.80]
INFL -0.036** -0.038* -0.055*** -0.031 -0.031
[-2.29] [-2.05] [-4.54] [-1.75] [-1.76]
FDI 0.089** 0.068 0.008 0.053 0.050
[2.24] [1.17] [0.28] [1.30] [1.15]
∆OPEN 0.103* 0.060 0.037 -0.022 -0.020
[1.89] [1.73] [1.08] [-0.50] [-0.46]
Crisis -3.206*** -5.427*** 0.477 7.75*
[-4.17] [-6.51] [0.46] [1.90]
Cr*∆LLY -1.026** -0.763* -0.973** -0.564 -1.830*** -1.878*** -1.645*** -2.23***
[-2.48] [-1.87] [-2.33] [-1.81] [-13.39] [-10.59] [-10.61] [-9.80]
Cr*∆PRIVY -0.301** -0.321** -0.208* -0.278** -0.149** -0.165*** -0.082 -0.137**
[-3.07] [-2.98] [-2.33] [-3.10] [-2.85] [-3.45] [-1.29] [-2.45]
Cr*∆BTOT 0.959 0.672 1.117 0.857 13.03*** 12.95*** 12.94*** 13.94***
[1.22] [0.75] [1.30] [1.19] [16.12] [13.85] [9.72] [5.42]
Cr*∆MCAP -0.017 -0.023 -0.028 -0.032 -0.004 -0.001 -0.012 0.025
[-0.65] [-1.13] [-0.90] [-1.60] [-0.26] [-0.09] [-0.71] [1.07]
Cr*∆TVT 0.644*** 0.473** 0.662*** 0.351* 0.620** 0.646** 0.564* 0.923*
[4.11] [2.95] [3.26] [1.92] [2.56] [3.11] [2.16] [1.91]
Cr*TOR 0.009 0.061*** 0.013 0.057*** 0.081*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.065**
[0.58] [4.60] [1.10] [6.07] [3.94] [3.27] [3.17] [2.93]
Cr*INFL -0.187 0.162* -0.144 -0.666
[-1.33] [1.91] [-1.22] [-1.75]
Cr*FDI -0.021 0.081** -0.035 -0.042
[-0.25] [2.39] [-0.88] [-0.99]
Cr*∆OPEN 0.0002 0.092* 0.080 0.147**
[0.00] [2.21] [1.45] [2.44]
R2 0.197 0.272 0.448 0.502 0.505 0.592 0.571 0.571 0.594 0.605
Obs 209 207 209 209 207 207 209 209 207 207
Note: See notes Table 5.7.
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Table 5.10: South panel
period whole sample ongoing crisis Cr=Cr0816 subprime crisis Cr=Cr0809
model model model model model model model model model model
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX) (X)
Intercept 1.079 -0.236 1.114 2.186** 0.323 2.944*** 1.119 1.139 0.253 0.282
[1.69] [-0.21] [1.82] [4.64] [0.30] [5.57] [1.63] [1.65] [0.23] [0.25]
∆LLY -0.027 -0.001 -0.071 -0.080 -0.089 -0.096 0.009 0.010 0.042 0.042
[-0.55] [-0.02] [-1.01] [-1.29] [-1.14] [-1.56] [0.24] [0.27] [0.72] [0.73]
∆PRIVY -0.016 -0.029 0.030 0.045 0.008 0.005 -0.038 -0.038 -0.031 -0.031
[-0.42] [-0.89] [0.57] [0.97] [0.16] [0.13] [-1.02] [-1.03] [-1.06] [-1.04]
∆BTOT 0.478** 0.505** 0.363** 0.315*** 0.400** 0.287** 0.431** 0.424** 0.463** 0.458**
[2.86] [2.88] [3.87] [4.70] [4.11] [4.08] [3.02] [2.99] [2.86] [2.82]
∆MCAP 0.023 0.033 0.012 -0.001 0.008 -0.010 0.018 0.018 0.030 0.030
[1.24] [1.37] [1.15] [-0.23] [0.76] [-1.41] [0.97] [0.96] [1.26] [1.25]
∆TVT 0.026 0.020 -0.0001 0.008 -0.002 0.002 0.0155 0.015 0.015 0.015
[1.14] [1.00] [-0.03] [1.80] [-0.43] [0.56] [0.93] [0.93] [1.02] [1.02]
TOR 0.003 0.008* 0.015* 0.005 0.011** 0.006** 0.006 0.006 0.009* 0.009*
[0.68] [2.37] [2.88] [1.65] [2.89] [3.31] [1.47] [1.43] [2.67] [2.60]
INFL 0.294 0.152 -0.105 0.204 0.200
[1.75] [1.12] [-1.41] [1.34] [1.29]
FDI -0.017* 0.255* -0.066 -0.018** -0.018**
[2.32] [2.58] [-0.88] [-3.02] [-3.02]
∆OPEN 0.016 0.097 0.106** -0.056 -0.057
[0.19] [1.67] [3.79] [-0.54] [-0.55]
Crisis -4.338*** -6.848*** -3.560** -5.079**
[-5.60] [-8.89] [-3.72] [-3.00]
Cr*∆LLY 0.201 0.207* 0.243* 0.329*** -0.131** -0.93 -0.183 -0.704***
[1.87] [2.73] [2.68] [4.56] [-3.08] [-2.00] [-0.90] [7.99]
Cr*∆PRIVY -0.134 -0.143 -0.103 -0.123 0.190*** 0.230*** 0.077* 0.038
[-1.92] [-1.89] [-1.40] [-1.76] [4.99] [6.81] [2.22] [1.36]
Cr*∆BTOT 4.664** 3.611** 3.823** 2.662* 0.355 -0.518 0.004 4.746***
[3.50] [3.97] [3.17] [2.18] [0.57] [-1.31] [0.00] [6.54]
Cr*∆MCAP 0.141* 0.100* 0.085 0.008 0.031 -0.080 -0.071 -0.915***
[2.62] [2.35] [1.33] [0.18] [0.45] [-1.31] [-0.22] [-6.59]
Cr*∆TVT 0.128** 0.055 0.108* -0.026 0.153*** 0.129** 0.039 0.048
[4.27] [1.76] [2.24] [-1.12] [5.76] [4.63] [1.23] [1.44]
Cr*TOR -0.024** 0.009 -0.014* 0.018** -0.005 0.006 -0.010 0.055**
[-3.39] [1.26] [-2.18] [3.78] [-1.64] [1.55] [-0.72] [3.41]
Cr*INFL -0.403 -0.274 -0.196 -4.90
[-0.89] [-1.38] [-0.11] [-5.70]
Cr*FDI -0.268** 0.066 0.197 1.616***
[-2.87] [0.89] [0.47] [5.57]
Cr*∆OPEN -0.021 0.297** 0.303 1.212***
[-0.10] [3.45] [0.80] [7.60]
R2 0.127 0.213 0.477 0.636 0.551 0.704 0.222 0.226 0.299 0.301
Obs 121 120 121 121 120 120 121 121 120 120
Note: See notes Table 5.7.
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5.3.5 Alternative estimation results
The previous results have been unable to demonstrate any clear evidence of the effect
of financial development on economic growth during the crisis periods. In this section is
introduced an alternative estimation of results by removing intercept dummy and collinear
variables. Considering the multicollinearity, the implicit assumption made when using
OLS estimation method is that the relationship between the explanatory variables are
independent (orthogonal). Thus, adding or removing a variable from the regression model
would not cause the estimated coefficients of the other variables to change. Klein (1953)
suggested as a rule of thumb, that multicollinearity may be a problem only if the value
of R2 obtained from the auxiliary regressions, that is a regression of each explanatory
variables on the remaining explanatory variables, exceed the overall value of R2 that
is the one obtained from the regression of dependent on all the independent variables.
Therefore, applying Klein’s rule of thumb, PRIVY and TVT are dropped and the results
are reported in the tables below.
5.3.5.1 All countries results
Table 5.11 reports the results for the full panel of countries. Model (I) includes the finan-
cial development measures, while model (II) includes the the financial development mea-
sures and the control variables. Model (III) includes the financial development measures
and their interaction with crisis dummy (Cr0816), while model (IV) includes interactions
with the control variables as well. Model (V) and (VI) are defined similarly to the ongoing
crisis with crisis dummy (Cr0809).
The first two models, present the results from the whole sample period. It is found
that the ratio of commercial bank assets and market capitalisation have a positive and
statistically significant impact on economic growth, while the other financial development
variables are insignificant.
In models III and IV, it is found that in the pre-ongoing crisis period the ratio
of commercial bank assets, market capitalisation and turnover ratio have a positive and
statistically significant impact on economic growth, while liquid liabilities is insignificant.
During the ongoing crisis period the only statistically significant variable is the turnover
ratio which has a negative effect on economic growth.
In the last two models, when the sub-prime crisis period is not included in the
models (V and VI), the results are similar to those in the pre-ongoing crisis period.
During the sub-prime crisis period (models V and VI) the ratio of commercial bank assets
has a positive and significant impact on economic growth with a remarkable great value
(approximately 9%), while liquid liabilities is negatively related to economic growth and
statistically significant.
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Interestingly, INF and FDI are negative and significant during the ongoing crisis,
while INF is negative and significant for the subprime crisis as well. OPEN is the only
positive and significant driving force of growth during both crisis periods.
Table 5.11: Full panel
period whole sample ongoing crisis Cr=Cr0816 subprime crisis Cr=Cr0809
Variables model (I) model (II) model (III) model (IV) model (V) model (VI)
Intercept 1.94 *** 2.07*** 1.914*** 2.20*** 2.00*** 2.280***
[7.94] [3.41] [3.72] [3.52] [3.76] [9.93]
∆LLY -0.08 -0.100 -0.030 -0.018 -0.014 0.018
[-1.47] [-1.18] [-1.51] [-0.62] [-0.43] [0.73]
∆BTOT 0 .273** 0 .237** 0.198*** 0.145** 0.192*** 0.158**
[2.73] [2.65] [3.24] [2.68] [2.97] [2.44]
∆MCAP 0.041** 0.037*** 0.025** 0.026*** 0.020* 0.024***
[2. 54 ] [3.41] [2.62] [2.80] [1.97] [2.70]
TOR 0.007 0.007 0.016*** 0.015 *** 0.010** 0.010***
[1.49] [1.48] [3.10] [3.21] [2.07] [2.77]
INFL -0.020 -0.031 -0.027**
[-0.91] [-1.54] [-2.29]
FDI -0.001 0.00007 -0.001
[-0.60] [0.06] [-055]
∆OPEN 0.032 0.0013 -0.021*
[0.79] [0.08] [-1.78]
Cr*∆LLY -0.149 -0.112 -0.570*** -0.474***
[-0.97] [-0.80] [-7.42] [-6.57]
Cr*∆BTOT -0.171 0.004 9.11*** 8.60***
[-0.77] [0.002] [5.15] [5.15]
Cr*∆MCAP 0.010 -0.017 -0.009 -0.031
[0.50] [-1.15] [-0.68] [-1.42]
Cr*TOR -0.023*** -0.019*** -0.0003 0.002
[-4.63] [-4.57] [-0.11] [0.39]
Cr*INFL -0.400** -0.307 ***
[-2.52] [-3.19]
Cr*FDI -0.004* 0.017
[-1.80] [1.26]
Cr*∆OPEN 0.134** 0.293***
[2.11] [7.27]
R2 0.082 0.096 0.177 0.244 0.234 0.326
obs 596 567 596 567 596 567
Note: See notes Table 5.7.
5.3.5.2 Regional results
Table 5.12 presents the results from the regional panels. Model (I) includes the finan-
cial development measures and the control variables for the North-West countries, while
model (II) includes the variables as in model (I) and their interactions with crisis dummy
(Cr0816). Model (III) is similar to the model (II), but the crisis dummy is for the sub-
prime crisis period (Cr0809) for the North-West countries as well. Similarly to the first
three models, models (IV), (V), and (VI) are defined for Central-Eastern and Baltic coun-
tries, while models (VII), (VIII), and (IX) are defined for South countries as well.
During the whole sample period and before the crisis periods, in the North-West
panel, the financial stock market development indicators promoted growth, while in
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Central-Eastern and South panels the ratio of commercial bank assets prevailed. Also, in
South countries the stock market liquidity contributed to economic growth. During the
ongoing crisis period, the adverse effect of liquid liabilities is from the group of transition
economies, while in the sub-prime crisis period is from all panels. Also, in the sub-prime
crisis period, the ratio of commercial banks assets have a positive and significant effect
on economic growth in the North-West and Central Eastern panels.
Table 5.12: Regional panels
Panel A: North-West EU countries B: Central-Eastern EU countries C: South EU countries
Transition economies
period whole ongoing sub-prime whole ongoing sub-prime whole ongoing sub-prime
sample Cr=Cr0816 Cr=Cr0809 sample Cr=Cr0816 Cr=Cr0809 sample Cr=Cr0816 Cr=Cr0809
Variables model (I) model (II) model (III) model (IV) model (V) model (VI) model (VII) model (VIII) model (IX)
Intercept 0.805 0.586 1.157 2.627** 3.589*** 3.605*** -0.770 -0.275 -0.233
[1.10] [0.77] [1.80] [3.06] [4.34] [4.35] [-0.59] [-0.24] [-0.18]
∆LLY -0.084 -0.024 0.049 -0.315 0.076 -0.012 0.029 0.028 0.140
[-1.03] [-0.66] [0.87] [-1.36] [0.88] [-0.23] [1.038] [0.29 ] [1.62]
∆BTOT 0.066 0.041 0.075 0.316** 0.164* 0.218** 0.625*** 0.467*** 0.559**
[0.55] [0.49] [0.75] [2.75] [1.95] [3.02] [2.96] [3.57] [2.75]
∆MCAP 0.048** 0.040*** 0.026* 0.036 0.0008 0.008 0.044 0.016 0.036
[2.43] [3.35] [2.00] [1.28] [0.02] [0.27] [1.46 ] [1.17] [1.30]
TOR 0.011 0.022** 0.017** 0.007 -0.002 -0.0013 0.010** 0.012** 0.010**
[1.53] [3.06] [2.44] [0.93] [-0.42] [-0.16] [2.76] [2.42] [2.43]
INFL 0.111 0.076 -0.141 -0.030* -0.032** -0.024 0.307** 0.216 0.230
[0.43] [0.25] [-0.92] [-2.22] [-2.37] [-1.60] [2.19] [1.41] [1.57]
FDI -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.126*** 0.116** 0.115*** -0.015** 0.261** -0.016**
[-0.87] [-1.52] [-1.64] [3.54] [2.38] [3.34] [-2.10] [2.73] [ -2.50]
∆OPEN 0.127*** 0.095* 0.089 0.082 0.038 -0.036 0.133 0.162** 0.062
[3.64] [2.11] [1.70] [1.76] [1.23] [-0.76] [1.70] [2.68] [0.57]
Cr*∆LLY -0.138 -0.503*** -0.967** -1.561*** 0.183* -0.317*
[-1.36] [-12.26] [-2.26] [-7.67] [1.96] [-1.80]
Cr*∆BTOT -0.076 4.897** -0.052 12.70*** 1.611* 0.358
[-0.26] [2.39] [-0.18] [11.25] [1.74] [0.53]
Cr*∆MCAP -0.011 0.033 -0.003 -0.005 0.034 -0.085
[-0.55] [1.57] [0.08] [-0.17] [0.48] [-0.31]
Cr*TOR -0.016** -0.007 -0.009 0.039** -0.010** -0.015
[-2.41] [-1.46] [-1.09] [2.46] [-2.25] [-1.35 ]
Cr*INFL -0.121 0.809*** -0.20 -0.112 -0.984*** -0.020
[-0.34] [4.28] [-1.24] [-0.93] [-2.90] [-0.02]
Cr*FDI -0.003 0.018*** -0.115 -0.104*** -0.266*** 0.319
[-1.66] [4.59] [-1.27] [-3.22] [-2.92] [1.06]
Cr*∆OPEN 0.045 0.028 0.030 0.107 0.129 0.199
[0.85] [0.50] [0.52] [1.63] [0.73] [0.73]
R2 0.287 0.417 0.511 0.173 0.375 0.462 0.254 0.521 0.337
obs 228 228 228 214 214 214 119 119 119
Note: See notes Table 5.7.
The results confirm that markets have a greater contribution to the economic performances
than the banks in North-West countries indicating that economic activities take place
through organised markets. In Central-Eastern and South countries the banks’ assets
contributed to economic growth suggesting that the capital adequacy of banks ensured
the stability of the financial system. Also, the major indicator of size relative to economy
liquid liabilities, hindered economic growth during the sub-prime crisis period showing
that any expansion of broad money as a share of GDP, has detrimental effects on economic
growth.
The overall findings suggest that when the crisis period is not included, financial
development promoted economic growth, while during the crisis periods has an adverse
effect on economic activity. During the years 2008 and 2009, the findings suggest that
the ratio of commercial bank assets kept the economy from falling out, implying that the
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capital adequacy of banks promoted the stability the financial system. Also, the results
obtained in the subprime crisis period suggest that liquid liabilities hindered economic
growth. Finally, the degree of international trade openness in the economy of a country
was the primary factor that led growth during both crisis periods.
5.3.6 Conclusions
This study aims to examine the relationship between financial development and economic
growth on the face of the recent financial crisis, using a panel dataset of 26 European
Union countries over the period 1990-2016. Also, six indicators are used as proxies for
the financial development and two phases of crisis periods are examined, namely the
subprime crisis period (2008-2009), and the ongoing crisis period (2008-2016). The em-
pirical approach uses multiplicative dummies to compare two distinct sub-periods before
(pre-ongoing)/after (ongoing) the crisis for the ongoing crisis models, and two distinct
sub-periods stress time (2008-2009)/regular for all the rest sample period. The initial
findings concluded that finance led growth at regular periods, while during the crisis
periods the results are mixed. Next, issues such that of the intercept dummy and the im-
perfect (near) multicollinearity were addressed to get more conclusive results. However,
the overall results of the study lead to several conclusions:
First, at regular periods, financial development has a positive effect on economic growth,
while during the crisis periods has an adverse effect on economic activity. From the re-
gional results, the main conclusion is that the impact of financial development indicators
on economic growth is heterogeneous and varies across countries over time, thus confirm-
ing the assumption of the panel heterogeneity, which may be due to differences in levels
of financial development.
Second, one of the most remarkable findings is that during the subprime crisis period
(2008 and 2009), total banks assets (BTOT) have a significantly positive effect on growth,
with a meaningful economic size. The relative importance of this finding is that the De-
posit Guarantee Scheme, which is a EU legislation that protects banks deposits in case
of bank failure, prevented the mass withdrawal of deposits. Hence, the capital adequacy
kept the stability of the financial system as well as the economy in permissible growth
level that did not lead to collapse.
Third, from the regional results it is worth noting that in North-West countries, the
stock market capitalization has a greater contribution to the economic performance than
banks, while in Central-Eastern and South countries the banks’ assets contributed to eco-
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nomic growth. However, this may be a challenge for further financial integration efforts.
Fourth, the results reveal that the higher activity of the stock market is not a driving
force of the economic growth, since it is not accompanied by higher liquidity, implying
that at stress times, investors feel hesitant about the direction of the stock market, and
thus future trading tends to increase, causing derivatives on specified securities to trade
more actively. A future trading is a standardized contract to buy and sell a fixed quan-
tity of specified assets at a pre-argue price, which is used by investors to hedge and to
perfectly offset their risk. Hedging is a recurring feature of every financial crisis, and
helps to reduce the risk of adverse price movement in an asset (Eales, 1997; Lioui and
Poncet, 2005; Valdez and Molyneux, 2015). Additionally, the higher stock market activity
is not accompanied by a higher stock market capitalization, implying that share prices
fell. Thus, the stock market size drops resulting in weakening of the economy.
Nevertheless, from the results there is no clear picture of which sector prevails in the
positive or negative effect on economic growth before and after the crisis. Principal com-
ponent analysis (PCA) will be employed in the next study to create two new aggregate
indices, one for banks and one for markets sectors, to get more specific results.
In relation to the previous literature, the findings refute the prior research of the pos-
itive finance-growth relationship as found by Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004), Apergis
and Fillipidis (2007), Pradhan et al. (2016), Anwar and Cooray (2012), Muhammad et al.
(2016) among others. These studies have not attempted to compare the effect of financial
development to identify what went wrong or what went well before, during and after the
recent financial crisis in a group of countries that implement the same regulations for the
financial sector. Adversely, the findings have corroborated the research of Menyah et al.
(2014), Swamy and Dharani (2018), Durusu-Ciftci et al. (2017), Narayan and Narayan
(2013), Ductor and Grechyna (2014), Cojocaru et al. (2015) who found a negative rela-
tionship between financial development and economic growth and their data sets extend
the year of crisis (2008). The current research has extended thinking and empirical ev-
idence in this field, exploring the role of financial development in economic growth and
investigating the relationship between the two in both short and long horizons, within and
outside the recent global financial crisis. However, what merits the current sub-study, is
that the work is a timely contribution to the knowledge providing important policy impli-
cations for the reforms to put forward to enforce the financial system’s stability since the
EU governments are currently developing new regulatory reforms to build a safer financial
system.
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5.4 Study 2: Financial Development, Economic Growth
and the Role of Fiscal Policy
5.4.1 Introduction
According to the empirical literature (Chapter 2), several studies examined the finance-
growth relationship and focused more on the employed methods, investigating either de-
veloped or developing countries. Also, most of the literature uses bank based financial
proxies due to the unavailability of long-span time series data of the stock market for many
of the countries. However, the impact of financial bank and stock market development
on economic growth is not widely investigated and the existing studies provide ambigu-
ous results. Levine (2002) documented that bank-based financial systems promote faster
economic growth than market-based that are at an early stage of development. Likewise,
Allen et al. (2012) found that bank-based financial systems are more helpful in economies
in which the major industries are associated with manufacturing and technology. In con-
trast, Narayan and Narayan (2013) found different results, suggesting that the financial
market sector has a significantly positive effect on economic growth, while the impact of
the banking sector is significantly negative.
This study investigates the behavior of two sectors of the economy, namely the bank-
ing sector and the market sector, attempting to examine the effect they had on economic
growth, before and after the crisis, which has not been addressed in the existing literature.
Furthermore, it is investigated the response of the financial development measures to the
quality of fiscal policy, which plays an essential role for the economic growth. The contri-
bution of this study is described in the introduction chapter (See Chapter 1, contribution
of the research). The remainder is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and
section 3 presents the specification model. Section 4 reports the empirical results, while
section 5 concludes.
5.4.2 Data
The current study is also based on a panel dataset covering 26 EU countries over the
period 1990-2016. The financial development measures are two aggregate indices, one for
the bank sector and one for the stock market sector, thus capturing the size of the finan-
cial system. The indices are created through the principal component analysis, which is
described in the next section. Also, additional macroeconomic variables are used for the
quality of the fiscal policy. The list of variables, descriptive statistics of new macroeco-
nomic variables, and correlation analysis are presented in Tables 5.13 to 5.15 below.
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Table 5.13: List of variables
variables Description of variables
GGDP Annual percentage growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
LLY Liquid liabilities to GDP(%), also known as broad money or M3.
PRIVY Credit to private sector as percentage to GDP(%).
MCAP Stock market capitalization to GDP (%).
TVT Stock market total value of all traded shares as a percentage of GDP(%).
INFL Inflation rate as a proxy for macroeconomic stability.
FDI Net inflows of foreign direct investments to GDP(%).
OPEN Trade openness to GDP(%), which is the sum of exports plus imports.
DEBT Central government debt to GDP(%).
EXP Government expenditures to GDP(%).
TAX Tax revenue to GDP(%).
Note: The variables DEBT, EXP and TAX are stationary since the obtained residuals from an autoregressive
time series model of order one are used as proxies for the fiscal policy in the estimation models (further
details in model specification).
Descriptive statistics and correlation analysis
Table 5.14 present the summary statistics of the additional macroeconomic variables which
are used as proxies for the fiscal policy. It is worth noticing that the mean of the public
debt is 58%, while the average of taxrevenues (41.4%) exceeds the average of public
spending (36.6%).
Table 5.14: Descriptive statistics of additional macroeconomic variables
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
Full-sample of countries
DEBT 656 58.74 32.59 3.66 181.32
EXP 653 36.25 11.06 1.87 63.06
TAX 665 41.46 7.72 14.94 61.92
Panel A: North and West countries of EU
DEBT 270 62.63 23.36 13.84 126.35
EXP 265 38.74 6.02 24.77 62.24
TAX 54 77.61 30.08 44.09 126.35
Panel B: Central-Eastern countries and Baltic of EU
DEBT 251 39.09 27.15 3.66 160.50
EXP 257 31.79 13.31 1.87 55.48
TAX 261 36.95 5.84 14.94 48.28
Panel C: South countries of EU
DEBT 135 87.51 33.68 35.51 181.32
EXP 131 39.97 11.10 16.88 63.06
TAX 135 39.75 4.87 27.96 50.29
Table 5.15 below presents the correlation matrix. The higher pair-wise correlation is
presented between LLY and PRIVY, followed by TVT and MCAP. According to the
results for the control variables and the additional macroeconomic variables for fiscal
policy, high correlation is not detected.
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Table 5.15: Correlation matrix
Variables LLY PRIVY MCAP TVT INFL FDI OPEN DEBT EXP TAX
LLY 1.000
PRIVY 0.792 1.000
MCAP 0.452 0.551 1.000
TVT 0.449 0.543 0.801 1.000
INFL -0.420 -0.425 -0.401 -0.423 1.000
FDI 0.0367 0.0038 0.184 0.068 0.025 1.000
OPEN 0.049 -0.045 -0.065 -0.222 -0.105 0.426 1.000
DEBT 0.394 0.215 0.059 0.055 0.080 -0.020 -0.137 1.000
EXP 0.347 0.218 0.012 -0.051 -0.080 0.020 -0.107 0.505 1.000
TAX 0.028 0.170 0.253 0.298 -0.207 0.008 -0.166 0.214 0.295 1.000
5.4.3 Principal component analysis (PCA)
Many studies in the empirical literature use either M2 or M3 as a ratio of GDP to capture
the overall size and depth of the financial sector (Savvides, 1995; Khan and Senhadji, 2003;
Chuah and Thai, 2004; Samargandi et al., 2015). Also, liquid liabilities of the financial
system, including the liabilities of banks, central banks and other financial intermediaries,
reflect the financial deepening, which is in turn positively related with financial services
(Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Favara, 2003). Additionally, credit to the private sector
as a proportion of GDP is the third most widely used alternative measure of financial
development. It accounts for credit granted to the private sector that enables the utiliza-
tion of funds and their allocation to more efficient and productive activities (Levine et al.,
2000; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Ang and McKibbin, 2007; Arcand et al., 2015).
In this study, PCA is employed for the construction of two financial development in-
dices to represent the size of both sectors, the bank and the stock market. For the bank
index, two indicators are used: liquid Liabilities and credit to private sector, capturing the
size of the banking sector. Second, for the stock market index, two additional indicators
are used: stock market capitalisation and total value traded, capturing the size of the
financial market sector.
Before proceeding with PCA, it is necessary to use stationary data. Bai and Ng (2004)
found that when the principal component analysis was applied to levels, all the estimated
series were far from the true series. This estimation using the data in levels is not consis-
tent. On the contrary, the constructed indices are robust to stationary assumptions when
scores are estimated from first-differenced data. Two financial development variables of
each sector are utilized, to reduce them to one index based on the Kaiser’s criterion that
requires an eigenvalue bigger than unity. Another criterion of retaining a component is
if it accounts for a large proportion of variance of the data set. The results for principal
component analysis are reported in Tables and below.
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Table 5.16 presents the results of the principal component analysis for the bank index.
The first component is the only one with an eigenvalue greater than 1 and it explains
about 74% of the variation of the dependent variable. The second principal component
explains the remaining 26%. Hence, it is clear that the first principal component has the
maximum explanatory power. It is used therefore as the financial development bank size
(FDB) indicator.
Table 5.16: Principal component analysis for financial bank size index
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 1.4773 0.9546 0.7386 0.7386
Comp2 0.5227 0.2614 1.000
Table 5.17 presents the results of the principal component analysis of the market index.
The first component is the only one with an eigenvalue greater than 1 and it explains
about 69.5% of the variation of the dependent variable. The second principal component
explains the remaining 30.4%. Hence, again it is clear that the first principal component
has the maximum explanatory power. It is used therefore as the financial development
market size (FDM) indicator .
Table 5.17: Principal component analysis for financial market size index
Component Eigenvalue Difference Proportion Cumulative
Comp1 1.391 0.7828 0.6957 0.6957
Comp2 0.6086 0.3043 1.000
5.4.4 Model specification
After the creation of two indices, ordinary least squares (OLSs) panel regressions are
employed to analyze the effect of different financial development banking and stock mar-
ket sectors on economic growth, before and after the crisis. According to the Hausman
test, panel country-fixed effects models are estimated. Furthermore, the Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) estimator is applied, which produces heteroscedasticity-and autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors that are robust to cross-sectional and temporal dependence.
The benchmark model is:
GGDPit = α0 + β
′
FDit + γ
′
Xit + uit (5.2)
where the dependent variable is GGDPit, measured by the annual percentage growth rate
of real GDP at (constant 2010 U.S. dollars), i and t subscripts are defined as i=1,2,...,26
EU countries and t=1990,...,2016. Then, α0 denotes the intercept; β and γ are the vec-
tors of coefficients; FDit is a matrix of financial development indices; Xit is a matrix of
control variables; uit captures the error term.
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Next, it is examined the quality of fiscal policy, which may influence not only the econ-
omy but also financial development. It is crucial to investigate the response of financial
development measures to the quality of fiscal policy, which plays an essential role in the
current and future directions in economic growth. In particular, to examine how the
quality of fiscal management changes financial development before and after the crisis,
it will be identified the unexpected changes in fiscal policy such that of the government
debt and the government size proxied by public spending or tax revenues. To isolate the
unexpected changes of these macroeconomic series, an autoregressive time series model
of order one is fitted that uses as independent variable observations from previous time
steps (one-lag-value) to predict the value at the next time step, and the residuals from
the equations, are treated as indicators of the quality of fiscal policy. The assumption
behind the AR(1) model is that time series behavior of Yt is primarily determined by its
own value in the preceding period. So what will happen in time t is mainly dependent on
what happened in t − 1. Alternatively, what will happen in t + 1 will be determined by
the behavior of the series in the current time t. In order to guarantee stationarity, it is
estimated the first difference of each macroeconomic variable for each country as below:
∆ ˆDEBT t = β̂1∆DEBT t−1 + e
DEBT
t (5.3)
∆ ˆEXP t = β̂2∆EXP t−1 + e
EXP
t (5.4)
∆ ˆTAX t = β̂3∆TAX t−1 + e
TAX
t (5.5)
where DEBT t is the central government debt, EXP t is the government expenditures,
TAX t is the tax revenues and stand for the predicted values for time t from its own
previous value of time t − 1. The obtained residuals eDEBTt , eEXPt and eTAXt from the
regressions are the unexpected changes in fiscal policy and represent the quality of fiscal
policy, which will be used as additional explanatory variables to our regressions.
5.4.5 Estimation results
5.4.5.1 Finance-growth: All countries results
The results from the full panel of countries are reported in Table 5.18. Model (I) includes
the financial development measures, while model (II) includes the financial development
measures and the control variables. Model (III) includes the financial development mea-
sures and their interaction with crisis dummy (Cr0816) as well as the intercept dummy,
while model (IV) includes interactions with the control variables as well. Models (V) and
(VI) are defined similarly to the ongoing crisis with crisis dummy (Cr0809).
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The first two models, present the results from the whole sample period. It is found
that the impact of the financial stock market development (FDM) on economic growth
is positive and statistically significant, while the impact of the bank sector (FDB) is
insignificant. Adding the control variables in model (II) provides negative effect from
inflation (INFL) and positive effect from openness (OPEN). Foreign direct investments
(FDI) seems to be insignificant.
In models III and IV the ongoing crisis period is examined. In model (III) the
results show that before the crisis, the coefficients of both sectors are positive and signif-
icant, while after the crisis the coefficient of bank sector becomes significantly negative
and the coefficient of the stock market sector is found insignificant. In model (IV), adding
control variables the results show that before the crisis the impact of the bank sector on
economic growth is insignificant, while the impact of the stock market is positive and sig-
nificant. After the crisis, the effect of both sectors negatively affected economic growth,
which is heavily dominated by the banking sector.
In the last two models (V and VI) the subprime crisis period is examined. In
both models, the findings suggest that at regular times, (when the crisis dummy is not
included in the models), the stock market sector has a positive and statistically significant
effect on economic growth, while the effect of the bank sector is insignificant. During
the subprime crisis period, both indices of financial development have a negative and
statistically significant effect on economic growth.
From the results concerning the crisis dummies, it is interesting to see that the
effect is negative and statistically significant on economic growth in all models. Also, at
regular times, the inflation rate has a significant and adverse effect on economic growth
and is properly signed, while at stress times, the impact becomes insignificant.
Interestingly, the positive and significant effect of trade openness before crisis re-
mains two years after the financial crisis, with economically meaningful effect size, but
becomes insignificant during the ongoing crisis.
The overall findings suggest that the financial development indicators show entirely dif-
ferent performance in crisis periods than in regular periods. In particular, there is strong
evidence that the stock market sector prevails in the positive effect at regular periods,
whereas the bank sector dominates the adverse effect at stress times. Consequently, the
bank sector exhibits high persistence of this adverse effect and may take a long time to
return to levels observed before the crisis. A similar situation can also be observed in the
stock market, although the effect tends to be insignificant (the negative effect seems to
be weak as the significance level becomes lower).
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Table 5.18: Full panel
period whole sample Ongoing crisis Cr=Cr0816 Subprime crisis Cr=Cr0809
Variables model (I) model (II) model (III) model (IV) model (V) model (VI)
Constant 2.433*** 2.238*** 3.364*** 3.335*** 2.856*** 2.859***
(4.69) (3.72) (13.57) (13.56) (7.21) (7.05)
FDB -0.259 -0.227 0.256** 0.209 0.138 0.113
(-0.84) (-0.85) (2.47) (1.69) (0.65) (0.49)
FDM 0.734*** 0.567** 0.365*** 0.268** 0.394** 0.384**
(2.90) (2.72) (3.31) (2.45) (2.65) (2.35)
INFL -0.004* -0.004*** -0.005*
(-1.99) (-3.35) (-1.94)
FDI -0.0004 0.0004 0.0006
(-0.15) (0.49) (0.21)
∆OPEN 0.119** 0.068*** 0.015
(2.22) (3.09) (0.41)
Cr -3.128*** -3.970*** -5.289*** -5.172***
(-6.63) (-5.71) (-3.79) (-4.22)
Cr*FDB -1.493*** -1.280*** -0.527** -0.680***
(-4.99) (-4.67) (-2.64) (-2.92)
Cr*FDM -0.191 -0.383* -0.748*** -1.080***
(-0.94) (-1.93) (-3.70) (-4.65)
Cr*INFL 0.101 0.245
(0.81) (1.55)
Cr*FDI 0.005 0.013***
(1.04) (2.96)
Cr*∆OPEN 0.093 0.223***
(1.74) (4.40)
R2 0.05 0.08 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.29
Obs 574 552 574 552 574 552
Note: The dependent variable is economic growth (GGDP). FDB stands for the index of bank sector
development and FDM stands for the index for the stock market development. The method of estimation is
fixed effects with Driscoll and Kraay (1998) estimator which produces heteroscedasticity-and autocorrelation-
consistent standard errors robust to cross-sectional dependence. Numbers in parentheses denote t-statistics.
(***), (**), (*) reflect 1%, 5%, 10% levels of significance respectively. The letter ∆ denotes the first difference
operator used for the variables that were transformed to become stationary. Cr is the interaction term and
stands for the crisis dummy.
One possible explanation for the negative effect of the banking sector index during the
subprime crisis period might be the liquidity trap. Krugman (1988) argued that liquidity
trap is the situation when investors have an abnormal preference over liquidity and prefer
to keep their assets in the form of cash or demand deposits. Specifically, in a depressed
economy, any increase in money supply is unlikely to cause inflation, and there is a de-
crease in the velocity of circulation. Also, the belief of an adverse event such as deflation
and insufficient aggregate demand might be the main reasons that lead consumers to
avoid investing in bonds and keep their funds in the form of cash or demand deposits.
A possible explanation for the negative effect of the bank sector eight years after the
crisis (ongoing crisis period) might be the ineffectiveness of monetary policy. In partic-
ular, it appears that the unconventional monetary policy instruments failed to stimulate
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the economy. The European Central Bank through the comprehensive program of Quanti-
tative Easing (QE) helped countries that are members of euro, to refinance their sovereign
debts at low-interest rates, which may effectively reduce the national debts, but was less
effective on the real economy. However, low interest rates do not necessarily mean that
consumers will invest. In contrast, they may not want to hold assets like bonds as they
prefer to save resources and need to be faced with good prospects. This situation is
described in a modern version of Keynesian economics, where the rise of money supply
into private banks by a central bank decreases interest rates, but the monetary policy is
ineffective.
Another reason for the adverse effect of the bank sector might be the type of credit
to private sector. In particular, household credit and enterprise credit have a different
impact on economic growth. There is empirical evidence that loans to enterprises enhance
economic growth by easing the liquidity constraint on firms, which in turn leads to the for-
mation of new companies and the expansion of existing ones (Levine, 2005). Conversely,
the evidence for loans to households, suggests that it either has no effect on medium
and long-term economic growth (Beck and Demirguc-Kunt, 2009) or that it even reduces
growth. Jappelli and Pagano (1994) argue that higher availability of household credit
reduces private savings and economic growth. The over-lending to households created a
credit boom that led to a banking crisis. Demirguc and Detragiache (1998) and Kaminsky
and Schmukler (2002) argue in their studies that the banking crises are associated with
the rapid growth of credit to the private sector.
As the results show, stock market activity sharply declined and has an adverse effect
two years after the crisis, which remains during the ongoing crisis period, but tends to
be insignificant because of the lower power. Those results may have been caused by the
drop in stock prices when the crisis erupted. Another possible reason for these results
might be the increase in output. In particular, from 2002 to 2008, there is a rapid growth
achieved by European securities markets and the possible explanation might be the newly
created currency area of the twelve participating European Union member states, which
strengthened the integration of the financial markets across the EU countries. This rapid
growth raises the demand for the industry’s product, and thus boosts profits for given
capital stock. The higher market value of capital attracts investment, and so the capital
stock starts to rise. As this is a temporary effect, the permanent result is that investments
respond less since firms respond less to a rise in profits when they know they will reverse
the increases (Romer, 2012). However, stock market performance is highly volatile and
easily affected by global economic conditions.
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5.4.5.2 Finance-growth: Regional results
The results from the regional panels are reported in Table 5.19. It is necessary to divide
the full panel of 26 EU countries into smaller regional panels that are more homogeneous
in terms of level of financial development. Model (I) includes the financial development
measures and the control variables, while Model (II) includes their interaction with crisis
dummy (Cr0816) and the intercept dummy as well. Model (III) is defined similarly to the
ongoing crisis with the crisis dummy (Cr0809) instead. Models IV to VI and VII to IX
are defined similarly to the first three models for the Central-Eastern and Baltic region
and South panel respectively.
The first three models, present the results for the North-West subsample. It is found
that during the whole sample period (as model I reports), the impact of the stock market
sector on economic growth is positive and statistically significant, whereas the impact of
the bank sector is significantly negative. In models II and III, at regular times, financial
stock market development promoted economic growth, while for the bank sector this is
not the case. During the ongoing crisis period, both indices are negative and significant,
while in the subprime crisis period the bank sector has an adverse effect on economic
growth. The estimated results for the macroeconomic variables show that the negative
and significant effect of inflation rate on economic growth at normal periods becomes sig-
nificantly positive at crisis periods. Also, the positive effect of trade openness at regular
periods becomes insignificant at crisis periods.
The next three models (IV to VI) report results for the transition countries. In
model IV, where the whole sample period is examined, it is found that the impact of the
stock market sector on economic growth is positive and statistically significant, while the
impact of the bank sector is insignificant. In models V and VI the findings suggest that
at normal times financial bank sector development contributed to economic growth, while
the effect of the stock market sector on economic activity is insignificant. During the crisis
periods, both financial development indices are negative and statistically significant. The
estimated results for the macroeconomic variables show that openness is the only positive
and significant driving force of growth during both crisis periods.
The last three models (VII to IX), present the results for the South group of
countries. The results show that during the whole sample period and the pre-ongoing
crisis period (as the models VII and VIII report), the impact of financial development
on economic growth is insignificant, while at normal time as evidenced in model IX,
the impact of the bank sector appears to be significantly positive. During the crisis
periods, both financial development indices are insignificant. The estimated results for
the macroeconomic variables show that the positive and significant effect of openness on
economic growth during the pre-ongoing crisis period remains unchanged only for the
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subprime crisis period.
Table 5.19: Regional panels
Panel A: North-West EU countries B: Central-Eastern EU countries C: South EU countries
period whole ongoing subprime whole ongoing subprime whole ongoing subprime
Cr=Cr0816 Cr=Cr0809 Cr=Cr0816 Cr=Cr0809 Cr=Cr0816 Cr=Cr0809
Variables model I model II model III model IV model V model VI model VII model VIII model IX
Constant 2.025** 3.512*** 3.089*** 2.400** 4.272*** 3.584*** 0.628 2.959*** 1.283
(2.42) (12.88) (7.72) (2.44) (6.33) (5.09) (0.64) (5.87) (1.34)
FDB -0.745* -0.122 -0.373 -0.175 0.814** 0.738** 0.459 0.055 0.635*
(-2.06) (-0.89) (-1.09) (-0.27) (2.22) (2.18) (1.44) (0.18) (1.86)
FDM 0.651** 0.509*** 0.332* 0.538* -0.115 0.2.65 0.733 0.030 0.597
(2.51) (3.58) (1.89) (1.78) (-0.41) (0.92) (1.43) (0.22) (1.30)
INFL -0.043 -0.467*** -0.418*** -0.004 0.0001 0.0003 0.239 -0.076 0.141
(-0.14) (-3.26) (-3.22) (-0.88) (0.05) (0.12) (1.73) (-0.71) (1.06)
FDI -0.0008 -0.0008 -0.0008 0.119** 0.047 0.084* -0.015* 0.027 -0.016*
(-0.40) (-1.27) (-0.35) (2.47) (1.31) (2.11) (-1.94) (0.39) (-2.04)
∆OPEN 0.136*** 0.086* 0.126* 0.107 0.031) -0.027 0.081 0.131*** -0.003
(3.47) (2.00) (2.03) (1.60) (0.97) (-0.61) (0.93) (3.98) (-0.02)
Cr -3.783*** -4.812*** -5.531*** -1.752 -3.927*** -2.583***
(-5.81) (-10.23) (-4.23) (-0.61) (-5.88) (-3.22)
Cr*FDB -1.564*** -1.362*** -3.095*** -4.662*** 0.452 -0.302
(-4.14) (-4.44) (-4.21) (-10.38) (1.31) (-0.77)
Cr*FDM -0.376* 0.059 -0.526* -0.943* 1.585 0.114
(-2.03) (0.24) (-2.08) (-1.90) (1.56) (0.10)
Cr*INFL 0.888** 1.458*** 0.170 0.006 0.117 0.329**
(2.55) (8.11) (0.94) (0.03) (0.25) (2.54)
Cr*FDI -0.0004 0.015*** 0.035 0.012 -0.033 0.070
(-0.11) (5.10) (0.92) (0.25) (-0.47) (0.83)
Cr ∗∆OPEN 0.030 -0.122 0.121** 0.308*** -0.090 0.199*
(0.42) (-1.66) (2.33) (3.13) (-0.53) (2.00)
R2 0.18 0.43 0.39 0.14 0.49 0.45 0.15 0.55 0.24
obs 225 225 225 208 208 208 119 119 119
Note: See notes Table 5.10.
The findings also provide valuable insights into the financial system of the regions. More
specifically, the results at normal periods indicate that North-West countries are more
market-oriented, while transition economies appear to be more bank-based. Besides,
transition economies present a stronger adverse effect at stress times than the North-
West countries, implying that countries with an underdeveloped stock-market make their
financial system more fragile. Allen et al. (2012), found in their study that countries with
bank-based financial systems may not have a well-developed stock market sector, which is
often the case in emerging markets. On the other hand, for countries with market-based
financial systems, it is very likely that the banking sector is also well-developed.
Moreover, the effect of the equity market during the crisis periods in North-West and
transition countries appears to be different during the subprime crisis period, but in the
ongoing crisis period seems to be strongly related in these two regions (since they both
report negative and significant results). A possible explanation of this result is that stock
market disruptions tend to increase in times of recessions or large shocks, which are often
affected through strong linkages and co-movements. Furthermore, in countries with bal-
anced financial system structures, enterprises can more easily shift financing from banks
to markets or vice-versa during a crisis. The change of financial channels might explain
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the results and would confirm the findings of Claessens et al. (2010) and Allen et al.
(2012), who found that the financial indicators during a crisis are very different in emerg-
ing economies than in developed economies. According to the same authors, in emerging
markets, economic recessions are often more costly, and the markets take more time to
recover after the crises.
The findings for South panel reveal that financial development does not stimulate eco-
nomic growth all times being considered, suggesting that in these economies the ability
of financial intermediaries to allocate resources is inefficient. A possible explanation of
this result might be the weakness of the private sector in generating economic activities
as well as the general inefficiency of financial institutions and the dominant role of the
public sector in resource allocation. This explanation is also consistent with the argument
provided by Nili and Rastad (2007), who found that the weakness of the private sector is
associated with an inefficient financial system to allocate resources and the dominant of
the public sector. Also, it seems that the entry of these countries in Eurozone weakened
the incentive to reduce the public debt.
5.4.5.3 Fiscal policy: All countries results
In Table 5.20, it is repeated the previous empirical estimation strategy adding the indi-
cators of the quality of fiscal policy as explanatory variables in the regressions. Model (I)
includes the financial development measures, control variables, public debt (DEBT) as
proxy for the fiscal policy and their interaction with crisis dummy (Cr0816) as well as the
intercept dummy. In model (II) is also included the government expenditures (EXP) and
its interaction with crisis dummy (Cr0816), while in model (III) is added the taxrevenues
(TAX) and its interaction with crisis dummy (Cr0816) as well. Models (IV) to (VI) are
defined similarly to the ongoing crisis with crisis dummy (Cr0809).
In models I to III the ongoing crisis period is examined. The results show that dur-
ing the pre-crisis period, the coefficients of both financial development indices are positive
and significant even after have been added the control variables for the quality of fiscal
policy. During the ongoing crisis period, the coefficients of both financial development
indices are negative and significant However, the results for the bank sector before the
crisis are statistically stronger compared to our main estimation, while after the crisis,
the findings are quite similar to the main results (Table 5.18 model IV).
In models IV to VI, where the subprime crisis period is examined, the results show
that at normal periods, the coefficients of the bank sector are insignificant, while the
coefficients of the stock market sector are positive and significant. During the subprime
crisis period, both financial development indices are negative and significant. However,
the results for the subprime crisis models remain unchanged regarding the signs and
significance levels compared to the main estimations.
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Table 5.20: Full panel
period Ongoing crisis Cr=Cr0816 Subprime crisis Cr=Cr0809
Variables model (I) model (II) model (III) model (IV) model (V) model (VI)
Constant 3.292∗∗∗ 3.343∗∗∗ 3.332∗∗∗ 2.815∗∗∗ 2.843∗∗∗ 2.863∗∗∗
(15.98) (16.40) (16.64) (8.25) (8.11) (8.79)
FDB 0.269∗∗∗ 0.273∗∗∗ 0.304∗∗∗ 0.226 0.251 0.255
(3.96) (3.77) (3.46) (1.22) (1.35) (1.45)
FDM 0.222∗∗ 0.207∗ 0.209∗∗ 0.251∗ 0.236∗ 0.269∗∗
(2.26) (2.11) (2.20) (2.04) (1.93) (2.48)
INFL -0.004∗∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.004∗ -0.005∗∗ -0.005∗∗
(-3.25) (-2.90) (-2.65) (-1.87) (-2.23) (-2.51)
FDI 0.0008 0.0008 0.0007 0.001 0.001 0.002
(1.04) (1.08) (0.92) (0.67) (0.65) (0.82)
∆OPEN 0.036 0.032 0.028 -0.003 -0.004 -0.012
(1.56) (1.38) (1.28) (-0.12) (-0.17) (-0.45)
eDEBT -0.140∗∗∗ -0.126∗∗∗ -0.132∗∗∗ -0.220∗∗∗ -0.204∗∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗
(-4.01) (-4.83) (-4.76) (-4.46) (-4.69) (-4.40)
eEXP -0.087 -0.074 -0.273∗∗∗ -0.211∗∗∗
(-0.85) (-0.79) (-3.37) (-3.41)
eTAX -0.048 -0.225∗
(-1.10) (-1.81)
Cr -3.232∗∗∗ -3.312∗∗∗ -3.189∗∗∗ -1.940 -1.191 -1.224
(-7.43) (-7.79) (-7.41) (-1.45) (-1.62) (-1.26)
Cr*FDB -0.915∗∗∗ -0.907∗∗∗ -0.925∗∗∗ -0.880∗∗∗ -1.270∗∗∗ -1.349∗∗∗
(-4.91) (-4.56) (-5.62) (-4.33) (-3.34) (-5.77)
Cr*FDM -0.475∗∗∗ -0.540∗∗∗ -0.344∗ -0.599∗∗ -0.720∗∗ -0.628∗∗∗
(-3.07) (-3.18) (-1.82) (-2.64) (-2.85) (-3.43)
Cr*INFL 0.114 0.106 0.094 0.076 6 0.055 -0.012
(1.12) (1.03) (0.98) (0.46) (0.43) (-0.09)
Cr*FDI 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.025∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗
(1.22) (1.24) (1.14) (3.29) (3.56) (4.17)
Cr*∆OPEN 0.092∗ 0.097∗∗ 0.095∗∗ 0.187∗∗∗ 0.194∗∗∗ 0.190∗∗∗
(2.11) (2.37) (2.23) (4.84) (5.41) (4.79)
Cr ∗ eDEBT -0.193∗∗ -0.155 -0.146 -0.258∗∗ -0.227∗∗∗ -0.279∗∗∗
(-2.15) (-1.73) (-1.63) (-2.88) (-3.20) (-4.26)
Cr ∗ eEXP -0.156 -0.105 -0.103 -0.0658
(-1.32) (-1.04) (-1.36) (-1.08)
Cr ∗ eTAX -0.803∗∗∗ -1.033∗∗∗
(-4.57) (-6.56)
R2 0.05 0.08 0.29 0.36 0.22 0.29
Obs 530 524 522 530 524 522
Note: See notes Table 5.10.
The proxies for the quality of fiscal policy, however, enter the regression with negative
signs and have not enhanced the economic activity all periods being considered. In par-
ticular, public debt is significantly negative at regular periods as well as two years after
the crash and tends to be insignificant eight years after the financial crisis. Splitting the
government size into public spending and tax revenues, enter the regressions with negative
and insignificant results at regular periods, and the adverse effect of tax revenues remains
eight years after the crisis.
As mentioned above, one possible explanation for the negative and significant effect of
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debt on economic growth, at regular periods, might be the lack of incentives for countries
that became members of Eurozone to reduce the public debt. However, after the sharp
recession and the sudden fall in output, the debt-to-GDP ratio increases and pressure is
caused to governments to offer a sovereign risk premium for their debt to be sold. When
this happens, the cost of debt rises further, making default even more likely. Thus, it is
necessary for governments to impose fiscal limits, namely, upper limits to tax revenues
and lower limits to public spending in order to avoid default. Such fiscal performance
implies expected future primary fiscal surpluses to make the public debt sustainable.
Moreover, the significant negative effect of debt on the economy continued in 2008 and
2009; and eight years after the crash becomes insignificant, thus confirming the assump-
tion above that the quantitative ease effectively reduced the sovereign debt for Eurozone
countries, but the monetary policy was ineffective on the real economy. Furthermore,
after 2008, it can easily be noticed that simultaneously with the reduction of government
debt, taxes have negatively affected the economy, implying that the effectiveness of the
undertaken austerity measures by policymakers did not deliver the expectations of in-
vestors. Hence, the different tax rates over time and the time-inconsistency problem that
arises from the difference between ex-ante and ex-post savings and capital tax rates might
be the possible explanation of the negative results of the stock market index during the
crisis periods.
The results are consistent with the existing findings, which argue that surprising changes
may not constitute good policy. Also, the unanticipated rise of government spending
through higher taxes as well as higher debt burden may have long-term consequences
which are far more worse than the short-term increase of GDP (Mountford and Uhlig,
2009). Therefore, it is assumed that the increase in debt always hinders the economic
activity and the impact may be sufficiently strong enough not only at stress times but
also, during the normal periods.
5.4.5.4 Fiscal policy: Regional results
In Table 5.21 are reported the results for the three subsamples of countries. For each
subsample, two models are used. In the first two models, the North-West group of coun-
tries is examined. Model (I) examines the ongoing crisis period and includes the financial
development measures, the control variables, the variables of fiscal policy and their in-
teraction with crisis dummy (Cr0816) and the intercept dummy as well. Model (II) is
defined similarly to the ongoing crisis with the crisis dummy (Cr0809) instead. Models
III to IV and V to VI are defined similarly to the first two models for the Central-Eastern
and Baltic region and South panel respectively.
173
Table 5.21: Regional panels
Panel A: North-West EU countries B: Central-Eastern EU countries C: South EU countries
period ongoing crisis subprime crisis ongoing crisis subprime crisis ongoing crisis subprime crisis
Cr=Cr0816 Cr=Cr0809 Cr=Cr0816 Cr=Cr0809 Cr=Cr0816 Cr=Cr0809
Variables model I model II model III model IV model V model VI
Constant 2.901∗∗∗ 2.519∗∗∗ 4.201∗∗∗ 3.466∗∗∗ 3.722∗∗∗ 1.552∗∗
(8.14) (5.89) (5.24) (5.09) (7.01) (2.55)
FDB -0.073 -0.160 0.888∗∗ 0.835∗∗ 0.244 0.737∗∗∗
(-0.93) (-1.00) (2.38) (2.63) (1.07) (3.17)
FDM 0.368∗∗∗ 0.189 -0.084 0.265 0.058 0.557∗
(4.50) (1.55) (-0.36) (0.99) (0.50) (2.07)
INFL -0.175 -0.157 -0.0008 0.0006 -0.357∗ 0.098
(-1.24) (-1.41) (-0.29) (0.25) (-1.99) (0.56)
FDI 0.00001 0.0005 0.060 0.094∗∗ 0.00006 -0.013∗∗
(0.03) (0.25) (1.27) (2.26) (0.00) (-2.79)
∆OPEN 0.062∗∗ 0.114∗∗ 0.004 -0.041 0.0389 -0.112
(2.41) (2.62) (0.13) (-1.03) (0.87) (-1.39)
eDEBT -0.180∗∗∗ -0.224∗∗∗ -0.079∗ -0.161∗∗ -0.158∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗
(-6.93) (-5.05) (-2.11) (-2.79) (-6.03) (-6.79)
eEXP -0.112 -0.161∗ -0.115 -0.050 -0.0269 -0.131∗
(-1.06) (-2.18) (-1.01) (-0.50) (-0.40) (-2.22)
eTAX -0.086 -0.546∗ -0.009 -0.088 0.081 -0.301
(-1.19) (-1.89) (-0.16) (-0.86) (0.45) (-1.04)
Cr -2.710∗∗∗ -1.414∗∗∗ -3.878∗∗∗ 2.176 -4.454∗∗∗ -0.577
(-5.91) (-3.60) (-4.52) (1.36) (-6.24) (-0.62)
Cr*FDB -0.703∗∗ -0.210 -2.217∗∗∗ -3.299∗∗∗ 0.015 2.633
(-2.36) (-0.43) (-5.51) (-3.39) (0.07) (1.02)
Cr*FDM -0.284 0.300∗ 0.087 0.353 1.722∗ 7.081
(-1.79) (1.93) (0.31) (1.22) (2.11) (1.33)
Cr*INFL 0.714∗∗∗ 0.575∗∗∗ 0.137 -0.184∗ 0.546 -0.432
(3.55) (4.78) (1.42) (-1.96) (1.77) (-1.53)
Cr*FDI 0.0007 0.018∗∗∗ 0.038 0.074 -0.007 0.366
(0.16) (7.73) (0.64) (1.50) (-0.14) (0.84)
Cr ∗∆OPEN 0.062 -0.106∗∗ 0.068 0.062 0.042 1.017
(1.10) (-2.37) (1.56) (0.98) (0.36) (1.48)
Cr ∗ eDEBT -0.083 0.032 -0.438∗ -1.075∗∗∗ 0.009 1.273
(-0.98) (0.60) (-2.05) (-10.17) (0.12) (1.13)
Cr ∗ eEXP -0.057 -0.660∗∗∗ 0.157 0.306 0.084 0.726
(-0.37) (-5.17) (0.98) (1.04) (1.27) (1.34)
Cr ∗ eTAX -1.041∗ 1.422∗∗∗ -0.712∗∗ -1.392∗∗∗ -1.155∗∗∗ 0.591
(-1.91) (3.57) (-2.41) (-6.48) (-4.39) (0.53)
R2 0.68 0.66 0.57 0.60 0.75 0.58
obs 217 217 195 195 110 110
Note: See notes Table 5.10.
The results in model (I) show that during the pre-ongoing crisis period the stock market
sector has a positive and significant effect on economic activity, while during the ongoing
crisis is found an adverse effect of the bank sector on economic growth. In model (II),
where the subprime crisis period is examined, during the regular time, there is no impact
of financial development on economic growth, while at stress time it appears that stock
market enhanced economic activity.
In models (III) and (IV), where the transition economies are examined, there is
a positive and significant effect of the bank sector on economic growth at normal times,
which becomes significantly negative at stress times. The effect of the stock market sector
is insignificant all periods being considered.
The last two models present the results for the South region, and in model (V),
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it is found that during the pre-ongoing crisis period the coefficients of both sectors are
insignificant, while during the ongoing crisis period the stock market enhanced economic
growth. On the other hand, in model (VI), where the subprime crisis period is examined,
during the normal period both sectors contributed to economic growth with the bank
sector to prevail in this positive effect, but two years after the crisis there is no impact of
financial development on economic growth.
Next, turning to the results of the proxies for fiscal policy, the results reveal that
the adverse effect of debt on economic growth at normal times across all regions remains
unchanged at crisis periods for the transition economies, but becomes insignificant for
the remaining panels. There is also substantial evidence that at normal periods taxes are
insignificant, while at crisis periods become significantly negative.
Additionally, after the proxies for fiscal policy have been added in models, and when
the models do not include the crisis dummy (normal periods), it can easily be observed
that the coefficients of the financial development indices do not alter, thus confirming
the main findings in regional panels (Table 5.19). However, the impact of the bank and
market sectors in the South region becomes stronger when the subprime crisis model is
examined. During the crisis periods, there is substantial evidence that there is a trade-off
between the coefficients of the financial development indices and proxies of fiscal perfor-
mance, as the power of the adverse effect of the bank sector seems to be weaker, while any
significant adverse effect of the stock market index becomes insignificant or significantly
positive. However, this is not the case for banks in transition economies.
The findings reveal that the effect of public debt becomes insignificant eight years after the
crisis, while for taxes this is not the case. A possible explanation of these results might be
the implementation of the unconventional measures of monetary policy whereby the ECB
refinanced the sovereign debts of countries that are members of Eurozone. Hence, the
findings confirm the assumption that the quantitative ease programme has not enhanced
the economic activity and the monetary policy was ineffective.
5.4.5.5 Additional discussion of results
The figure 5.1 show the mean of the FDB index (on the left) that is constructed from the
of the original variables liquid liabilities (LLY) and credit to private sector (PRIVY) (on
the right). Also, it can be easily observed from the right graph that both indicators have
an upward trend from 1995 to 2008 and reached at levels close to 100% of GDP, which
is twice as much of 1995. Over the period 2008-2016, liquid liabilities are moving around
91%, while credit to private sector fell from 104% to 86%.
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Figure 5.1: FDB index from LLY and PRIVY
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Figure 5.2: Bank deposits, deposits interest rate and inflation rate
The figure 5.2 show the mean of the bank deposits (on the left) and the deposits interest
rates combined with the inflation rate (on the right). It is remarkable that while liquid
liabilities and credit to private sector increases, deposit and inflation rate decline from ap-
proximately 6-7% in 1990 to 2% in 2016. The belief of an adverse event such as deflation
and insufficient aggregate demand might be one of the main reasons that led consumers
to avoid investing in bonds and keep their funds in deposits. Krugman (1988) argued that
liquidity trap is the situation when investors have an abnormal preference over liquidity
and prefer to keep their asset in the form of cash or demand deposit. This situation is
described also in a modern version of Keynesian economics, where the rise of money into
the private banks by a central bank decreases interest rates but the monetary policy is
ineffective. The common characteristics of a liquidity trap are low-interest rates (close to
zero) and ineffective monetary policy. Thus, in a depressed economy (liquidity trap) is
unlikely to cause inflation and there is a decrease in the velocity of circulation.
Another possible explanation for this result might be the condition of the economy and
the growth in productivity (the Long Run Aggregate Supply LRAS). The growth of real
output is supposed to increase at the same rate of money supply. Figure 5.3 below gives
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a clearer picture of this interpretation.
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Figure 5.3: The means of GDP, LLY and PRIVY in USD
The left figure above shows the average of real output (GDP) and the money supply
(LLY), both expressed in US Dollars (USD), while the right figure the real output and
the credit to private sector (PRIVY) in US Dollars as well. As illustrated from the graphs,
before 2008, when the size relative to the economy is increasing, the growth of real output
is not increasing at the same rate. From 2008 to 2016 GDP is moving along with the
liquid liabilities, but with the money circulation being greater than the real output. On
the right graph, it is obvious that the over-lending after 2008 fell dramatically converging
to GDP.
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Figure 5.4: FDM index from MCAP and TVT
The figure 5.4 show the mean of the FDM index (on the left) that is constructed from
the original variables MCAP and TVT (on the right). Also, the right graph shows that
the size of the stock market proxied by stock market capitalization (MCAP) and total
value traded (TVT), have upward and downward trends showing that are highly volatile.
Around the turn of 2000, it was a period of massive growth in the use and adoption
of the internet, and spending on technology was volatile. Also, it was a historic period
of excessive speculation and the dot-com bubble occurred. After suffering losses, retail
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investors transitioned their investment portfolios to more cautious positions, their oper-
ational mentality completely changed, which in turn led western markets to a structural
change in the market component of financial development. As growth in the information
technology sector stabilized, companies consolidated; gained market share and the stock
market development led to a faster growth rate, thus explaining the positive impact of
financial stock market development over the pre 2008 period’s results.
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Figure 5.5: GDP, MCAP and TVT
The left graph of the figure 5.5 shows the average of real output (GDP) and the stock
market capitalization (MCAP), both expressed in US Dollars (USD), while the right fig-
ure the real output and the total value traded (TVT). As illustrated from the graphs,
over the period 2002 to 2008, when the size of the stock market is increasing, the growth
of real output is increasing at the same rate. From 2008 to 2016 GDP is moving steadily,
being greater than the size of the stock market which fell. However, by the end of 2015
the size of stock market recovered converging to the GDP.
The figure 5.6 shows that the economic growth contracted in 2008 and reached approxi-
mately to 0% and 4.6% in 2009.
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Figure 5.6: Growth rate of North-West countries
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After the subprime crisis period, quickly recovered and in 2010 reached to 2.7%, but never
reached at the pre-crisis levels (2.3% in 2016).
The figure 5.7 shows that the economic growth contracted in 2008 and fell from 7.2%
in 2007 to 2.4% in 2008 and in 2009 reached at -7.7%. After the subprime crisis period
recovered and in 2010 reached to 1%. Obviously, the economic growth has never recovered
to the pre-crisis levels (similarly to North-west panel, 2.2% in 2016).
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Figure 5.7: Growth rate of Central-Eastern and Baltic countries
The figure 5.8 shows that the economic growth contracted in 2008 and fell from 3.2%
in 2007 to 0.8% in 2008 and in 2009 reached at -3.6%. Unlike the other regions in 2012
presented deeper recession reaching -4.0% and until 2014 was running at a negative rate of
economic growth. Similarly to the other regions, the economic growth has never recovered
to the pre-crisis levels ( 2.2% in 2016).
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Figure 5.8: Growth rate of South countries
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5.4.5.6 Summarised results
Table 5.22 summarizes results for the effect of financial development (broken down to
banking sector and market sector) to economic growth. For the ongoing crisis (2008-
2016 in the sample) we observe that for the full sample of countries before the crisis
markets have a positive effect on the economy, which is reversed fully after the crisis with
the banking sector effect being the most disrupting. When we examine the North-West
region, the results are quite similar suggesting again that the banking sector was the
one that caused growth to suffer after 2008; while markets are the financial system that
promoted heavily growth before the crisis. For the Central East region the picture is
reversed since the banking sector here seems to be the driving force of growth before the
crisis as well as the one that hindered growth after 2008 till 2016. For the South region
the results are insignificant for both banks and markets; suggesting clearly that it was
different forces that led to economic growth before the crisis and the recession after the
crisis.
For the subprime crisis (2008-2009 only), for the full sample of countries we see
that markets were the driving force at normal periods and both markets and banks had
a large negative effect during the crisis period. When it comes to North-West, markets
are important at regular periods, and during crisis it was the banking sector that led to
the recession of GDP. For the Central East region it is the opposite, banks are heavily
important during the normal periods, while during crisis both banks and markets brought
recession, but this was heavily dominated by the banking sector. For the South region
again while banks seem to be significant drivers of growth at normal time, during crisis
it was mainly other factors (than banks and markets) that led to the recession.
Table 5.22: Summary results of financial development and growth during crisis
Countries All North-West Transition South
Period Before After Before After Before After Before After
Tables Table 3(IV) Table 4(II) Table 4(V) Table 4(VIII)
o
n
g
o
in
g
FDB + -(***) - -(***) +(**) -(***) + +
FDM +(**) -(*) +(***) -(*) - -(*) + +
Period normal stress normal stress normal sterss normal stress
Tables Table 3(IV) Table 4(II) Table 4(V) Table 4(VIII)
su
b
p
ri
m
e
FDB + -(***) - -(***) +(**) -(***) +(*) -
FDM +(**) -(***) +(*) + + -(*) + +
Table 5.23 presents summary results for the effect of financial development on economic
growth in conjunction with the possible effect of fiscal policy. For the ongoing crisis, we
observe that for the full sample of countries, before the crisis, banks and markets have
a positive effect on growth, whereas public debt has negatively affected the economy.
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After the crisis banks, markets and taxes have a negative effect on the economy with the
banks and taxes being the most detrimental. When the North-West panel is examined,
the results for fiscal policy are quite similar both periods being considered; while after
the crisis stock market contributed to GDP before crisis and banks negatively affected
the economy. For the transition economies, public debt has a negative effect on economy
both periods, while taxes have a greater negative impact on the economy during crisis.
However, the banking sector is the driving force of growth before the crisis, which is
fully reversed after the crisis. For the South region, public debt has a negative effect on
economy before the crisis, while taxes was the one that caused growth to suffer after 2008;
however, banks and markets are insignificant before crisis, while markets contributed to
growth after the crisis.
Table 5.23: Summary results of for the role of fiscal policy
Countries All North-West Transition South
Period Before After Before After Before After Before After
Tables Table 5(III) Table 6(I) Table 6(III) Table 6(V)
on
go
in
g
FDB +(***) -(***) - -(**) +(**) -(***) + +
FDM +(**) -(*) +(***) - - + + +(*)
eDEBT -(***) - -(***) - -(*) -(*) -(***) +
eEXP - - - - - + - +
eTAX - -(***) - -(*) - (-)** + -(***)
Period normal stress normal stress normal stress normal stress
Tables Table 5(VI) Table 6(II) Table 6(IV) Table 6(VI)
su
b
p
ri
m
e
FDB + -(***) - - +(**) -(***) +(***) +
FDM +(**) -(***) + +(*) + + +(*) +
eDEBT -(***) -(***) -(***) + -(**) -(***) -(***) +
eEXP -(***) - -(*) -(***) - + -(*) +
eTAX -(*) -(***) -(*) +(***) - -(***) - +
For the subprime crisis, for the full sample of countries, we see that during the normal
periods fiscal policy indicators had a negative effect on economy, while the stock market
sector is the driving force on growth. At stress time, both financial sectors, public debt
and taxes negatively affected economic growth. When it comes to North-West, fiscal
policy hindered economic activity during the regular periods, while in years 2008-2009,
tax revenues and markets contributed to the economy. However, the negative effect of
government spending at normal times becomes stronger at stress time. For Central-
Eastern region, at normal periods, public debt had a negative effect on economy, while
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the bank sector is heavily important. During the subprime crisis period, public debt, taxes
and banks adversely affected economic growth. For the South region, at regular periods,
public debt and spending had a negative effect on economy, while both financial sectors
seem to be driving forces of growth. At stress time, neither fiscal policy nor financial
system affected growth.
5.4.6 Conclusions
In this study is used a panel dataset on 26 EU countries over the period 1990-2016 to ex-
amine the link between financial development and economic growth in view of the recent
financial crisis. Considering the major role of bank and market sectors, principal compo-
nent analysis is employed for the construction of two new aggregate financial development
indices thus capturing the overall size of financial development.
The overall findings for the finance-growth relationship before and after the crisis, sug-
gest that at normal times financial development promoted economic growth with the stock
market sector prevailing in this positive effect, while in crisis periods financial develop-
ment hindered economic activity with the bank sector dominating in this negative effect.
Also, the negative effect of banks on growth and the weakness of stock markets to restrain
the economy from the recession exhibit high persistence eight years after the occurrence
of financial crisis and do not return to the situation as was at regular periods. However,
since stock markets facilitate the access of investors to financial resources, measures that
possibly could implemented and generate positive effect on economic growth in case of re-
cessions are: (i) sound macro-economic policy to enforce the stock market performance (ii)
timely implementation of Quantitative Ease for stimulating efficient investments through
lower interest rates, and stimulate growth through accumulation of funds in less volatile
stocks (e.g Healthcare, Real Estate, Precious metals).
The findings for the effect of financial development on economic growth in conjunction
with the effect of fiscal policy suggest that at normal times financial development was
a driving force of growth and both sectors are heavily important, while in crisis periods
financial development negatively affected the economy with banks dominating in this neg-
ative effect. Additionally, the significant negative effect of debt on the economy continued
in the subprime crisis period; and eight years after the crash was insignificant, thus con-
firming the assumption that the quantitative ease effectively reduced the sovereign debt
for Eurozone countries, but the monetary policy was ineffective on the real economy.
Hence, banks and other institutions held more government bonds to enhance the govern-
ments’credibility not to default, and the ability of intermediaries to invest on assets was
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limited.
Furthermore, the negative results of the stock market index during the crisis periods,
confirm the ineffectiveness of the undertaken austerity measures by policymakers, which
did not deliver the expectations of investors and the time-inconsistency problem raised
from the difference between ex-ante and ex-post savings and capital tax rates. Thus, the
findings have important implications for the quality of fiscal policy and regulators need
to pay more attention to the optimal tax policy as well as time-consistent policy. Policy
makers must keep the tax rates constant over time or to find the least distorting mix of
taxes to finance the public spending.
The results from the regional panels show that the impact of financial development varies
across the countries due to heterogeneous nature of economic structures, financial mar-
kets, and so on. The financial system of the North-West panel tends to be increasingly
market based as the economy develops, while in transition economies, the banking sector
seems to be more efficient than the market sector which remains below the correspond-
ing ones of the more developed EU countries. In South countries financial development
seems to be inefficient. However, the results uncover that countries with their financial
systems being market-oriented suffered less from the recession and recovered more quickly
compared with countries that are bank-based. On the other hand, bank-based countries
suffered from a deeper recession and required more time to recover from economic down-
turns after the financial crisis. Therefore, it can be inferred that transition economies
should focus on the adoption of euro along with the new regulations, which can enforce
the financial system, while South countries should focus on the implementation of policies
to make their financial system more efficient. Indeed, one might argue that joining the
euro would enhance their exposure to global risks and, hence, would render their finan-
cial system more susceptible to external shocks. However, this is supported theoretically
by the optimum currency area (large integrated labour market, flexibility of pricing and
wages and mobility of capital), and is achieved lower volatility of exchange rates, benefits
for portfolio diversification across industries rather than countries and removal of trade
barriers. Also, integration within EU is likely to align the business cycles. In practice,
the problem of asymmetric shocks is alleviated as long as factors of production can move
between countries.
Finally, the results of this study provide new insights into the finance-growth nexus during
the recent crisis. The important implication is that financial development failed to play
a safeguarding role for economic growth in a homogeneous group of countries such that
of EU. Also, a general conclusion that can be drawn from the results confirm the initial
assumption that the crisis is ongoing and the refinancing of the public debt led to a re-
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pression policy. Appropriate policies should be undertaken from policymakers to improve
regulatory and supervisory framework to advance the financial system, allow financial
institutions to hold small amount of their own countries government bonds and take into
consideration the benefits of the market-oriented policies. However, further investigation
needs to be undertaken to find the best strategy for the refinancing the public debt and
find a possible threshold effect of the debt-growth relationship.
Nevethelss, both studies, study 1 and 2 have potential limitations. The standard panel
models, such as fixed effects and random effects models have some shortcomings. For
instance, the fixed effect model, assumes that the estimator has common slopes and vari-
ance but country-specific intercepts. Particularly for two-way fixed effects estimation,
both cross-sectional and time effects can be observed through the introduction of dummy
variables, and this estimator faces a problem because of the loss of the degree of freedom
(Baltagi, 2008).
Another disadvantage of the static panel approaches is that they are unable to capture the
dynamic nature of data, which is a fundamental issue in empirical research. Additionally,
as Loayza and Rancière (2006) argue, static panel estimators do not take the advantage
by distinguishing between the short-and the long-run relationships. However, many eco-
nomic relationships are dynamic in nature, and one of the advantages of the panel data
is that they allow understanding the dynamics adjustments or the long-run tendencies.
These dynamic relationships are characterised by the presence of a lagged dependent
variable among the regressors and through the next sections dynamic panel models are
employed to study the short and long-run economic relationships encountered in the data.
However, concerning the previous literature, where the panel data methods are employed,
the findings refute the prior research of Pradhan et al. (2016), Anwar and Cooray (2012),
Muhammad et al. (2016) and Ductor and Grechyna (2014); Durusu-Ciftci et al. (2017),
who found a positive finance-growth relationship with the causality effect to be unidirec-
tional from financial development to economic growth. As the main advantage of these
studies was the investigation of the long run finance-growth nexus, their prime objective
was to examine the impact of financial development on economic growth, without being
considered the crisis effect and the behaviour of two sectors (banking vs stock market)
of the financial system before/after the stress time, as being considered in the current
sub-study. On the other hand, the findings have corroborated the research of Claessens
et al. (2010) and Allen et al. (2012) who documented that recessions and disruptions in
underdeveloped stock markets of transition economies, are often more costly, and it takes
more time to recover. Nevertheless, the current sub-study extends the knowledge to the
literature for the finance-growth relationship at normal times and at stress times as well
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as whether the bank or the market sector prevails in any positive or negative impact
on economic growth before and after the crisis. Furthermore, after the financial crisis,
many EU countries experienced high public debts as a share of GDP, and the financial
crisis was converted to a debt crisis. Hence, one of the main contributions of the current
sub-study is also that examines together with the financial development, the quality of
fiscal policy before and after the financial crisis. This allows investigating the response of
the financial development measures to the quality of fiscal policy, which plays an essential
role in economic growth.
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5.5 Study 3: Finance and growth. A dynamic panel
data analysis
5.5.1 Introduction
In the empirical literature, a considerable number of studies focused on exploring the
dynamic relationship between financial development and economic growth using panel
datasets and the results do not provide substantial evidence supporting the view that fi-
nancial development promoted economic growth (Menyah et al., 2014; Ductor and Grechyna,
2014; Caporale et al., 2015; Ayadi et al., 2015; Swamy and Dharani, 2018).
However, these studies employed GMM dynamic panel estimates and ignore the integra-
tion and cointegration properties of the data. More recent studies examined the dynamic
impact of financial development on economic growth using the panel ARDL model that
have not been widely used, and the results show that finance has a positive and a homoge-
nous effect on growth in the long-run, whereas in the short-run the impact is negative
(Loayza and Rancière, 2006; Samargandi et al., 2015; Sohag et al., 2015).
On the above discussion, this study provides new evidence on the finance-growth re-
lationship employing panel ARDL model on the face of the recent crisis. Specifically,
through the model it is investigated the short and long-run impact of financial devel-
opment on economic growth using two indices for banks and markets before and after
the crisis. The contribution of this study is described in the introduction chapter (See
Chapter 1, contribution of the research).
Prior to the estimation of the short and long-run relationships from the dynamic het-
erogenous panels, a cointegrating relationship needs to be confirmed. The motivation is
linked primarily with the need to test for the presence of long-run relationships among
integrated variables. The following section describes the dataset, while section 3 reports
the results from the panel cointegration tests. Section 4 presents the model specification,
section 4 provides the empirical results and discussion, while section 5 concludes.
5.5.2 Data
The current study is also based on a panel dataset covering 26 EU countries over the period
1990-2016 and similarly to the previous study, uses the bank and stock market indices as
financial development measures. The variables used in the study and descriptive statistics
are provided in the Table 5.24 below.
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Table 5.24: Descriptive statistics
Statistics GGDP LLY PRIVY MCAP TVT CPI FDI OPEN
Mean 1.889 71.42 74.99 45.02 28.18 81.02 9.483 92.12
Max. 11.88 258.0 261.4 238.8 242.9 114.8 734.0 221.1
Min. -34.90 7.867 7.089 0.025 0.000 0.03 -43.46 33.00
St.D. 4.340 37.42 45.15 38.31 37.77 24.88 42.26 37.80
Obs 696 688 681 623 606 688 637 702
Note: GGDP is the the annual percentage growth rate of GDP. LLY is the ratio of liquid liabilities to
GDP. PRIVY is the credit to private sector to GDP. MCAP is the stock market capitalisation to GDP.
TVT is the stock market total value traded to GDP. CPI is the the consumer price index and is used
as proxy of the inflation rate. FDI is the net inflows of foreign direct investments to GDP. OPEN is the
trade openness.
5.5.3 Panel cointegration tests
Before proceeding to the tests, it is essential to ensure that the regression variables are α
priori integrated of the same order.1 However, when a linear combination of several I(1)
series is stationary, they are said to be integrated and this cointegration implies that the
I(1) series are in a long-run equilibrium and they move together, although the group of
them can wander arbitrarily.
However, to find whether the bank or the market sector or both have a long-run rela-
tionship with economic growth the following three models are used: The first two models
(I and II), examine the long-run relationship between the real output, banking and market
sector respectively, while their long-run relationship along with control variables is tested
in the model (III).
Yit = α1i + β1iFDBit + ε1it Model (I)
Yit = α2i + β2iFDMit + ε2it Model (II)
Yit = γi + δ1iFDBit + δ2iFDMit + δ3iCPIit + δ4iOPENit + uit Model (III)
where Yit is real output (GDP) in country i and year t, α1i, α2i and γi are the panel
specific means, βs and δs are the cointegrating parameters and depending on the type of
the cointegration test may vary or be the same across all panels.2 FDBit and FDMit are
the financial development indices for bank and market sectors respectively.3 Additionally,
more cointegrating relations are investigated involving the macroeconomic variables CPI
and OPEN, where CPI is the consumer price index and is the proxy of inflation rate,
1See further details in Chapter 4.5
2The tests derived in Kao (1999) assume a cointegrating vector that is the same across all panels,
which restricts βi = β
3Here FDBit and FDMit are obtained after principal component analysis in levels in order to be
integrated of order one.
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while OPEN stands for trade openness. Each variable is integrated of order one and for
this purpose GDP and CPI are expressed as an index number (2010=100). It is worth
noticing that net foreign direct investments (FDI) is I(0) and is not included in the tests.
Next, it is investigated the long-run relationship between economic growth and finan-
cial development through the panel cointegration analysis. More specifically, it examines
the existence of the long-run equilibrium among variables and to this purpose Kao (1999),
Pedroni (1999) and Westerlund (2005) cointegration tests are applied on the three models
above (I, II and III).
5.5.3.1 Kao test
The first type of cointegration test is Kao’s test where the null hypothesis is the absence
of cointegration. The results in Table 5.25 show that all test statistics reject the null
hypothesis of no cointegration in favour of the alternative hypothesis of the existence of
a cointegration across all panels.
Table 5.25: Kao residual cointegration test results
Test
Model I Model II Model III
t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics
Modified Dickey-Fuller 2.589*** 3.102*** -2.839***
Dickey-Fuller 2.123** 2.983*** -2.426***
Augmented Dickey-Fuller 2.443*** 1.736** -3.438***
Unadjusted-Modified Dickey-Fuller -6.559*** 2.844*** -2.741***
Unadjusted-Dickey-Fuller -4.793*** 2.612*** -2.380***
Notes: ***Signifies rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1% level of significance, while ** at
5%. The maximum number of lags for ADF test is (2), and is selected using Akaike Info Criteria (AIC). Bartlett
Kernel with Newey and West automatic lag selection chose an average of 1.5 lags across all panels to correct for
serial correlation. The AR parameter is the same for all panels.
5.5.3.2 Pedroni test
The second type of panel cointegration test is the Pedroni test, where the null hypothesis
is the absence of cointegration, while the alternative is that all panels are cointegrated.
The test assumes panel-specific cointegrating vectors (βs and δs represent panel-specific
cointegration parameters) and this heterogeneity distinguishes Pedroni tests from Kao
tests. Another difference is that the Pedroni test allows for the autoregressive (AR) co-
efficient to vary over panels, while the Kao tests assumed the same AR parameter. The
panel-specific AR coefficients are the default options in Pedroni’s test, while a second
option restricts the AR coefficients to be the same over panels.
Table 5.26 reports the results for the Pedroni test. There are two parts of statistical
results. In the first part, the three test statistics refer to the tests based on panel-specific
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AR parameters (between-dimension tests), while in the second part, the four test statis-
tics, refer to the tests based on the same AR parameter (within-dimension tests). Most
of the estimate results indicate that the null of no cointegration can be rejected. Thus,
similarly to Kao’s test results, the long-run relationship between the examined variables is
confirmed. However, there are some exceptional results that are not significant, and this
can be caused by the different relationships between output and financial development
and other macroeconomic variables in these countries.
Table 5.26: Pedroni residual cointegration test results
Test
Model I Model II Model III
t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics
Between group Panel-specific AR parameter
Modified Phillips-Perron t 1.059 5.005*** 4.010***
Phillips-Perron t -2.006** 5.762*** 2.704***
ADF-t Statistic -7.367**** 5.647*** 2.289**
Within group Common AR parameter
Modified variance ratio -1.782** -3.426*** -4.025***
Modified Phillips-Perron t -0.322 3.165*** 3.758***
Phillips-Perron t -2.974*** 3.636*** 0.921
ADF-t Statistic -7.827*** 3.663*** -2.685***
Notes: ***Signifies rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1% level of significance, while ** at
5%. The maximum number of lags for ADF test is (4), and is selected using Akaike Info Criteria (AIC). Bartlett
Kernel with Newey and West automatic lag selection chose an average of (4) lags across all panels to correct for
serial correlation. The AR parameter is the same for all panels.
5.5.3.3 Westerlund test
The third type of panel cointegration test is the Westerlund cointegration test, and Table
5.27 reports the results.
Table 5.27: Westerlund cointegration test results
Test
Model I Model II Model III
t-statistics t-statistics t-statistics
Alternative hypothesis: Some panels are cointegrated
Variance ratio -1.643** 3.362*** -2.814***
Alternative hypothesis: All panels are cointegrated
Variance ratio -3.807*** -2.067** -1.838**
Notes: ***Signifies rejection of the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1% level of significance, while ** at
5%. The maximum number of lags for ADF test is (2), and is selected using Akaike Info Criteria (AIC). Bartlett
Kernel with Newey and West automatic lag selection chose an average of 1.5 lags across all panels to correct for
serial correlation. The AR parameter is the same for all panels.
The null hypothesis is the same as in Kao’s and Pedroni’s tests. There are two parts of
statistical results. In the first part, the tests are based on panel-specific AR parameters
and test the null hypothesis of no cointegration under the alternative that some panels
are cointegrated. In the second part, the tests are based on a model in which the AR
parameter is the same over the panels. Also, similarly to Pedroni tests, this test assumes
panel-specific cointegrating vectors. The estimate results of the variance ratio statistic
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reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration, implying that all panels are cointegrated.
Overall, the estimates of cointegration tests conclude that economic growth, banking and
market sector development along with macroeconomic variables have a long-run equilib-
rium in EU countries. The next section of the study examines the short and long-run
relationship between financial development and economic growth.
5.5.4 Model specification
Based on Pesaran et al. (1999), the dynamic heterogeneous panel regression can be
incorporated into the error correction model using the autoregressive distributed lag
ARDL(p,q) technique as below:
∆GGDP i,t =
p−1∑
j=1
γij∆GGDP i,t−j +
q−1∑
j=0
δij∆Xi,t−j
+φi[GGDP i,t−1 − βi0 + β
i
1Xi,t−1] + εi,t (5.6)
where GGDP is the GDP growth rate, X is a matrix of independent variables including
financial development indices FDB and FDM, γ and δ represent the vectors of the short-
term coefficients of lagged dependent and independent variables respectively, βs are the
vectors of the long run coefficients and φ is the of speed of adjustment to the long-run
equilibrium. The subscripts i and t represent country and time indices respectively, while
p is the lag of the dependent variable and q is the lag of independent variables. The
term in the square brackets of Eqn.(1) contains the long-run growth regression, which is
derived from the following equation:
GGDP i,t = β
i
0 + β
i
1Xi,t + ui,t (5.7)
Eqn.(1) can be estimated by three different estimators: The first is the mean group
(MG) model of Pesaran and Smith (1995). The main characteristic of this method is
that it does not impose any restriction and allows for all coefficients to vary and be
heterogeneous in the long-run and short-run. The second is the pooled mean group
(PMG) estimator developed by Pesaran et al. (1999), where the short-run coefficients,
the intercepts as well as the speed of adjustment to the long-run equilibrium values can
be heterogeneous (different for each country), while the long-run slope coefficients are
restricted to be homogeneous across countries. The third, is the dynamic fixed effect
(DFE) estimator, which is very similar to the PMG estimator and imposes restrictions
on the slope coefficient and error variances to be equal across all countries in the long
run. The DFE model further restricts the speed of adjustment coefficient and the short-
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run coefficient to be equal too. Pesaran and Smith (1995) and Pesaran et al. (1999)
present the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) model in error correction form as a
new cointegration test and showed that panel ARDL can be used with different orders of
integration irrespectively of whether the variables are I(0) or I(1) or a mixture of the two.
This is the main advantage of panel ARDL models and makes the panel unit root tests
unnecessary.
5.5.5 Estimation results
5.5.5.1 Full sample period: All countries results
Table 5.28 reports the results of PMG, MG and DFE estimation, along with the Haus-
man tests to measure the efficiency and consistency among them. According to the PMG
estimator, the results indicate that the financial bank sector development (FDB) has a
significantly negative impact on economic growth in the long and short run, while under
the MG assumption the long and short run coefficients are insignificant. The DFE model,
in turn, suggests a significantly negative effect of FDB on growth in the long-run, but
insignificant in the short-run.
Turning now to the results for the financial stock market development (FDM), according
to the PMG estimator the short run coefficient is insignificant and becomes significantly
positive in the long run. Furthermore, the MG estimator suggests insignificant long and
short run coefficients, while under the DFE assumption the short run coefficient is in-
significant and becomes significantly positive in the long run.
The negative sign of error correction coefficients and their significance levels, satisfy the
main requirement of validity, consistency, and efficiency of a long run relationship among
the variables of interest and confirms the results from the panel cointegration tests that
there is a long-run equilibrium. Also, it is worth noticing that in PMG the speed of
adjustment is 53%, indicating how quickly the model comes to equilibrium. However, the
speed of adjustment estimates from each model implies significantly different short run
dynamics (comparing φ̂ = −0.529 for PMG, φ̂ = −0.842 for MG and φ̂ = −0.490 for
DFE).
Interestingly, the estimated long and short-run parameters of inflation, as proxied by the
consumer price index (CPI), are significantly negative, as expected. On the other hand,
the estimated coefficients for trade openness (OPEN) are significantly positive across all
models in the short run, while in the long run are significantly positive under the PMG
and DFE approaches. However, the positive and significant effect of foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) appears in the short run under the PMG approach, whereas according to the
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PMG and DFE estimators, the long run coefficients are significantly negative, but they
have not economically meaningful effect size.
Finally, The Hausman test examines the validity of the long-run homogeneity restric-
tion across countries. Specifically, it tests the null hypothesis of no systematic differences
between the coefficients of PMG and MG firstly and secondly between PMG and DFE,
in order to measure the efficiency and consistency among them. According to the corre-
sponding p-values of the coefficients in last rows of the table, the test fails to reject the
null hypothesis that there is long run homogeneity restriction, and in the short run is
allowed to be country-specific. Thus, PMG is a more efficient estimator than either MG
or DFE. Therefore the interpretation of the results will focus on the PMG approach.
Table 5.28: Full sample period: All countries
variable Pooled Mean Group Mean Group Dynamic fixed effects
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
long-run coefficients
FDB -0.344∗∗∗ (-3.18) 21.04 (1.10) -0.861∗∗∗ (-3.12)
FDM 0.734∗∗∗ (6.73) -20.46 (-1.30) 0.480∗ (1.86)
INFL -0.088∗∗∗ (-5.64) -2.370∗∗ (-2.64) -0.114∗∗∗ (-5.23)
FDI -0.001∗∗∗ (-0.88) 0.432 (0.42) -0.003∗∗∗ (-0.49)
OPEN 0.034∗∗ (2.56) 2.256 (1.27) 0.070∗∗∗ (2.95)
short-run coefficients
ECT -0.529∗∗∗ (-7.78) -0.842∗∗∗ (-10.41) -0.490∗∗∗ (-11.58)
∆FDB -0.534∗∗ (-2.59) -0.575 (-1.65) -0.200 (-1.51)
∆FDM -0.726 (-0.83) 1.504 (1.23) 0.061 (0.52)
∆CPI -0.292∗∗ (-2.57) -0.355∗ (-1.82) -0.197∗∗∗ (-3.34)
∆FDI 0.169∗∗ (2.09) -0.066 (-1.00) 0.003 (0.89)
∆OPEN 0.196∗∗∗ (7.34) 0.116∗∗ (2.34) 0.164∗∗∗ (8.09)
Intercept 3.997∗∗∗ (9.20) 5.110 (0.92) 3.070∗∗∗ (3.72)
N 527 527 527
Hausman test 0.21a 4.21b
p-values 0.976 0.519
Notes:∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is GDP growth. The lag structure is
ARDL(1,1,1,1,1) and the order of variables is: GDP growth, financial development bank index, financial
development market index, consumer price index, trade openness. a PMG is more efficient than MG under
null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 0.21. b PMG is more efficient than DFE under null hypothesis
and the calculated statistic is 4.21. Both statistics are χ2 distributed.
The findings suggest that there is overwhelming evidence of a negative relationship be-
tween financial development of the bank sector and economic growth, indicating that big
and fast-growing financial bank sector creates a financial boom, which is not in general
growth enhancing. The higher financial intermediation may have adverse effects if the fi-
nancial system is liberalized and allowed to operate under a weak regulatory environment.
Also, the results of this study are in line with Sundararajan et al. (1991), Easterly and
Kraay (2000), and Ang and McKibbin (2007), who find that any monetary and credit ex-
pansion along with a lack of regulatory control and monitoring from the banks, may result
in ineffective mobilization of savings and allocation of funds to inappropriate selection of
192
projects, which in turn, has an adverse effect of financial development on economic growth.
Also, the results suggest a positive relationship between financial development of the
stock market sector and economic growth. As discussed in section 5.4.5, the reason might
be the newly created currency area (euro area) and the integration of the financial markets
across the EU countries. This process of integration coincided with the trends towards
globalization and securitization as well as the expanded privatization and the entry of
foreign investors. However, integration within EU is likely to align the business cycles. In
practice, the problem of asymmetric shocks is alleviated if factors of production can move
between countries. Also, joining euro does not imply large welfare losses from asymmetric
business cycles.
5.5.5.2 Full sample period: Regional results
Turning now to regional panels, it is examined to what extent the above findings vary, by
re-estimating the three different estimators in the dynamic panel framework. The results
are reported in Table 5.29. Models I to III present the results for the North-West panel.
Models IV to VI present the results for the Central-Eastern and Baltic region and models
VII to IX report the results for the South group of countries. Also, models (I), (IV),(VII)
account the results for the PMG estimator, models (II), (V),(VIII) account the results
for the MG estimator, and (III), (VI),(IX) account the results for the DFE.
For the North-West group of countries, according to the PMG and DFE estimators,
it is found that the long run coefficients of the bank index are highly significant with
negative sign, whereas the long run coefficients of the stock market are significantly pos-
itive. However, under the MG assumption the long run coefficients of both indices are
insignificant. In the short run, the coefficient of the bank index is found negative and
statistically significant with PMG estimator, while under MG and DFE assumptions are
insignificant.
For the transition economies, according to the PMG estimator, it is found that the long
run coefficients of bank and market indices are positive and statistically significant, while
under the MG and DFE approaches are insignificant. In the short run, the coefficients of
the bank index are negative and significant under the PMG and MG assumptions, while
under the DFE estimator is insignificant. The short-run estimated coefficients for the
stock market index are insignificant all models being considered.
The results for the South panel, show that under the PMG assumption the long run
coefficient for the bank index is insignificant, while for the market index is significantly
positive. According to the MG and DFE estimators, the long run coefficients for both
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indices are insignificant. In the short run, the coefficients of the bank index are sig-
nificantly negative under the MG and DFE approaches, while according to the PMG
estimator is insignificant. The short-run estimated coefficients for the stock market index
are insignificant all models being considered.
Table 5.29: Full sample period: Regional panels
Countries North-West Central-Eastern and Baltic South
Estimators PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE
Models (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
long run coefficients
FDB -0.481∗∗∗ -7.736 -1.164∗∗∗ 0.812∗ -1.465 -1.065 -0.438 0.976 0.373
(-3.70) (-1.18) (-4.38) (1.98) (-0.81) (-1.43) (-1.26) (0.68) (0.63)
FDM 0.900∗∗∗ 2.890 0.369∗ 0.718∗∗∗ -4.685 0.956 1.202∗∗ -0.316 0.327
(7.27) (1.25) (1.77) (2.76) (-1.16) (1.43) (2.09) (-0.21) (0.50)
CPI -0.043∗ 0.560 -0.144∗∗∗ -0.052∗ -0.172 -0.097∗∗ -0.190∗∗∗ -0.247∗∗∗ -0.137∗∗∗
(-1.97) (0.81) (-4.08) (-1.82) (-0.95) (-2.57) (-4.86) (-4.40) (-2.99)
FDI -0.001 -0.039 -0.0004 -0.049 1.415 0.079 -0.064∗∗∗ 1.979 -0.148∗∗
(-0.88) (-0.16) (-0.10) (-1.12) (1.49) (0.67) (-2.70) (1.19) (-2.31)
OPEN 0.001 -0.552 0.094∗∗∗ -0.001 0.003 0.049 -0.142∗∗∗ -0.229 0.018
(0.05) (-0.86) (3.07) (-0.05) (0.01) (1.21) (-2.895) (-0.79) (0.23)
short run coefficients
ECT -0.750∗∗∗ -0.807∗∗∗ -0.740∗∗∗ -0.426∗∗∗ -0.904∗∗∗ -0.468∗∗∗ -0.307∗∗ -0.582∗∗∗ -0.367∗∗∗
(-7.85) (-5.86) (-9.55) (-4.54) (-6.27) (-6.78) (-2.22) (-4.10) (-4.24)
∆FDB -0.436∗∗ 0.123 0.265 -0.788∗∗ -1.215∗∗ -0.387 -0.367 -0.477∗∗∗ -0.466∗
(-2.07) (0.27) (1.51) (-2.39) (-2.20) (-1.53) (-1.10) (-2.81) (-1.85)
∆FDM 0.075 1.724 0.208 -1.743 0.526 -0.256 0.050 0.171 0.139
(0.34) (1.27) (1.37) (-1.19) (0.48) (-0.97) (0.25) (0.64) (0.67)
∆CPI -0.148 -0.367 0.025 -0.499∗∗∗ -0.483∗ -0.286∗∗∗ -0.632∗∗ -0.739 -0.406∗∗
(-0.77) (-0.85) (0.16) (-2.84) (-1.97) (-3.00) (-2.17) (-1.51) (-2.23)
∆FDI 0.050 -0.041 0.0008 0.224∗∗ -0.130 0.020 0.266 0.010 0.032∗∗∗
(1.53) (-0.91) (0.24) (2.05) (-0.72) (0.40) (0.65) (0.04) (2.89)
∆OPEN 0.184∗∗∗ 0.166∗∗ 0.129∗∗∗ 0.218∗∗∗ -0.028 0.157∗∗∗ 0.265∗∗∗ 0.336∗∗∗ 0.181∗∗∗
(4.85) (2.47) (3.71) (4.50) (-0.43) (4.63) (3.07) (2.66) (3.84)
Intercept 4.525∗∗∗ 1.802 4.747∗∗∗ 4.359∗∗∗ -1.516 3.194∗∗ 10.91∗∗ 14.30∗∗ 5.250∗∗
(8.40) (0.21) (3.32) (4.85) (-0.14) (2.14) (2.19) (2.44) (2.45)
N 216 216 216 197 197 197 114 114 114
H-test 1.39a 33.39b 0.71c 4.31d 1.50e 8.91f
p-val. 0.925 0.000 0.982 0.506 0.913 0.112
Notes:∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is GDP growth. The lag structure is
ARDL(1,1,1,1) and the order of variables is: GDP growth, financial development bank index, financial de-
velopment market index, consumer price index, trade openness. a PMG is more efficient than MG under null
hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 1.39. b DFE is more efficient than PMG under null hypothesis and the
calculated statistic is 33.39. c PMG is more efficient than MG under null hypothesis and the calculated statistic
is 0.71. dPMG is more efficient than DFE under null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 4.31. e PMG
is more efficient than MG under null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 1.50. f DFE is more efficient
than PMG under null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 8.91. The test statistic is found negative and
the results of this test are obtained by the alternative covariance matrix (Hausman, 1985). All statistics are χ2
distributed.
Finally, the Hausman tests suggest that the regressors have homogeneous short and long
run effects on growth in the North-West and South regions, thus DFE model is more
efficient model than PMG and MG. For the transition panel, the regressors have homoge-
neous long run effects but heterogeneous short run effects on growth, thus PMG is more
efficient model than MG and DFE.
The findings provide valuable insights into the relationship between financial develop-
ment and economic growth across the three regions. Specifically, the results show that
there is short and long run equilibrium as indicated by the statistically significant and
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negative coefficients of the error correction term. Thus, the coefficients of one period
lag-residual in North-West countries is -0.740 meaning that system corrects its previous
disequilibrium at a speed of 74% annually to reach the steady state.
However, the speed of adjustment between the short run and the long run equilibrium
for North-West countries appears to be faster than the other group of countries, implying
that it may take longer time for the disequilibrium to be reduced for transition economies
and South countries. Nevertheless, the results undermine the notion that financial devel-
opment has a positive and significant long run effect on economic growth and the effect
of the financial crisis will be examined in the following section.
5.5.5.3 Ongoing crisis: All countries results
Next, the study examines the dynamic relationship between financial development and
economic growth for the full sample of countries including a dummy that has the value
1 for the 2008-2016, splitting the sample to periods before and after the crisis. This can
also be viewed as a hypothesis that the crisis is ongoing. Table 5.30 reports the results
of PMG, MG and DFE estimation along with the Hausman test. Across all models, the
Hausman tests fail to reject the short and long run homogeneity restrictions, thus empha-
sis will be based on the DFE model for interpreting the results.
Focusing on the results at normal pre-crisis periods (where the crisis dummy is not in-
cluded as interaction term), the short run coefficient of banks (-0.241) is significantly
negative, while in the long run becomes insignificant (0.081). The short and long run
coefficients of the stock market are insignificant (-0.011, 0.132 respectively). During the
ongoing crisis period, one year after the crisis the coefficient of banks is positive and in-
significant (0.138), which becomes significantly negative eight years after the crash with
a meaningful effect size (-2.078). Likewise, the coefficients of the stock market are found
insignificant in the short and long run (0.253, -0.048).
The conclusion drawn according to the main results, is that the financial development
did not contribute to economic activity in the short and long run before and after the
crisis. Also, the results reveal that from the insignificant effect at normal period to the
negative association at the ongoing crisis period becomes easily perceived that eight years
after the crisis the banking system evolves significantly in a worst way compared to the
pre-crisis period. The analysis, therefore confirms the initial findings in the main results,
and one of the principal effects that led to the financial crisis might be the credit expan-
sion and the over-lending at normal periods without tight lending conditions. However,
looking specifically at terms of bank loans before the crisis, less collateral were provided
as a proportion of loans.
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Table 5.30: Full sample period: All countries
variable Pooled Mean Group Mean Group Dynamic fixed effects
Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic
short-run pre-crisis period
ECT -0.570∗∗∗ (-7.76) -0.984∗∗∗ (-9.01) -0.663∗∗∗ (-15.53)
∆FDB -0.561∗∗ (-2.08) -0.208 (-0.31) -0.241∗ (-1.73)
∆FDM 0.382 (0.37) 2.812 (1.31) -0.011 (-0.09)
∆CPI -0.348∗∗∗ (-3.24) -0.720∗∗∗ (-2.84) -0.152∗∗∗ (-2.73)
∆OPEN 0.094∗∗∗ (2.82) 0.018 (0.47) 0.110∗∗∗ (5.62)
long-run pre-crisis period
FDB -0.228∗∗∗ (-3.20) -1.621 (-1.44) 0.081 (0.31)
FDM 0.507∗∗∗ (5.49) -4.602 (-0.90) 0.132 (0.63)
CPI -0.022 (-1.61) -0.041 (-0.87) -0.016 (-0.86)
OPEN 0.013 (1.31) 0.302∗∗∗ (2.97) 0.082∗∗∗ (4.64)
short-run ongoing-crisis period
∆Cr ∗ FDB 1.728∗∗ (2.27) 0.647 (0.53) 0.138 (0.62)
∆Cr ∗ FDM -6.045 (-1.06) -1.923 (-1.33) 0.253 (1.14)
∆Cr ∗ CPI -0.237∗∗∗ (-2.65) -0.230∗ (-1.83) -0.0008 (-0.05)
∆Cr ∗OPEN 0.204∗∗ (2.55) 0.229∗∗ (2.06) 0.020 (1.43)
long-run ongoing-crisis period
Cr ∗ FDB -1.397∗∗∗ (-7.28) -0.368 (-0.17) -2.078∗∗∗ (-5.10)
Cr ∗ FDM 0.625∗∗∗ (2.77) 0.964 (1.04) -0.048 (-0.12)
Cr ∗ CPI -0.010∗ (-1.66) 0.405∗ (1.78) -0.030∗∗∗ (-2.73)
Cr ∗OPEN 0.0007 (0.18) -0.407∗∗ (-1.99) -0.021∗∗ (-2.11)
constant 2.621∗∗∗ (9.23) -10.62 (-1.38) -1.268 (-1.26)
N 548 548 548
Hausman test 0.29a 4.79b
p-values 0.976 0.780
Notes:∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is GDP growth. The lag structure is
ARDL(1,1,1,1) and the order of variables is: GDP growth, financial development bank index, financial
development market index, consumer price index, trade openness. a PMG is more efficient than MG under
null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 0.29. b DFE is more efficient than PMG under null hypothesis
and the calculated statistic is 41.23. Both statistics are χ2 distributed.
5.5.5.4 Ongoing crisis: Regional results
Next, it is explored to what extent the above findings vary, by re-estimating the PMG,
MG and DFE models for the three regional panels. The results are reported in Table 5.31.
Models I to III present the results for the North-West panel. Models IV to VI present
the results for the Central-Eastern and Baltic region and models VII to IX report the
results for the South group of countries. Also, models (I), (IV),(VII) account the results
for the PMG estimator, models (II), (V),(VIII) account the results for the MG estimator,
and (III), (VI),(IX) account the results for the DFE. Again, across all subsamples, the
Hausman tests fail to reject the long and short run homogeneity restrictions at the con-
ventional levels of significance, thus supporting that the DFE is the efficient model and
gives consistent results. Hence, emphasis will be based on the DFE model for interpreting
the results.
First, it is examined the North-West group of countries. The results of DFE esti-
mator show that before the crisis the short and long run coefficients for the bank index
are insignificant. During the ongoing crisis and in the short run, banks affected positively
the economy, while in the long run the the effect is significantly negative. For the stock
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market index, the results show that before the crisis, markets positively affected the eco-
nomic growth in the long-run, while during the ongoing crisis period this is the case only
in the short-run.
Table 5.31: Ongoing crisis: Regional panels
Countries North-West Central-Eastern and Baltic South
PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE PMG MG DFE
Variables (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) (IX)
short-run pre-crisis period
ECT -0.792∗∗∗ -1.057∗∗∗ -0.892∗∗∗ -0.668∗∗∗ -0.890∗∗∗ -0.714∗∗∗ -0.790∗∗∗ -1.222∗∗∗ -0.482∗∗∗
(-5.57) (-7.17) (-12.62) (-4.29) (-3.14) (-9.39) (-5.11) (-13.80) (-5.33)
∆FDB -0.349 0.450 -0.0264 -0.181 -1.359 -0.236 -0.598∗∗ 0.213 -1.106∗∗∗
(-1.14) (1.36) (-0.15) (-0.37) (-0.85) (-1.03) (-2.49) (0.71) (-3.70)
∆FDM -0.175∗∗ -0.398 -0.0657 -0.913 0.613 -0.120 -0.163 -0.180 -0.0411
(-2.54) (-1.56) (-0.38) (-0.66) (0.21) (-0.44) (-1.52) (-0.51) (-0.21)
∆CPI -0.435∗∗ -0.538 -0.213 -0.0624 -1.272∗∗ -0.149∗ -0.419∗∗ -0.547 -0.584∗∗∗
(-2.21) (-1.34) (-1.47) (-0.60) (-2.14) (-1.78) (-1.99) (-0.87) (-3.38)
∆OPEN 0.126∗∗∗ 0.0981∗∗ 0.0901∗∗∗ -0.0103 -0.0863∗ 0.0426 0.135∗∗∗ 0.117 0.158∗∗∗
(3.97) (2.42) (2.88) (-0.18) (-1.88) (1.35) (2.88) (1.04) (3.10)
long-run pre-crisis period
FDB -0.303∗∗∗ -0.489 0.0730 -0.342∗∗∗ -7.540∗ 0.288 -0.0158 -0.891∗∗∗ 1.123
(-3.86) (-0.78) (0.31) (-4.11) (-1.73) (0.62) (-0.05) (-3.15) (1.46)
FDM 0.587∗∗∗ 0.820∗∗ 0.368∗∗ 0.734∗∗∗ 1.112 -0.102 0.211 0.181 0.0597
(5.63) (2.19) (2.01) (4.92) (0.17) (-0.23) (1.09) (0.40) (0.13)
CPI -0.0332∗ -0.0811 -0.0971∗∗∗ -0.0507∗∗∗ 0.151 0.0236 0.0474∗∗∗ -0.0564 -0.00584
(-1.79) (-1.06) (-2.76) (-3.71) (0.85) (0.92) (2.73) (-1.32) (-0.14)
OPEN 0.0170 0.209∗ 0.106∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.0719∗∗∗ 0.0307 0.187 -0.0883
(1.37) (1.84) (4.41) (10.27) (2.79) (2.66) (1.27) (1.47) (-1.22)
short-run ongoing-crisis period
∆Cr ∗ FDB -0.875 0.317 0.515∗ 0.120 3.924 -0.0849 0.493 -4.075∗∗ 1.144∗∗∗
(-0.49) (0.40) (1.83) (0.11) (1.55) (-0.14) (0.31) (-2.56) (2.61)
∆Cr ∗ FDM -1.330 -0.279 0.510∗∗ -9.524 -2.448 0.320 0.848 -3.054 -0.0335
(-0.98) (-1.04) (1.99) (-1.07) (-1.25) (0.68) (0.37) (-0.81) (-0.05)
∆Cr ∗ CPI -0.0581 -0.419∗ 0.0374∗ -0.491∗∗∗ -0.416∗∗∗ -0.0504 0.151 0.316 -0.0179
(-0.72) (-1.93) (1.69) (-4.57) (-3.24) (-1.37) (1.22) (1.06) (-0.59)
∆Cr ∗OPEN 0.0811 0.399∗∗ -0.0183 0.409∗∗∗ 0.412∗∗∗ 0.0793∗∗∗ -0.153 -0.362 0.0437
(0.99) (2.32) (-0.96) (5.22) (4.14) (2.85) (-1.21) (-0.81) (1.05)
long-run ongoing-crisis period
Cr ∗ FDB -1.527∗∗∗ -3.207 -2.528∗∗∗ -0.0978 2.808 -4.136∗∗∗ 0.252 0.886 -1.205
(-6.29) (-1.02) (-6.54) (-0.17) (1.42) (-4.52) (0.55) (0.75) (-1.13)
Cr ∗ FDM 0.858∗∗∗ 0.0364 -0.395 1.617∗ 0.303 0.412 1.395∗ 4.024 3.732∗
(3.38) (0.10) (-1.31) (1.66) (0.49) (0.42) (1.65) (1.07) (1.89)
Cr ∗ CPI 0.00111 0.394 -0.00263 0.0329∗∗∗ 0.985∗ -0.0330 -0.0837∗∗∗ 0.179 0.00334
(0.17) (0.87) (-0.24) (2.73) (1.80) (-1.20) (-4.39) (0.59) (0.10)
Cr ∗OPEN -0.00484 -0.324 -0.0219∗∗ -0.0755∗∗∗ -1.011∗ -0.0421∗ 0.0318 -0.299 -0.0714
(-1.10) (-0.81) (-2.36) (-8.32) (-1.92) (-1.84) (1.47) (-0.65) (-1.63)
constant 3.580∗∗∗ -3.673 1.793 -2.472∗∗∗ -24.42∗ -2.078 -1.197 -0.731 5.787∗∗
(8.98) (-0.31) (0.96) (-2.67) (-1.91) (-1.28) (-1.21) (-0.10) (2.34)
N 234 234 199 199 115 115
H-test 0.15a 10.98b 15.69c 37.56d 46.49e 3.50f
p-value 1.000 0.000 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.899
Notes: ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01. Dependent variable is GDP growth. The lag structure is ARDL(1,1,1,1) and the
order of variables is: GDP growth, financial development bank index, financial development market index, consumer price
index, trade openness. a PMG is more efficient than MG under null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 0.15. b DFE
is more efficient than PMG under null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 10.98. c MG is more efficient than PMG
under null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 15.69. d DFE is more efficient than MG under null hypothesis and the
calculated statistic is 37.56. e PMG is more efficient than MG under null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 46.49. f
DFE is more efficient than PMG under null hypothesis and the calculated statistic is 3.50. For d and f , the test statistic is
found negative and the results of this test are obtained by the alternative covariance matrix (Hausman, 1985). All statistics
are χ2 distributed.
Second, the transition economies are examined. The DFE estimator suggests insignificant
results for the bank sector before the crisis in the short and long-run. The insignificant
effect of banks on growth remains one year after the crisis, while eight years after the
crisis, the effect becomes significantly negative. Regarding the stock market index, the
results suggest insignificant coefficients all periods being considered.
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Turning now to the results of the South group of countries, before the crisis the short
run estimated coefficient for the bank index is significantly negative, while in the long
run is insignificant. One year after the crisis period, the effect of banks on growth is
significantly positive, while in the long run is insignificant. The stock market coefficients
are insignificant before the crisis, while after the crisis appears to be significantly positive
in the long run.
5.5.6 Summarized results
Table 5.32 summarizes the results for the dynamic panel effect of banks and stock markets
on economic growth. It is found for the full panel of countries that before the crisis, finan-
cial development did not contribute to the economic growth, and banks have a negative
effect on growth only in the short run. After the crisis, financial development did not
promote the economic activity, with the banking sector effect being significantly negative.
Table 5.32: Summary results of financial development and growth during crisis
Countries All North-West Transition South
Period short long short long short long short long
Tables Table 5.31(PMG) Table 5.32(PMG) Table 5.32(DFE) Table 5.32(PMG)
b
ef
o
re FDB -(*) + - + - + -(***) +
FDM - + - +(**) - - - +
Period short long short long short long short long
a
ft
er
FDB + -(***) +(*) -(***) - -(***) +(***) -
FDM + - +(**) - + + - +(*)
When the North-West panel is examined, the results suggest that stock markets promoted
heavily growth before the crisis. After the crisis, both sectors stimulated the economy
for one year (short-run), which is fully reversed in the long run with the banking sector
being the most disrupting. For the Central-Eastern and Baltic region, the results are in-
significant for both banks and markets before the crisis, while after 2008 banks negatively
affected the economy. For the South panel, banks and markets are insignificant before
the crisis in the long run, while markets contributed to growth after the crisis. Similarly
to the North-West region, banks stimulated the economy one year after the crisis.
5.5.7 Conclusions
The study employs heterogeneous dynamic panels to examine the link between financial
development and economic growth in view of the financial crisis. To estimate the long-run
relationships the panel error correction-based autoregressive distributed lag ARDL(p,q)
model is employed, which offers three different test: namely, mean group (MG), pooled
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mean group (PMG) and dynamic fixed effects (DFE) estimators. Also, two aggregate
financial development indices are used, thus capturing the overall size of financial devel-
opment for the bank and market sectors.
The overall findings suggest that before the crisis, banks negatively affected the econ-
omy, while only the markets of the North-West countries promoted economic growth.
After the crisis, there is an overwhelming evidence that banks hindered economic activity,
while for markets there is weak evidence of positive effect on economic growth only in
South countries. Interestingly, the results reveal that one year after the crisis (short-run)
banks contributed to economic growth.
However, comparing to the results of the previous study (Table 5.22), we observe that
banks negatively affected the economy eight years after the crisis, and the banking sector
evolves significantly in a worse way compared to the pre-crisis period. Another important
implication confirmed in this study, is that the North-West panel of countries is heavily
relied on the stock market sector implying that the financial system in these countries is
more market based. Also, one year after the crisis, banks stimulated the economy and
provide new insights into the banking system. Given that the failure of many banks was
imminent, governments launched a massive bailout package to support banks in distress
and prevent from a wide scale of financial collapse.
According to the results in the previous study, the assumption for the prime and ex-
act reasons for the inverse relationship between financial bank sector development and
growth is the over-lending and the credit expansion along with a lack of regulatory con-
trol and monitoring from the banks. However, the findings of the study have potential
importance for the financial regulation to bring efficiency in the short and long run. Any
project for stimulating economic growth and productivity via increased finance appears
to have less of an impact, possibly owing to deficiencies and weaknesses in frameworks.
The results of the Hausman tests for the regional panels show that the dynamic fixed
effects estimator is more efficient, implying that these groups are more homogeneous than
the full panel of countries, as the slope coefficients are homogeneous across all countries
in the long run and the short-run. Therefore, the overall results for the subsamples are
more conclusive and provide a new insight that the impact of financial development varies
across European economies due to the heterogeneous nature of the economic structure,
institutional quality and financial market.
The results are important for policymakers in terms of optimizing the structure of the
financial system. Also, appropriate measures, financial regulation and supervision re-
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main essential to reduce the systemic risk and promote the financial systems stability.
Moreover, the results reveal that the post-crisis economic growth recovery was so weak
and the financial system has not enhanced the economic activity. This might be due to
the subsequent European debt crisis, and the debt overhang makes the economy more
vulnerable to future shocks. However, the priority is to understand the causes and to
design an appropriate policy response. Nevertheless, the fundamental question might be
why financial development did not contributed to economic growth eight years after the
crisis, and further research should shed more light on the possible threshold effects of the
finance-growth relationship.
The central point of this study is the finance-growth relationship in the long and short
run. The findings contradict the common assumption that financial development plays
a significant role in fostering growth and are not in line with King and Levine (1993a),
Levine et al. (2000), Seetanah (2009), Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) and Loayza and
Rancière (2006) among others, who found positive effects of financial development on
growth. However, the results are in line with Arcand et al. (2015) and Narayan and
Narayan (2013), who found a negative long run effect of finance on growth.
More specifically, concerning the previous literature where the panel data methods are
employed, the findings refute the prior research of Pradhan et al. (2016) and Anwar and
Cooray (2012) who provided a significant contribution to the field. As the prime objective
of these studies was to examine only the long-run equilibrium and the causality effects
of financial development on economic growth, the current sub-study investigates not only
the long run, but also the short run for both periods, before and after the crisis the crisis
in 2008, by employing a more advanced econometric dynamic model. Furthermore, it
extends the literature providing empirical evidence because of the financial crisis using
the longest period, according to the availability of data, thus leading to more consistent
results. On the other dimension, the findings of the current sub-study have corroborated
the research of Narayan and Narayan (2013) and Samargandi et al. (2015), and extend the
empirical literature regarding to the behaviour of two sectors of the economy, banking and
equity, during both; the pre-and post-crisis periods, as well as for the short and long-term,
which has not been addressed before. The impact of the financial development bank and
market sectors in the short and long run may have important policy implications. If there
is clear evidence that more financial banking or stock market development promotes or
hinders economic activity, then policymakers should propose new regulations accordingly.
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Chapter Six
Conclusions
This chapter focuses on summarizing the main findings and the policy implications ob-
tained from the empirical analysis of each study in the previous chapter. The chapter is
organised as follows: The first section provides an overview of the main findings, including
policy implications. The second section discusses the drawbacks of the study and outlines
avenues for further research.
6.1 Main findings and policy implications
The fundamental research question analysed in this thesis concerned the impact of finan-
cial development on economic growth before and after the crisis. The thesis focused on
three issues:
(1) The relationship between financial development and economic growth during
the recent crisis.
(2) The impact of banks and stock markets on economic growth as well as the role
of the fiscal policy in the link between finance and growth.
(3) The short and long-run impact of financial development on economic growth
before and after the crisis.
6.1.1 Study 1
The first study provided new evidence concerning the finance-growth relationship for
the EU countries over the period 1990-2016. The primary objective was based on the
impact of financial development on economic growth before and after the crisis. It was
examined two different phases of crisis periods; the sub-prime crisis period (2008-2009),
and the ongoing crisis period (2008-2016). Panel fixed effects estimates were employed
using Driscoll Kraay (1998) standard errors estimates that are robust to disturbances
being heteroscedastic-autocorrelated and cross-sectional dependence.
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6.1.1.1 Main findings
The initial results demonstrate that before the crisis and at regular periods, financial de-
velopment positively affected the economy, while during the crisis periods finance did not
contribute to the economic activity. Also, considering a homogeneous panel such that of
EU, where common regulations are implemented, the empirical results from the regional
panels reveal that the finance-growth relationship is heterogeneous and varies across coun-
tries over time. Hence, the findings confirm the assumption of the panel heterogeneity
because of the differences in levels of financial development.
One of the most remarkable outcomes that contributes to our knowledge is that in years
2008 and 2009 the ratio of commercial bank assets (BTOT) was significantly positive with
a meaningful economic size. The relative importance of this finding is that the Deposit
Guarantee Scheme, which is an EU legislation that protects bank deposits in case of bank
failure, prevented the mass withdrawal of deposits. Hence, the capital adequacy kept the
stability of the financial system as well as the economy in permissible growth level that
did not lead to collapse.
Another noteworthy contribution is the relative importance of the results of the stock
market. The findings suggest that at stress times, a higher trading volume is not accom-
panied by higher liquidity in the stock market or vice-versa; and the higher activity and
liquidity are not accompanied by higher stock market capitalization. These results imply
a reduced ability or willingness of stock market participants to act as investors (because
of their doubt about the direction of the stock market), and thus hedging on specified
securities tends to increase as well as share prices fell. The fall in stock prices reflected
real economic problems and contributed to the economic slowdown.
6.1.1.2 Policy implications
Regarding the indicators of the bank sector, the primary implication is that policymak-
ers need to take into account the benefits of Deposit Guarantee Scheme and implement
financial policies to preserve the trust in the banking system from depositors seeking to
withdraw their savings simultaneously at times of financial stress. In this stage of eco-
nomic development across EU countries, the attention should be paid on new procedures
for creating a more transparent, unified, and safer market risk for banks. More specifi-
cally, the implementation of common rules and regulatory standards for supervision; the
treating of national and cross-border banking activities equally; and the early intervention
if banks face problems to help prevent them from collapsing, might be tools to create a
more reliable and efficient banking system. However, a further discussion for stronger and
more consistent protection of retail depositors on a European level should be taken into
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consideration.
Regarding the indicators of the stock markets, the findings for the regular periods show
that the higher activity and liquidity facilitated the financing of investments in the real
economy, while the financial crisis has shown that a sudden lack of liquidity can occur
during the time of stress. The primary implication is that the higher liquidity levels were
not sustainable for the long term, and the existing rules for the financial market failed as
shortcomings were exposed in the wake of the financial crisis. This may be a challenge for
further financial integration efforts in the EU, and a more robust regulatory framework
is needed even though the consequences are unintended.
6.1.2 Study 2
The second study used the same panel dataset as the first study and provided new evidence
of the finance-growth relationship, of which sector prevails in the positive or negative
effect on economic growth before and after the crisis. The primary objective was based
on the impact of banks and stock markets on economic growth before and after the
crisis. Considering that the financial crisis was converted to a debt crisis, the study
also examined the role of the fiscal policy in the link between finance and growth. The
principal component analysis was employed for the construction of two new aggregate
financial development indices thus capturing the overall size of financial development.
6.1.2.1 Main findings
The empirical results extended our knowledge and suggested that at regular times finan-
cial development promoted economic growth with the stock market sector prevailing in
this positive effect, while in crisis periods financial development hindered economic activ-
ity with the bank sector dominating in this adverse effect. Also, the study demonstrated
the relative importance of the two sectors of the financial system, which have different ef-
fects on economic growth following each relevant period, before and after the crisis. More
specifically, the negative effect of banks on growth and the weakness of stock markets to
restrain the economy from the recession exhibit high persistence eight years after the oc-
currence of the financial crisis and do not return to the situation as was at regular periods.
The findings for the effect of financial development on economic growth in conjunction
with the effect of fiscal policy suggest that at normal times financial development was
a driving force of growth and both sectors are heavily important, while in crisis peri-
ods financial development negatively affected the economy with banks dominating in this
negative effect. Additionally, a noteworthy contribution is that the significant negative
effect of debt on the economy continued in the subprime crisis period; and eight years
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after the crash was insignificant, thus confirming the assumption that the quantitative
ease effectively reduced the sovereign debt for Eurozone countries, but the monetary pol-
icy was ineffective on the real economy. Hence, banks and other institutions held more
government bonds to enhance the governments’ credibility not to default, and the ability
of intermediaries to invest in assets was limited. On the other hand, the negative effect
of taxes seems to have the most detrimental effect on growth eight years after the crash.
The results from the regional panels show that the impact of financial development varies
across the countries due to the heterogeneous nature of economic structures, financial
markets, and so on. Therefore, the regional results confirm the initial findings of the
previous study about the panel heterogeneity. Also, the results suggest that the financial
system of the North-West panel tends to be increasingly market-based as the economy
develops, while in transition economies, the banking sector seems to be more efficient than
the market sector which remains below the corresponding ones of the more developed EU
countries. In South countries, financial development seems to be inefficient.
However, the relative importance of the results from the first two studies that contribute
to our knowledge is that financial development failed to play a safeguarding role for eco-
nomic growth during the crisis periods in a homogeneous group of countries such that
of EU. Adding the role of fiscal policy, the results confirm the initial assumption that
the crisis is ongoing and the refinancing of the public debt led to a repression policy.
Finally, the degree of international trade openness in the economy of a country show that
the more the country is exposed to international trade the higher economic activity since
trade openness is the only positive driving force in economic growth during a time of
stress.
6.1.2.2 Policy implications
The primary implication of the results from the second study is that regulators need to
pay attention to the framework of the financial system and allow financial institutions to
hold a small amount of their own countries government bonds. Also, the undertaken aus-
terity measures by policymakers were ineffective and did not deliver the expectations of
investors and the time-inconsistency problem raised from the difference between ex-ante
and ex-post savings and capital tax rates. Thus, the findings have important implications
for the quality of fiscal policy, and regulators need to focus more on the optimal tax policy
as well as time-consistent policy. Policymakers must keep the tax rates constant overtime
or find the least distorting mix of taxes to finance public spending.
Another outcome of primary importance for policymakers is that countries with higher
levels of financial stock market development (North-West), suffered less from the recession
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and recovered more quickly compared with countries that have higher levels of financial
bank sector development (Central-Eastern and Baltic). Therefore, it can be inferred that
policymakers in transition economies should focus on the adoption of Euro along with the
new regulations, which can enforce the financial system, while South countries should fo-
cus on the implementation of policies to make their financial system more efficient. Hence,
appropriate policies should be undertaken from policymakers, taking into consideration
the benefits that can be attributed to the development of the stock markets, since the
allocation of resources for productive opportunities contribute to economic development.
6.1.3 Study 3
The third study used the indices of banks and markets from the previous study and pro-
vided new evidence of the dynamic impact of financial development on economic growth
employing a panel heterogeneous data analysis of the EU economies. The primary objec-
tive was based on the short and long-run effect of banks and stock markets on economic
growth for the full sample period as well as before and after the crisis. To estimate the
short and long-run relationships the panel ARDL(p,q) model was employed, which offers
three different tests: namely, mean group (MG), pooled mean group (PMG) and dynamic
fixed effects (DFE) estimators.
6.1.3.1 Main findings
The findings suggest that for the full sample period financial bank sector development
negatively affected economic growth in the short and long run, while the financial stock
market development was the driving force of the economy only in the long-run. When
the full panel is examined before the crisis period, both banks and stock markets had
no impact on economic growth. After 2008, there is overwhelming evidence that finan-
cial development negatively affected the economy, with the bank sector being the most
disrupting. Also, the findings reveal that eight years after the crisis, the banking sector
evolves significantly in a worse way compared to the pre-crisis period.
The regional results provided clear evidence that the financial system in the North-West
panel is more market based, and confirms the findings of the previous studies. For tran-
sition economies and South region, it is not confirmed that were bank-based, implying
that the financial system in these countries was inefficient. Also, one year after the crisis,
the banks of the North-West and South countries stimulated the economy and provide
new insights into the banking system at stress times. More specifically, given that the
failure of many banks was imminent, governments launched a massive bailout package to
support banks in distress and prevent from a wide scale of financial collapse.
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The central point of this study was the finance-growth relationship in the long and short
run. The findings contradict the common assumption that financial development plays
a significant role in fostering growth and are not in line with King and Levine (1993a),
Levine et al. (2000), Seetanah (2009), Christopoulos and Tsionas (2004) and Loayza and
Rancière (2006) among others, who found positive effects of financial development on
growth. However, the results are in line with Arcand et al. (2015) and Narayan and
Narayan (2013), who found a negative long-run effect of finance on growth.
6.1.3.2 Policy implications
The primary implication for the inverse relationship between financial bank sector de-
velopment and growth is the over-lending and the credit expansion, along with a lack of
regulatory control and monitoring from the banks. However, the results have potential
importance for the financial regulation to bring efficiency in the short and long run. Any
project for stimulating economic growth and productivity via increased finance appears
to have less of an impact, possibly owing to deficiencies and weaknesses in frameworks.
The results are of potential importance to policymakers in terms of optimizing the struc-
ture of the financial system. Also, appropriate measures, financial regulation, and super-
vision remain essential to reduce systemic risk and promote the financial systems stability.
Moreover, the results reveal that the post-crisis economic growth recovery was so weak,
and the financial system has not enhanced economic activity. This might be due to the
subsequent European debt crisis, and the low-interest rates have made higher debts, and
the debt overhang makes the economy more vulnerable to future shocks. Hence, the fun-
damental question might be why economic growth has become so debt-dependent, and
policymakers should take into account possible threshold effects of government debt on
economic growth.
6.2 Limitations of the study and recommendations
for further research
This study employed the aggregate level of data for empirical analyses. However, disag-
gregated data for the bank and market-level could also be highly beneficial in achieving an
understanding of the nature of the relationship established between finance and growth .
One of the significant issues frequently emphasised in the finance-growth literature con-
cerns the measures related to the financial development. The study employed several
measures related the size (or financial depth) and efficiency of financial institutions and
stock markets. However, future research should aim to re-examine the same issues, utilis-
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ing measures related to the stability and the degree of access to financial institutions and
markets, reflecting the diverse aspects of a financial system.
Another limitation of this study is the unavailability of up-to-date data as well as more
frequenting data. More specifically, recently, the availability of data for the employed
dataset in this study was until 2016. Besides, given that the availability of data is on an
annual basis, the research concern a limited number of observations and the inclusion of
control variables results in the consumption of degrees of freedom. On the other hand,
the exclusion of the control variables could lead to issues related to the omitted variables
and thus bias the empirical results. Hence, the increased future availability of data may
expand the empirical analysis by enabling the inclusion of an increased number of con-
trol variables. Further research could also re-investigate the finance-growth relationship
because of crisis in conjunction with the increased availability of data in the future.
A further limitation of this study relates to the extent of the empirical analysis. A more
in-depth analysis of the financial system has the potential to provide an understanding
of the factors behind the weakness to contribute to economic growth and understand the
heterogeneity. In particular, future research should find possible threshold effects of the
finance-growth relationship employing measures from both financial sectors the banking
and the stock market. Finally, considering the ineffective monetary policy, further inves-
tigation needs to be undertaken to find the best strategy for the refinancing the public
debt during the abnormal periods.
The final limitation of the current study is the issue of European stock market integra-
tion, which is of considerable importance to both investors and the economy as a whole.
Since the late 1990s, to achieve a higher degree of integration in EU, a series of exchange
mergers have led to the evolution of two pan-European stock exchanges, the Euronext and
the Office Max-OMX-(each of which later successively merged with US stock exchanges).
Future research might be interesting to consider a further investigation of the performance
of those exchange groupings in response to the conventional and unconventional measures
of monetary policy as well as the evolution of foreign (presumably institutional) investors
participation in European markets.
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